E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

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ἡ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξίς τις] ἀπόδειξις, in its strict, proper, and highest senses, is exact scientific demonstrative proof, by syllogism, leading from and to universal and necessary conclusions. And therefore, properly speaking, παραπλήσιον φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν, Eth. Nic. I 1. ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμὸς ἐπιστημονικός, Anal. Post. I 2, 71 b 18. ἐξ ἀναγκαίων ἄρα συλλογισμός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, c. 4, 73 a 24. ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμὸς δεικτικὸς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διά τι, Ib. c 24, 85 b 23. ἀπόδειξις ἐστίν, ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων ὁ συλλογισμὸς ᾖ, ἢ ἐκ τοιούτων ἃ διά τινων πρώτων καὶ ἀληθῶν τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ γνώσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφεν, Topic. A 1, 100 a 27. Waitz, Comm. ad Anal. Post. Vol. II p. 293 seq. πίστις therefore, whose premisses and conclusions are never more than ‘probable’, cannot properly be said to be ‘a kind of demonstration’. It resembles it however, and may be regarded as a ‘sort of demonstration’ in this; that probable proof often produces a belief or conviction as strong and certain as that which follows from demonstration. It is therefore to be understood here, as often elsewhere, as a general term including proof of every kind. A similar misapplication of ἀπόδειξις to rhetorical proof is found in Rhet. II 1, 2, and II 20, 9. So συλλογίζεσθαι, of reasoning, inference, conclusion in general; Rhet. I 6 § 17, 10 § 1, 11 § 23 and II 22 § 4, where συλλογισμοί stands for ‘Enthymemes’; Poet. 4, 5, συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον. Phys. II 1, 193 a 7, συλλογίσαιτο γὰρ ἄν τις ἐκ γενετῆς ὢν τυφλὸς περὶ χρωμάτων. Similarly, ἀποδεικτικός of a rhetorical argument or speech, Rhet. II 1, 2, πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὁρᾷν, ὅπως ἀποδεικτικός (conclusive) ἦ καὶ πιστός. A still more remarkable example of this looseness of expression occurs I 4, 5, where Dialectics is called ἡ ἀναλυτικὴ ἐπιστήμη˙ The rhetorical enthymeme, again ‘a kind of ἀπόδειξις’, is subsequently and this time correctly, called κυριώτατο:ν τῶν πίστεων. See Introd. p. 92.

τὸ δ᾽ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός˙ τις]. On the enthvmeme, Introd. p. 101— 105. On περὶ δὲ συλλογισμοῦ ἰδεῖν, and on μέρους τινός, Introd. p. 143, note.

δῆλον δέ] δέ, omitted by one MS, and rejected by Buhle, Schrader, Bekker, and Spengel, is retained and defended by Victorius and Vater. It is justified not only by the common usage of the Greek language (see Buttm. Exc. XII on Dem. c. Mid. de particula δέ in apodosi, p. 150; the passages which he thus quotes might be multiplied indefinitely), but also by the special usage of Aristotle himself. Waitz, on Organ. 17 b 1, Vol. I p. 335, comp. Zell ad Eth. Nic. I 1 § 4, Vol. II p. 5, who quotes examples from Aristotle, to which add Rhet. I 4 § 2, I 10 § 4, I 11 §§ 6 and 11, II 25 § 10, an exact parallel, the protasis here also commencing with ἐπεί. Similarly Pol. VII (IV) 13 init. ἐπεὶ δὲ δὐ ἐστιν (a long parenthesis of several clauses intervenes, and the apodosis begins with) δεῖ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις κ.τ.λ. de Anima I 3, 406 a 4 and 10. Phys. VI 8, 2, εἰ τὸ μέν... ἵστασθαι δέ. See also Stallb. on Phædo 78 C. The particle is thus used in the apodosis generally, not always, as a repetition of a preceding δέ, and in these cases may be translated by “I say”. It repeats in order to recal the attention to the connexion of the apodosis with the foregoing protasis, which might be overlooked after a long parenthesis: in cases where this would not be necessary, it may be accounted for by the influence of habit or association. Of the many illustrative passages I had collected from other writers as well as Aristotle, I will content myself with citing two or three apposite ones from Thucydides. I 11, sub init., ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφικόμενοι μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν, (parenthesis) φαίνονται δέ κ.τ.λ. I 18 init., ἐπειδὴ δέ (ten lines) μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν κ.τ.λ. II 65, ἐπεί τε ὁ πόλεμος κατέστη, ὁ δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐν τούτῳ προγνοὺς τὴν δύναμιν. IV 132, ὁ δὲ Περδίκκας κ.τ.λ. and VIII 29 (three of these are referred to by Arnold, note 2 on I 11). Paley on Aesch. P. V. 952, 994, 2nd ed. gives some instances from Aeschylus. I may also add Plat. Phaedo 78 C, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ᾽ ἄλλως καὶ μήδεποτε κατὰ ταὐτά, ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι τὰ ξύνθετα. A good example may be found in Phaedo 87 A, B, δοὺς δέ—εἰ δὲ τοῦτο...

