E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

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Top. XII. ἐκ τῶν μερῶν] the argument from the parts to the whole. This topic, so briefly dispatched here, is much more clearly and fully set forth in the Topics, B 4, 111 a 33 seq. [Grote's Ar. I p. 417], to which we are referred; the same example being given in both. The parts and whole, are the species and genus. Anything of which the genus or whole can be predicated must likewise fall under one of its species, because the species taken together make up the genus; if knowledge for instance be predicable of something, then some one of its parts or branches—grammar, music or some other species of knowledge—must needs be predicable of the same; otherwise it is no part of knowledge. And the same applies to the declensions—παρωνύμως λεγόμενα, the same root or notion with altered terminations—of the words representing the genus; what is true of ἐπιστήμη &c. is equally true of ἐπιστήμων, γραμματικός, μουσικός. If then all the parts of the genus are or can be known (this is assumed in the text), we have to consider when any thesis is proposed, such as, the soul is in motion (τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖσθαι, meaning, that the soul is motion), what the kinds of motion are, and whether the soul is capable of being moved in any of them; if not, we infer, ‘from part to whole’, that the genus motion is not predicable of soul, or that the soul is devoid of motion.

κίνησις is usually divided by Aristotle into four kinds, (1) φορά, motion of translation, motion proper; (2) ἀλλοίωσις, alteration; (3) αὔξησις, growth; and (4) φθίσις, decay. De Anima I 3, 406 a 12. Again Metaph. Λ 2, 1069 b 9, κατὰ τό τι ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποῦ, where γένεσις ἁπλῆ καὶ φθορά are added to the list, and distinguished from αὔξησις and φθίσις, but still included in four divisions; γένεσις καὶ φθορά, κατὰ τόδε or τὸ τί; αὔξησις καὶ φθορά, κατὰ τὸ ποσόν; ἀλλοίωσις, κατὰ τὸ πάθος, or ποιόν; and φορά, κατὰ τόπον, or ποῦ. In Phys. VII 2 sub init. there are distinguished φορά, ποσόν, ποιόν. Categ. c. 14, 15 a 13, six, γένεσις, φθορά, αὔξησις, μείωσις, ἀλλοίωσις, ἡ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή. Plato gives two, Parmen. 138 C, (1) motion proper or of translation and (2) change. To which, p. 162 E, is added as a distinct kind the motion of revolution or rotation, (1) ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, alteration, change of character, κατὰ τὸ πάθος, τὸ ποιόν; (2) μεταβαίνειν, change of place; and (3) στρέφεσθαι, revolution. And in Legg. X c. 6, 893 B seq., where the distinctions are derived from a priori considerations, ten is the total number, 894 C. (Comp. Bonitz ad loc. Metaph., Waitz ad l. Categ.) Cicero treats this topic of argument, under the general head of definitio, Top. V 26, seq., afterwards subdivided into partitio and divisio; and under the latter speaks of the process of dividing the genus into its species, which he calls formae; Formae sunt hae, in quas genus sine ullius praetermissione dividitur: ut si quis ius in legem, morem, aequitatem dividat, § 31: but does not go further into the argument to be derived from it.

Quintilian, V 10. 55, seq., follows Cicero in placing genus and species under the head finitio, § 55, comp. § 62; in distinguishing partitio and divisio, as subordinate modes of finitio § 63; and points out the mode of drawing inferences, affirmative or negative, from the division of the genus into its parts or species, as to whether anything proposed can or can not be included under it, § 65. These are his examples. Ut sit civis aut natus sit oportet, aut factus: utrumque tollendum est, nec natus nec factus est. Ib. Hic servus quem tibi vindicas, aut verna tuus est, aut emptus, aut donatus, aut testamento relictus, aut ex hoste captus, aut alienus: deinde remotis prioribus supererit alienus. He adds, what Aristotle and Cicero have omitted; periculosum, et cum cura intuendum genus; quia si in proponendo unum quodlibet omiserimus, cum risu quoque tota res solvitur.

