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[*] 2818. Second Form (usually but indeed, but in fact, but the truth is, but be that as it may). Here there is a single predicate. Thus, ““καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτι_μάζων λέγω . . . ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων . . . οὐδὲν μέτεστι” and I do not speak in disparagement; but the truth is I have nothing to do with these matters” P. A. 19c, ἀλλὰ γιγνώσκω γὰρ . . . ὅτι κτλ. but indeed I know that, etc. X. C. 2.1.13, ““ἀλλ᾽ εἰσορῶ γὰρ τόνδε . . . Πυλάδην δρόμῳ στείχοντα” but indeed I see Pylades yonder coming at full speed” E. Or. 725, ““ἀλλ᾽ ου᾽ γὰρ ἔστι τἀ_μφανῆ κρύπτειν” but indeed it is impossible to hide what lies open” S. O. C. 755. a. In this use γάρ may have preserved, or regained, its primitive adverbial (confirmatory) force. Many scholars, however, claim that there was a conscious or unconscious ellipse, after ἀλλά, of an idea pertinent to the situation; and thus regard this form as logically equivalent to the form in which γάρ is a causal conjunction. In actual use ἀλλὰ γάρ was clearly a formula used without any consciousness of an omitted idea.
American Book Company, 1920.
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