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‘The demonstrative enthymeme (which proves directly) is, to draw an inference’ (to ‘gather,’ colligere; corresponding to the conclusion, συμπέρασμα, of the regular syllogism) ‘from universally admitted premisses (those general probabilities which everyone is ready to admit); the refutative is to draw inferences or conclusions not agreeing (with the opinions or inferences of the adversary)’. The ἔλεγχος is ἀντιφάσεως συλλογισμός, the negative of, or conclusion contradictory to, the conclusion of the opponent: refutation always assumes an opponent, real or imaginary, whose arguments, or opinions, or theories are to be refuted by proving the negative. This interpretation is in conformity with the received signification of ἀνομολογούμενος ‘disagreeing with, contradictory’. This negative sense is rare: Plat. Gorg. 495 A, Ar. Anal. Pr. I 34, 48 a 21 [τοῦτο δὲ ἀνομολογούμενον τοῖς προειρημένοις], Rhet. II 23. 23, bis, are the only instances cited; comp. Buttm. Auctar. ad Heind. Gorg. § 108, p. 490. So Victorius, “quae adversentur iis quae ab adversario ostensa prius et conclusa fuerint;” and Augustinus Niphus (quoted by Schrader) “quod ex datis concessisve adversario repugnantia atque improbabilia colligit. Repugnantia autem et improbabilia dico quae sunt contra adversariorum opinionem.”
Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Edward Meredith Cope. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1877.
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