‘Example from Theodectes' Socrates: “What temple has he profaned? To which of the gods that the city believes in (recognises, accepts) has he failed to pay the honour due?”’ The phrase ἀσεβεῖν εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς occurs twice (as Victorius notes) in Aesch. c. Ctes. §§ 106, 107. Theodectes' “Socrates,” which is (most probably) quoted again without the author's name § 18, was one of the numerous ἀπολογίαι Σωκράτους of which those of Plato and Xenophon alone are still in existence. We read also (Isocr. Busiris § 4) of a paradoxical κατηγορία Σωκράτους by Polycrates (one of the early Sophistical Rhetoricians, Spengel Art. Script. pp. 75—7. Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX vol. III 281—2), which was answered by an ἀπολογία Σωκράτους from Lysias, Speng. op. cit. p. 141. On this see Sauppe, Lys. Fragm. CXIII Or. Att. III 204: which is to be distinguished from another and earlier one, also by Lysias Sauppe, u. s. Fr. CXII p. 203. [Blass, Att. Bereds. I, p. 342, II, pp. 337, 416.]

Theodectes is here answering the charge of Meletus, οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, Xen. Mem. I 1. 1, Apol. Socr. § 11, Plat. Ap. Socr. 26 B. To this Xenophon, like Theodectes, replies by a direct contradiction, and affirmation of the contrary, Mem. I 1. 2, θύων τε γὰρ φανερὸς ἦν, κ.τ.λ. comp. § 20; and sim. Apol. Socr. § 11 seq. How the charge is met by Plato in his Apology cc. XIV, XV, and dialectically argued, has been already intimated, supra § 8,—see note, and comp. III 18. 2. The difference of the mode of treatment severally adopted by the two disciples in the defence of their master is remarkable. The inference implied in Theod.'s argument is this:—You accuse Socrates of impiety and disbelief in the gods. Has he ever profaned a temple? Has he neglected to worship them and do them honour, by sacrifice and other outward observances? The indignant question, implying that the speaker defies the other to contradict him and prove his charge, assumes the negative. But such offences as these are the parts of impiety which indicate disbelief in the gods—the orator in his excitement takes for granted that the enumeration is complete, that there is nothing else which could prove disbelief in the gods—and if he is not guilty of any of them, neither can he be guilty of the impiety which includes these, and these alone, as its parts; the whole or genus is not predicable of him¹.

§§ 14, 15. Top. XIII. Argumentum ex consequentibus; ἐκ τῶν ἑπομένων τινὶ ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, which Vict. found as a title to the topic in one of his MSS. On ἕπεσθαι and ἀκολουθεῖν, and their various senses, dialectical and in the ordinary language, see note on I 6. 3. The general meaning of them seems to be ‘concomitant’; that which constantly waits or attends upon something, either as antecedent, simultaneous, or subsequent.

There are two topics of consequents, XIII and XIV. The first is simple. Most things have some good and some bad consequent usually or inseparably attached to them, as wisdom and the envy of fellow-citizens are the ordinary results of education. In exhortation, defence, and encomium (the three branches of Rhetoric) we urge the favourable consequence—the resulting wisdom in the case proposed—if we have to dissuade, to accuse, to censure, the unfavourable; each as the occasion may require. The second is somewhat more complex. Here we have two opposites (περὶ δυοῖν καὶ ἀντικειμένοιν) to deal with—in the example public speaking falls into the two alternatives of true and fair speaking, and false and unfair. These are to be treated ‘in the way before mentioned’, τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ τρόπῳ: that is, in exhorting or recommending we take the favourable consequent, in dissuading the unfavourable. But the difference between the two topics lies in this (διαφέρει δέ); that in the former the opposition (that must be the opposition of the good and bad consequent, for there is no other) is accidental—that is, as appears in the example, there is no relation or logical connexion between wisdom and envy; they may be compared in respect of their value and importance as motives to action, but are not logical opposites—but in the latter, the good and the bad consequences are two contraries (τἀναντία) love and hatred, divine and human. In the example of the second topic, the dissuasive argument which comes first assigns evil consequences (hatred) to both alternatives of public speaking: that in recommendation, the contrary, love. The topic of consequences, in the general sense, as above explained, has been already applied in estimating the value of goods absolute, I 6.3; and in the comparison of good things, I 7.5. In Dialectics it does not appear in this simple shape, though it is virtually contained in the application of it to the four modes of ἀντίθεσις or opposition, Top. B 8; and in the comparison of two good things, Top. Γ 2, 117 a 5—15. Brandis u. s. [Philologus IV 1] observes of the two Rhetorical topics, that they could not find an independent place and treatment in the Topics.