τοὺς λογικοὺς συλλογισμούς] Waitz on Anal. Post. I 21, 82 b 35, p. 353, ‘opponitur τῷ λογικῶς τὸ ἀναλυτικῶς 84 a 8, 86 a 22, 88 a 19, accurata demonstratio, quae veris ipsius rei principiis nititur, ei quae probabili quadam ratione contenta est....Unde fit ut λογικόν idem fere sit quod διαλεκτικόν.’ And this is its usual signification...‘Quamquam’ (he adds, referring to the present passage) ‘1355 a 13, quum λογικὸς συλλογισμός et hic et in iis quæ proxime sequuntur opponatur rhetorico syllogismo (ἐνθυμήματι), veram demonstrationem significare videatur.’ To the same effect is what follows, where τὸ ἀληθές exact truth and knowledge, scientific certainty, is represented as the object of the λογικοὶ συλλογισμοί, and τὸ ο<*>´μοιον τῷ ἀληθεῖ (probability, τὰ ἔνδοξα, which has only a resemblance to truth), as the object of the enthymeme. And as both are apprehended by the same faculty, this faculty will be cultivated by the study and exercise of both alike, and the processes that lead to them, syllogism and enthymeme: and therefore the knowledge of the materials and modes of constructing syllogisms, and the practical application of them, equally in all their varieties, demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical (enthymeme), are serviceable to the rhetorician as a training and preparation for the practice of his art.

πρὸς τὰ ἔνδοξα] ‘things probable, matters of opinion, not certainty’; the materials, objects, and results of Rhetoric, as of Dialectics. Top. A 10, 104 a 8, ἔστι δὲ πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ ἐρώτησις ἔνδοξος, κ.τ.λ. Ib. c. 1, 100 b 21, ἔνδοξα δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις. Cic. de Orat. I 23, 108, sunt enim varia et ad vulgarem popularemque sensum accommodata omnia genera huius forensis nostrae dictionis.

διότι] ‘that’,=ὅτι. The earliest instance of this use of διότι appears to be in Herod. II 50. It occurs in Xenophon (add Symp. I 11, to the examples in Sturz's Lexicon), Plato, Ep. I 309 D, Dem. de Cor. §§ 155, 167, 184, but each time in a document. Isocr. Paneg. § 48, Phil. § 1, Archid. § 24, Plat. § 23, Antid. §§ 133, 263. π. τοῦ ζεύγους § 43, πρὸς Καλλίμαχον §§ 1, 31. (Some of these referring to Isocrates are derived from Benseler's note, Praef. p. v note 4, who has the following remark, from Baiter on Paneg. § 48, ‘Isocrates ubicunque διότι usurpavit, id fecisse videtur hiatus evitandi causa’ [see esp. Isocr. Lochit. § 7, where ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι is followed by καὶ διότι...S.]. It is found several times in the Rhet. ad Alex. as c. 17 p. 1432 a 16, c. 30 p. 1437 a 19, and elsewhere, but it is in Aristotle that it first becomes common; too common to need further illustration. See however Waitz on Anal. Pr. 58 b 7, Comm. I p. 495. For διότι = ὅτι, Steph. Thes. Vol. II 1544 cites Crito Com. ap. Athen. 4, p. 173 C, πάντων ἀκούων διότι παρασίτῳ τόπος οὗτος τρία μόνον ἀγαθὰ κεκτῆσθαι δοκεῖ. Its ordinary sense is ‘because’.

It has also a third signification, ‘why.’; the indirect interrogative, corresponding to the direct, διὰ τί, as ὅπως to πῶς, ὅποτε to πότε, ὅσος to πόσος, ὅπου to ποῦ, &c. In this sense it occurs in Plato, Phaedo 100 C, (four other examples in Ast's Lex.), Xen. Cyrop. VIII 4, 7, ἦ καὶ ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν διότι; Demosth. Phil. A 46, 10; Isocr. Archid. § 16, and in Aristotle, Rhet. II 23, 24, (where it is explained by the preceding τὴν αἰτίαν), Polit. IV (VI) 11, 1296 a 22. Met. A I, 981 a 29, where again it is explained by τὴν αἰτίαν). περὶ ἀναπνεύσεως 14, ult. and elsewhere, e.g. Ar. de Anima II 8, 12, 421 a 4, φανερὸν δὲ καὶ διότι οἱ ἰχθὺς ἄφωνοι, οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσι φάρυγγα. In Rhet. III 11, 14, it is explained by τὸ αἴτιον. Cf. Amphis Dith. Fragm. 1 ap. Meineke, Comm. Fragm. III 306; B. διὰ τί δ̓ οὐκ ἄγεις εἰς τὸν ὄχλον αὐτό; Α. διότι φυλὴν περιμένω.

With διότι ‘that’, compare οὕνεκα and ὁθούνεκα in Sophocles, as Philoct. 634, the reason, the what for, passes into a mere statement of fact; because, into that. See Ellendt, Lex. Soph. ὁθούνεκα.

ἀπονεύειν, to bend the head away from something else and turn the attention to a particular object; hence, to incline to, fix the attention upon: ἀπό as in ἀποβλέπειν, (supr. § 1). Plat. Theaet. 165 A, ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. In Plat. Legg. VII 815 A, ἔκνευσις πληγῶν καὶ βολῶν, is declinatio, the bending of the head aside to avoid a blow. (In Eur. Iph. T. 1186 v. 1155 Herm. σὺ δ᾽ ἐς τὸ τῆς θεοῦ γ̓ ἐξένευσας εἰκότως, ἐξένευσας is of doubtful interpretation. Hermann, followed by Paley, derives it from ἐκνεῖν evadere, referring to Valckenaer on Hippol. 469, and 822. It seems however at least equally probable that the aorist belongs to ἐκνεύειν abnuere, opposed to ἐπινεύειν annuere, and that the meaning of the line is “It was natural, or reasonable, for thee to decline, reject, their offer, εἰς τὸ τῆς θεοῦ γ̓, looking to, in respect of, in regard of, thy duty to the goddess”. This sense of the word seems to be more in conformity with what precedes; and it occurs again in line 1330 Dind., with the same sense and derivation, ἐξένευσ᾽ ἀποστῆναι, beckoned us off, “gave us a sign to stand aloof”.)