This text is part of:
εὐτυχία] ‘good fortune or luck’, accidental, transitory, fragmentary, is opposed to εὐδαιμονία, complete, permanent, substantial happiness, the essence of which resides in its αὐτάρκεια or independence of all accidental and external conditions. Eth. Nic. II 5 (Bekk.), 1097 b 6 seq. X 7, 1176 a 27 (on θεωρητική as the highest happiness). Polit. IV (VII), I, 1323 b 23, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, ὃς εὐδαίμων μέν ἐστι καὶ μακάριος, ἰ οὐθὲν δὲ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ δἰ αὑτον αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποιός τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας διὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον ἑτέραν εἶναι: τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν αἴτιον ταὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη, δίκαιος δ̓ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ σώφρων ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην ἐστί. Eur. Med. 1229, ὄλβου δ᾽ ἐπιρρυέντος εὐτυχέστερος ἄλλου γένοιτ̓ αν ἄλλος, εὐδαίμων δ̓ ἂν οὔ, where Paley quotes, Troad. 509, των δ᾽ εὐδαιμόνων μηδένα νόμιζετ̓ εὐτυχεῖν πρὶν ἂν θάνῃ, explaining the distinction; and Androm. 420, ἡσσον μὲν ἀλγεῖ δυστυχῶν δ᾽ εὐδαιμονεῖ. ἡ τύχη αἰτία] On Aristotle's conception of τύχη as ‘a cause’, with further details, see Introd. Appendix C to Bk. I c. 10, p. 218—224. On this passage, p. 223. γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν] ‘acquisition or possession’. καί in this and similar cases is properly rendered by ‘or’. Aristotle frequently expresses as a combination two things which are not actually, but only hypothetically, combined in the conception, which we therefore more correctly represent as an alternative. αἰτία ἡ τύχη ἐνίων ὧν καὶ αἱ τέχναι] ‘Simplicius, ad Phys. II p. 73, 6, inter alia haec habet: καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν δὲ ἔνιοι πάντα σχεδὸν εἰς τὴν τύχην ἄγουσιν, ὥστε καὶ τῆς τέχνης οἰκείαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖν, λέγοντες, τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην (Agathon ap. Ar. Eth. Nic. VI 41). τὸν εὐτυχοῦντα δὲ καὶ φρονεῖν φασι (Eur. Fragm. Inc. 204). πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁρῶμεν ἔνια τῶν ἀπὸ τέχνης γινομένων καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα: καὶ γὰρ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τέχνης: διψήσας γὰρ καὶ πιών τις ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ γέγονεν ὑγιής.’ These are illustrated in the text by two examples; health, which may be due to chance as well as art; and beauty and strength, to chance as well as nature. ἀτέχνων] ‘independent of art’. οἷον ὅσων ἡ φύσις] The contradiction between this and the statements in the scientific Physics is pointed out in the Introd., u. s., p. 223. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι] Most probably a mere occasional and parenthetical note, according to the usual practice of this author (comp. § 14), ‘chance may give rise not only to things natural and independent of nature, but also to things unnatural, monstrous, or abnormal’, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν τέρατα: on which see the reff. in Introd. p. 225. Compare the def. of φύσις in I 10, 13, δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἡ τύχη αἰτία εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων, i.e. τῶν παρὰ φύσιν. In this case the colon should be retained after εἶναι, the connexion being carried on from οἷον ὅσων ἡ φύσις to ὑγιείας μέν κ.τ.λ. as examples, ὧν αἱ τέχναι, καὶ ἡ φύσις αἰτία, and the note parenthetical. Bonitz, however, Aristotel. Stud. I 87, would alter the punctuation, placing a comma at εἶναι, and connecting this clause closely with the preceding, in the sense, ‘of which the cause is nature, but (which) may be also contrary to nature’: regarding this as an instance of the Aristotelian custom of ‘not repeating the relative in the second of two co-ordinated members’, illustrated by Waitz, Organ. 25 b 35, and certainly common enough in our author. This is further supported by Muretus, who translates, ‘quae natura efficiuntur, ita tamen ut etiam praeter naturam evenire possint.’ The words quoted above from I 10, 3, seem to me to be in favour of the former interpretation: and the practice of introducing ‘notes’ of this kind is at least as common with Aristotle as that which is noticed by Bonitz. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ λόγον ἀγαθῶν αἰτία τύχη] Phys. 197 a 18, καὶ τὸ φάναι εἶναί τι παράλογον τὴν τύχην ὀρθῶς: ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἢ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ἢ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἡ δὲ τύχη ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις παρὰ ταῦτα: ὥστ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἀόριστα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ἡ τύχη ἀόριστος. See further in Introd. p. 221. τοῦ πλησίον] (ὄντος, ἱσταμένου), ‘one's next neighbour’, as ὁ πέλας. In Plat. Theaet. 174 C, it is distinguished from γείτων, ὁ πλήσιον καὶ ὁ γείτων, having a more extended and general sense, ‘a fellow-creature’. ἢ εἰ μὴ ἦλθε μόνος ἀεὶ φοιτῶν κ.τ.λ.] ‘Or if one who was in the constant habit of visiting a certain place’ (φ οιτᾷν, to go backwards and forwards, ever and anon, repeatedly, to frequent, haunt) ‘was the only one that failed to go (on some particular occasion), whilst those that went only once (ἅπαξ, once for all) all perished’. It is possible that this sense of repetition in the verbal termination ᾷν may be the origin of the other signification of ‘disease’ illustrated on the word πνευστιᾷν, c. 2 § 18 p. 45. A too-frequently repeated action might very well be interpreted as a diseased habit.
Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Edward Meredith Cope. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1877.
The National Endowment for the Humanities provided support for entering this text.
This text was converted to electronic form by professional data entry and has been proofread to a medium level of accuracy.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.