Cicero speaks of the general topic of consequence dialecticorum proprius ex consequentibus antecedentibus et repugnantibus, omitting the simple form in which it appears in Rhetoric. His consequentia are necessary concomitants, quae rem necessario consequuntur. Top. XII 53. The mode of handling it is illustrated, XIII 53.

Quint. V 10. 74, Ex consequentibus sive adiunctis; Si est bonum iustitia, recte iudicandum: si malum perfidia, non est fallendum. Idem retro. § 75, sed haec consequentia dico, ἀκολουθά; est enim consequens (in Cicero's sense) sapientiae bonitas; illa sequentia, παρεπόμενα, quae postea facta sunt aut futura. And two other examples of the application of the argument, §§ 76, 77. Quintilian naturally, like Aristotle, gives only the rhetorical, and omits the dialectical use of the topic.

Note by the way the redundant ὥστε in συμβαίνει ὥσθ᾽ ἕπεσθαι. See Monk on Eur. Hippol. 1323, Κύπρις γὰρ ἤθελ᾽ ὥστε γίγνεσθαι τάδε. And add to the examples there given, Thuc. I 119, δεηθέντες ὥστε ψηφ., VIII 45, ἐδίδασκεν ὥστε, Ib. 79, δόξαν ὥστε διαναομαχεῖν Ib. 86, ἐπαγγελλόμενοι ὥστε βοηθεῖν. Herod. I 74, III 14. Plat. Protag. 338 C, ἀδύνατον ὥστε, Phaed. 93 B, ἔστιν ὥστε, 103 E, (Stallbaum's note,) Phaedr. 269 D (Heindorf ad loc. et ad Protag. l. c.). Dem. de F. L. § 124 (Shilleto's note). Aesch. de F. L. p. 49, § 158, ἐάσετε...ὥστε. Arist. Polit. II 2, 1261 a 34, συμβαίνει ὥστε πὰντας ἄρχειν (as here), Ib. VI (IV) 5, 1292 b 12, συμβέβηκεν ...ὥστε. Ib. VIII (V) 9, 1309 b 32, ἔστιν ὥστ᾽ ἔχειν. Pind. Nem. V 64, Soph. Oed. Col. 1350 (D), δικαιῶν ὥστε...Eur. Iph. T. 1017 (D), πῶς οὖν γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ὥστε... Ib. 1380.

The example of Top. is taken from the passage of Eur. Med. 294, already employed in illustration of a γνώμη, II 21. 2. Education of children has for its inseparable attendants wisdom or learning as a good, and the envy of one's fellow-citizens as an evil: we may therefore take our choice between them, and argue either for or against it, persuading or dissuading. (Note a good instance of μὲν οὖν, as a negative (usually) corrective, ‘nay rather’; this of course comes from the opponent who is arguing on the other side, that education is advantageous. Also in § 15.)

‘The illustration of this topic constitutes the entire art of Callippus— with the addition (no doubt) of the possible, (the κοινὸς τόπος of that name,) and all the rest (of the κοινοὶ τόποι, three in number), as has been said’, in c. 19, namely.

The two notices of Callippus and his art of Rhetoric in this passage and § 21, are all that is known to us of that rhetorician. He is not to be confounded with the Callippus mentioned in I 12. 29. Spengel, Art. Script. 148—9, contents himself with quoting the two passages of this chapter on the subject. He was one of the early writers on the art of Rhetoric; and it is possible that a person of that name referred to by Isocrates—who was born in 436 B. C.—as one of his first pupils, περὶ ἀντιδόσεως § 93, may have been this same Rhetorician Callippus.