E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

βουλεύονται δὲ...τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος] Eth. Nic. III 5, 1112 b 12, βουλευόμεθα δὲ οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. (This is because the means are within our own power to attain, the ends are not. βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν πρακτῶν, 1112 a 31, ὅσα γίνεται δἰ ἡμῶν...περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα, Ib. line 12, and this is afterwards repeated.) Οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλεύεται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους: ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τέλος τι, πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι, κ.τ.λ. Ib. b 34, οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

στοιχεῖα] i.e. τόπους, the ‘Elements’, the primary topics of the subject ‘good’. See Introd. p. 127, 8.

ἁπλῶς] See note on p. 30, c. 2 § 4. The sense in which ἁπλῶς is here intended is evidently that of good in general, as a general or abstract conception, opposed to καθ᾽ ἕκαστον special and particular goods. Schrader's rendering extra comparationem, if it means, as it seems to do, ‘absolute good’, ‘good in itself’, opposed to ‘relative’ or ‘human good’— that which cannot be compared with, i. e. has no relation to, any other kind of good, but exists in itself independently—is certainly wrong. ‘Absolute good’ can have no place in a rhetorical system or in the practice of the rhetorician; such a definition would be in direct violation of the principle so often laid down by Aristotle, that the rhetorical method must be in conformity with the materials of the art, of a popular and practical character, adapted to the understanding of an unlearned and unscientific audience. This is especially the case with definitions. See Introd. p. 12, 13. The general notion of good is first considered in §§ 1—3, and then this is applied and illustrated in particulars in the remainder of the chapter.