Compare the corresponding topic of II 23, 12. On this kind of ‘authority’ see I 15, where it is exemplified under the head of ‘witnesses’, §§ 13 and 15. The φρόνιμος, the man of practical wisdom, skill and judgment, the ‘artist’ or expert in each pursuit, is the proper standard or measure to be appealed to in every disputed question. The general judgment of such well-qualified persons is the ὀρθὸς λόγός, which must be applied even to the determination of the due measure of virtue, which is a μεσότης...ὡρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν. Eth. N. II 6, init. ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν] so Eth. X 5, ult., the standard of moral judgment is said to be ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός. IX 4, 1166 a 12, μέτρον ἑκάστῳ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος. III 6, 1113 a 32, διαφέρει πλεῖστον ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾷν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὤν. προέκρινεν] ‘decided, distinguished by preference’. Ἑλένην Θησεύς] The preference of Theseus, a man of consummate authority, παντελῆ τὴν ἀρετὴν κτησάμενον, for Helen, is actually introduced by Isocrates as one of the topics of his encomium of that much calumniated lady, Helen. §§ 18—22.
Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Edward Meredith Cope. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1877.
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