E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

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‘(And men in anger are more easily pacified) if they think that (those that they desire to punish) will never find out that the punishment is due to them (that they are the authors of it) and that it is in compensation for their own injuries’; (this is the φαινομένη ὀλιγωρία of the defi nition: see note on p. 10,) ‘for anger is always directed against individuals, (II 2. 2, infra 4. 31, where this is made the characteristic of anger, as opposed to hatred,) as appears from the definition’. This inference from the definition is drawn from the φαινομένη τιμωρία which is the object of the angry man. If the punishment is to be such as can be actually seen, the anger cannot be directed against abstractions like classes or kinds, but must have a single, palpable, concrete, and also animated object; something that can feel, and shew that it is hurt.

‘And therefore (the trait of character, the representation, in) the verse’ (of Homer, Odys. IX 504) ‘is right and true (to nature, rightly conceived and expressed), “Tell him that it is Ulysses waster of cities (that blinded him)”—as though his revenge was not complete’ (i. e. the revenge of Ulysses, or of the character in Homer; which is the suppressed nomin. to πεποίηται, and with which τετιμωρημένος agrees: lit. the character is rightly represented in the verses as not fully avenged) ‘unless the other (the Cyclops) was aware by whom and for what’ (the blindness was inflicted).

The passage runs thus: Κύκλωψ, αἴ κέν τίς σε καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀφθαλμοῦ εἴρηται ἀεικελίην ἀλαωτύν, φάσθαι Ὀδυσσῆα πτολιπόρθιον ἐξαλαῶσαι, υἱὸν Λαέρτεω, Ἰθάκῃ ἔνι οἰκἴ ἔχοντα. ‘So that men are not angry with all the rest (all besides those who are actually within reach), who are out of sight (far away, for instance), nor any more with the dead’ (ἔτι, they do not retain their anger beyond the grave) ‘as with those who have endured the last extremity, and are no longer susceptible of pain, nor indeed of any feeling, which (to give the other pain and to make him feel) is what the angry man aims at. And therefore the poet (Homer, Iliad, Ω 54) has well said of Hector, wishing to represent Achilles as ceasing from his anger against the dead (lit. wishing to put a stop to his anger, i. e. represent it as ceasing): “For in truth it is but dumb (senseless) earth that he is outraging in his wrath.”’ Or rather, παῦσαι βουλόμενος means to suggest or assign a reason or motive for Achilles' ceasing from his anger: the words being those of Apollo, who is haranguing the Gods on the propriety of permitting Hector's body to be buried, and concludes his speech very emphatically with this line.

παῦσαι βουλόμενος] These words, applied to the poet himself instead of the character Apollo, represented in the poem, are an instance of a not unfrequent confusion in expressions of this kind. It is the substitution of the author himself for his personage or character; or the conversion of the doctrine of a given philosopher or school into the philosopher or school that holds it. Plat. Rep. II 363 D, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοσίους...κατορύττουσιν ἐν Ἅιδου, καὶ κοσκίνῳ ὕδωρ ἀναγκάζουσι φέρειν, of Musaeus and the Orphics, who ‘represent them as buried, and compelled to carry...’ Theaet. 183 A, ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ, the Heracliteans to wit, ‘that we may not represent them as stopping’—contrary to their doctrine of the universal flux. Similarly the Eleatics, Ib. 157 A, are called οἵ ἵσταντες, ‘the stationers’, meaning those who represent every thing as stationary or at rest. So Soph. 252 A, the opposition school, of Heraclitus, receives the name of οἱ ῥέοντες, ‘the fluent philosophers’, ‘the flowing gentry’, instead of their theory: and compare Theaet. 181 A, τῶν τὰ ἀκίνητα κινούντων. A good example is Thuc. I 5, οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τὰς πύστεις τῶν καταπλεόντων...ἐρωτῶντες εἰ λησταί εἰσιν, making their characters put these questions. Arist. Ran. 15, if the vulg. be retained (Meineke omits it), Ib. 833, ἐτερατεύετο, 911 (Aeschylus), πρώτιστα μὲν γὰρ ἕνα τιν᾽ ἂν καθῖσεν (introduced in a sitting position) ἐγκαλύψας. In Aristotle it is still more common: de Gen. Anim. 722 b 19, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς γεννᾷ. Metaph. A 8, 989 b 34, οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι...γεννῶσι τὸν οὐρανόν, de Anima I 2, 405 a 25, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος...ἐξ ἧς τἆλλα συνίστησιν, ‘of which he represents, holds theoretically, everything else to be composed’. Ib. 404 b 16 and 24, (certain philosophers) τὴν ψυχὴν συνιστᾶσιν. De Gen. et Corr. I 1, 314 a 9, ὅσοι πάντα ἐξ ἑνὸς γεννῶσιν, and b 1, τοῖς ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα κατασκευάζουσιν. De part. Anim. I 1. 21, 640 b 11, οὕτως τὸν κόσμον γεννῶσιν, and § 22, 640 b 17, ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σωμάτων συνιστᾶσι τὴν φύσιν πάντες. See Dr Lightfoot's notes on Ep. ad Gal. vi 13, οἱ περιτεμνόμενοι, ‘the Circumcisionists’, the advocates of Circumcision. Similarly in Latin, Juven. VII 151, quum perimit saevos classis numerosa tyrannos. Hor. Sat. II 5. 41, Furius hibernas cana nive conspuet Alpes.