E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

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‘Again, if others are included in the charge who are admitted not to be liable to the accusation; for instance if (it be argued) that so and so is an adulterer because he is a smart dresser, (the reply is) why in that case so must Smith and Jones be adulterers'—although it is perfectly well known that Smith and Jones are entirely free from that vice. Bekker and Spengel accept Riccoboni's, and Bekker's own, suggestion καθάριος for vulgata lectio καθαρός: but they retain the article ὁ in its old position ὅτι καθάριος ὁ μοιχός. With this reading the only translation can be, “that all adulterers dress smartly”, which is not to the point. The converse is required by the argument—which is, to free yourself from a suspicion which has arisen from some accidental association, by shewing that, if the two things were really associated, others would be liable to the same suspicion, who are known not to be obnoxious to it: “if, as is alleged, all smart dressers were adulterers, then so and so, who are known not to be liable to the charge, would be involved in it”: and besides this, the following passages on the same subject shew that this was the argument that was used. καθάριος, II 4. 15, for ‘neatness and cleanliness in dress’ and attention to personal appearance: the argument from this appears II 24. 7, ἐπεὶ καλλωπιστής, καὶ νύκτωρ πλανᾶται, μοιχός: τοιοῦτοι γὰρ; and de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 9, βουλόμενοι γὰρ δεῖξαι ὅτι μοιχός, τὸ ἑπόμενον ἔλαβον, ὅτι καλλωπιστὴς ἢ ὅτι νύκτωρ ὁρᾶται πλανώμενος. It is necessary therefore, besides the alteration of καθαρός into καθάριος, either to change the position of the article, εἰ ὅτι ὁ καθάριος μοιχός or to omit the article altogether εἰ ὅτι καθάριος μοιχός. If such a mistaken inference has been drawn, you infer from this example by analogy to a like case.