‘And in general, people are not ashamed in the presence of those for whose opinion, in respect of perceiving the truth and forming a sound judgment on it, they have a very great contempt—for no one feels shame in the presence of children or brutes—nor of the same things’ (ταὐτά cogn. accus. after αἰσχύνονται understood) ‘in the presence of persons well known to them and of strangers; but in the presence of intimates they are ashamed of things which are considered (δοκοῦντα) really and essentially, in that of the remote (from them in connexion), of what is only conventionally, disgraceful’. On this distinction of πρὸς ἀλήθειαν and πρὸς δόξεν=πρὸς τὸν νόμον, see note on II 4. 23: and on ἄπωθεν (the termination) note on I 11. 16.
Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Edward Meredith Cope. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1877.
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