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λογισμόν] Ib. p. 229. Reasoning or calculation is a cause of action, when any of the goods already mentioned (c. 6) are presented to us as objects of our interest, as expedient and useful to us, (this is good under the aspect of utility; the other two forms of good are τὸ καλόν the moral end, ‘the right’, and τὸ ἡδύ: see Eth. Nic. II 2, 1104 b 30, τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις...καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος,) in the form of an end, or of means to that end; when, that is, good is the object of the action, (I add this qualification) because even the licentious (those who have lost all self-control, and therefore cannot act with a deliberate purpose to an end) do things that are expedient or for their interest, only not for that reason, but for mere pleasure.
Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Edward Meredith Cope. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1877.
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