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you could use a dirk to trim vine branches and a knife
and many other instruments.” “Certainly.”
“But nothing so well, I take it, as a pruning-knife fashioned for
this purpose.” “That is true.” “Must
we not then assume this to be the work or function of that?”
“We must.”
“You
will now, then, I fancy, better apprehend the meaning of my question when I
asked whether that is not the work of a thing which it only or it better
than anything else can perform.” “Well,” he
said, “I do understand, and agree
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that the work of anything is that.”
“Very good,” said I. “Do you not also think
that there is a specific virtue or excellence of everything for which a
specific work or function is appointed? Let us return to the same examples.
The eyes we say have a function?” “They have.”
“Is there also a virtue of the eyes?” “There
is.” “And was there not a function of the
ears?” “Yes.” “And so also a
virtue?” “Also a virtue.” “And what
of all other things? Is the case not the same?” “The
same.” “Take note now. Could the eyes possibly fulfil
their function well
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if they lacked their
own proper excellence and had in its stead the defect?”
“How could they?” he said; “for I presume you
meant blindness instead of vision.”
“Whatever,” said I, “the excellence may be.
For I have not yet come
1 to that question, but am only asking whether whatever
operates will not do its own work well by its own virtue and badly by its
own defect.” “That much,” he said,
“you may affirm to be true.” “Then the ears,
too, if deprived of their own virtue will do their work ill?”
“Assuredly.” “And do we then apply
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the same principle to all things?”
“I think so.” “Then next consider this. The
soul, has it a work which you couldn't accomplish with anything else in the
world, as for example, management, rule, deliberation, and the like, is
there anything else than soul to which you could rightly assign these and
say that they were its peculiar work?” “Nothing
else.” “And again life? Shall we say that too is the
function of the soul?” “Most certainly,” he
said. “And do we not also say that there is an excellence virtue
of the soul?”
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“We
do.” “Will the soul ever accomplish its own work well if
deprived of its own virtue, or is this impossible?” “It
is impossible.” “Of necessity, then, a bad soul will
govern and manage things badly while the good soul will in all these things
do well.
2” “Of necessity.”
“And did we not agree that the excellence or virtue of soul is
justice and its defect injustice?” “Yes, we
did.” “The just soul and the just man then will live
well and the unjust ill?” “So it appears,” he
said, “by your reasoning.”