‘And those who don't bear malice’ (this is one of the characteristics of the μεγαλόψυχος, Eth. Nic. IV 9, 1125 a 2, οὐδὲ μνησίκακος: οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν), ‘and are not retentive’ (if φυλάττειν be ‘to guard, keep in possession’, as Xen. Mem. III 4. 9, ad servandum idoneus, Sturz, Lex.: or ‘observant’, ‘on the watch for’, if ‘to be on the look out for’; so Xen. Mem. III 1. 6, φυλακτικὸν καὶ κλέπτην: opposed to ἀφύλακτος, and ἀφυλαξία, Hier. VI 4) ‘of complaints and accusations, but easily reconciled’. Instead of keeping in mind the complaints and accusations to which our errors and faults, though perhaps trifling, will give rise, and so prolonging the estrangement and the quarrel between the two friends, these are ready at any moment for a reconciliation. And this is, ‘because they think themselves equally liable (to these faults and errors, and equally requiring forgive ness) with the others’, lit. because such as they suppose themselves to be to the rest of mankind, (i. e. such as is their liability to give unintentional offence to others,) such they think others are to them: that others are no more liable to them than themselves.
Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Edward Meredith Cope. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1877.
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