E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

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τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρὸν] ‘the present (instant) time’. ἐνιστάναι, ‘to place in’ a position: ἐνίστασθαι, ἐνστῆναι, ἐνεστηκέναι, ἐνεστάναι, ‘to be placed, set in, stand in’, a position. Hence (2) (I think) of things ‘standing in the way’, and so either (a) close by, ‘present’, ‘instant’, ‘instans’ (tempus, bellum, &c.), ‘impending’, ‘threatening’; (for instans, ‘present’, Quint. V 10. 42, praeteritum, instans, futurum). In grammar, ἐνεστὼς χρόνος, ‘the present tense’, ἐνεστῶσα μετοχή, ‘the present participle’, instans tempus (Facc. Lex. s. v.); or (β) ‘to stand in the way’ as an obstacle, impediment, or ‘objection’; as the logical ἐνστῆναι and ἔνστασις, of an objection, or contrary instance, to a supposed conclusion; and hence also ‘instance’, something which stands in your way and so possibly attracts your attention, or as a generalisation of the logical ‘instance’ or objection. See Introd. p. 269, and note.

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων] ‘The rest are easily discerned’—‘the rest’ are what follows, the causes namely and consequences of virtue—‘anything that is productive of, because it tends to or promotes (πρός), virtue, or that is the effect or result of it (τὰ ἀπ᾽ ἀρετῆς γινόμενα), is estimable and an object of praise (καλόν). Such things are (the first) the ‘signs’, (the second) the works of virtue (and therefore praiseworthy)’. The σημεῖον (Introd. p. 161—163) is the probable—or, in the case of the τεκμήριον, certain—indication of the existence of the thing which it accompanies; from the ‘signs’ of virtue in a man we infer, with more or less probability, its actual existence. Schrader quotes the little tract περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν, printed as an appendix to the three Ethical treatises in Bekker's 4to ed. Vol. II p. 1249. It is an abridgment or epitome of Aristotle's account of the virtues in the third and fourth books of the Ethics, with a slight admixture of Platonism and other occasional alterations. ἐπαινετὰ μέν ἐστι τὰ καλά, ψεκτὰ δὲ τὰ αἰσχρά. καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡγοῦνται αἱ ἀρεταί, τῶν δ᾽ αἰσχρῶν αἱ κακίαι. ἐπαινετὰ δ̓ ἐστι καὶ τὰ αἴτια τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα ταῖς ἀρεταῖς (these are the τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς and ‘signs’), καὶ τὰ γινόμενα ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, ψεκτὰ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, 1249 a 26.

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων...ἰδεῖν] for the more usual τὰ ἄλλα ἰδεῖν. This substitution of a preposition with its case for the direct government of the verb, has been noticed by Heindorf in the case of εἰς, on Plat. Lys. § 16, and in that of περί and ἀμφί, on Phaedo § 65, p. 250 C (in which place περὶ κάλλους takes the place of the nominative); likewise of περί and ὑπέρ by Bremi on Dem. Olynth. I p. 14. 18 (ap. Schäfer Appar. Crit. ad Demosth. I 208); and a similar use of the Latin, &c. by Heusing, ad Cic. de Off. I 15. 3. Comp. Epist. ad Div. II 17. 1; III 12. 2 (Schäfer). But what has not been observed of this usage is, that it is almost exclusively characteristic of a middle or later period of the Greek language, viz. the fourth century B.C.

The earliest instances I have noted of it are Soph. Oed. Col. 422, ἐν δέ μοι τέλος αὐτοῖν γένοιτο τῆσδε τῆς μάχης πέρι, and Aj. 684, ἀμφὶ τούτοισιν εὖ σχήσει. In Plato it is not uncommon, Phaedo 231 D, βούλεσθαι περί τινος, Rep. IV 427 A, εἶδος νόμων πέρι καὶ πολιτείας (a good example), Ib. 436 B, καθ᾽ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν πράττομεν, Phaedo 249 C (this use of καθ᾽ ἕκαστον for the simple accusative is found in various writers; see Stallbaum on Rep. ll. cc.), Ib. VII 533 B, περὶ παντὸς λαμβάνειν, Theaet. 177 B, Gorg. 487 A. But in Demosthenes and Aristotle it becomes quite a usual mode of expression. In the de Fals. Leg. alone it occurs in §§ 6, 7, 64, 167, 239, and probably elsewhere in the same speech.

From Aristotle, with whom it is still more familiar, I will content myself with referring to Rhet. I 15. 1, περὶ τῶν ἀτέχνων...ἐπιδραμεῖν, Ib. § 27, περὶ ὅρκων...διελεῖν. II 4. 30; 5. 21, τοιούτους περὶ ὧν (i.e. οὓς) φοβοῦνται, a good example. 18. 4, περὶ μεγέθους (i.e. μέγεθος) κοινόν (ἐστι), Ib. 21, init., in both of which it stands for the nominative, as it does also in Pol. VI (IV) 2, 1289 a 11, and III 3, init. Pol. I 1 ult. I 9, 1257 a 5, II 1 init., Ib. c. 4, 1262 b 25, περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν—πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχήν. Eth. N. IV 4 init., περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας διελθεῖν, X 1 sub init., 1172 a 26, ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων —παρετέον εἶναι, where it stands for the accusative. de Insomniis c. 2, 459 a 29, ἐπὶ τῶν φερομένων—κινεῖται, would be more regularly τὰ φερόμενα.