ἔστω] marking the popular nature of the definition, which may be assumed for the occasion, though perhaps not strictly exact and scientific, has been already noticed several times, and will occur again in the definitions of the next two chapters. ‘Let it be assumed then that shame is a kind of pain or disturbance (of one's equanimity, or the even balance of the mind, which is upset for the nonce by the emotion) belonging to’ (περί, arising or manifested in) ‘that class of evils which seem to tend to discredit’ (loss of reputation— φόβος τῆς ἀδοξίας, the popular definition, in Eth. N. IV 15, init.)—‘present past or future’ (this marks the confusion or identification of αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη, see above), ‘and shamelessness a kind of slight regard of, con temptuous indifference to’ (on ὀλιγωρία, note on II 2. 1, comp. II 2. 3), ‘and an insensibility to these same things’. On the connexion of ἀναισχυντία and ὀλιγωρία, comp. Demosth. de F. L. § 228, τίνα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει φήσαιτ᾽ ἄν βδελυρώτατον εἶναι καὶ πλείστης ἀναιδείας καὶ ὀλιγωρίας μεστόν (see Shilleto's note); adv. Conon. 1268 and 9, §§ 38, 39, ὃ τοίνυν πάντων ἀναιδέστατον...τὴν δὲ τούτου πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτ᾽ ὀλιγωρίαν κ.τ.λ.
Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Edward Meredith Cope. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1877.
The National Endowment for the Humanities provided support for entering this text.
This text was converted to electronic form by professional data entry and has been proofread to a medium level of accuracy.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.