E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

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δίκαιος κολασθῆναι] On this idiomatic usage of δίκαιος, and similar constructions—in which the adjective, instead of being expressed impersonally in the neuter, as δίκαιόν ἐστι, is attracted as it were to the subject of the sentence—especially with δῆλος and its compounds, φανερός, γελοῖος, and such like, see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 297, comp. 549. 5. It is to be observed that the case of δίκαιος is peculiar; this takes the infinitive, whereas all the rest are construed with the participle. To Matthiae's examples add ἄξιος, similarly constructed in Thuc. I 70, sub init. ἄξιοι νομίζομεν εἶναι τοῖς πέλας ψόγον ἐπενεγκεῖν; some Platonic examples in Stallbaum's note on Gorg. 448 D; Soph. Aj. 634, κρείσσων γὰρ Ἅιδᾳ κεύθων, and Lobeck's note; the proverb μὴ κίνει Καμάριναν, ἀκίνητος γὰρ ἀμείνων: Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 641, ἡδίους ἔσεσθε ἀκούσαντες; Arist. Nub. 1241, Ζεὺς γελοῖος ὀμνύμενος: Ar. Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 b 34, γελοῖος φαίνοιτο ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὤν: Pl. Phaedrus 236 D, γελοῖος ἔσομαι... ἰδιώτης αὐτοσχεδιάζων.

Σοφοκλῆς] Not the poet, but a statesman and orator advanced in life at the close of the Peloponnesian war. He was one of the ten πρόβουλοι, Rhet. III 18. 6, appointed by the Athenians, after the Sicilian disaster in 413 B.C., to devise measures for the public safety, Thuc. VIII I, Grote's Hist. Gr. Pt. II, ch. 61, Vol. VII, p. 499, and note: and afterwards one of the thirty tyrants, Xen. Hellen. II 3. 2. This Sophocles is doubtless the same who is again mentioned, Rhet. III 15. 3. He is there described as an old man, which agrees with the statement of Thucydides, u. s., that the πρόβουλοι were an ἀρχὴ πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν; and the ‘charge’ brought against him (Rhet. l. c.) was probably connected with his conduct as a member of ‘the thirty’.

τιμήσειν, ἐτίμησεν] In all causes civil as well as criminal which could be brought before an Athenian law-court, one point to be considered in the judgment was the τίμημα or estimate, assessment, either of the kind or amount of the penalty in criminal prosecutions, or of the damages in civil actions. This gives rise to the division of all legal processes into ἀγῶνες ἀτίμητοι and τιμητοί. In the former of these the penalty and damages are already fixed by law or by previous private arrangement (C. R. Kennedy), and are therefore ‘unassessable’ by the judges; in the τιμητοὶ ἀγῶνες of all kinds, the amount of the damages or penalty to be awarded is at the discretion of the judges, who τιμῶσιν, estimate, assess, or fix the amount. This is the explanation of Harpocration, and Ulpian, followed by Meier & Schömann, Attischer Process, p. 171 note, Böckh Publ. Econ. Bk. III, c. 11 (p. 371 Engl. Transl.), and Hermann Pol. Antiq. § 143. 7—12. Suidas, and other ancient writers, invert this distinction, and make τιμητοὶ ἀγῶνες the cases in which the penalty is already fixed, and ἀτίμητοι those in which it is open to adjudication. See Meier & Schömann, u. s., p. 171 note.

On the whole subject see Meier & Schömann u. s. et seq. and Mr C. R. Kennedy's article in Smith's Dict. Antiq. p. 970 (1st ed.) [p. 1131, 2nd ed. and cf. note on Dem. Select Private Orations, Part II, Or. 55 § 18. S.]

The accuser in a criminal process, where the penalty was not already fixed by law, himself in the first instance assessed its amount, which the judges confirmed or not as they thought proper. The first was called τιμᾶσθαι, the second τιμᾶν, in accordance with the usual distinction of the active and middle voice, as marking by their contrasted significations the functions of the judge and the parties in the case, δικάζειν and δικάζεσθαι, κρίνειν and κρίνεσθαι, &c.; the one administering justice and deciding the question, whilst the others ‘get this done for them’ by the intervention of another. Aristotle has here neglected this ordinary distinction, for reasons best known to himself. As far as the phrase ὁ παθὼν ἐτίμησεν is concerned, the reason might be, that the accuser is supposed to represent the estimate by the deceased of his own wrongs as of equal authority with a judicial decision: but this will not apply to τιμήσειν, Sophocles' own estimate. At the same time as τιμᾶν and τίμημα may denote an ‘estimate’ in general, the use of the verb here must be regarded rather as a departure from ordinary usage, than as a solecism, or violation of the laws of the language.

On the συνήγοροι, see Schneider's note on Pol. VI 5. 10, vol. II, p. 391, and addenda, pp. 502—4. συνηγορῶν here is not technical: there is no reason to suppose that it denotes one of the public συνήγοροι, appointed by the state.

Lastly, the entire topic, καὶ εἰ ὁ παθών—ἐτίμησεν, is thus illustrated by Schrader: ‘Sexti Tarquinii flagitium ideo maius est, quod illius foeditate inducta Lucretia sibi ipsi vim intulit. (This is suggested by Victorius.) Et Appii Claudii decemviri sceleratum de L. Virginii filia iudicium eo sceleratius est, quoniam pater illo commotus filiam interfecit (Liv. III 48).’