E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

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In this last section there are two or three points requiring consideration which it will be as well to dispatch before proceeding to the translation. The first is, whether we are to read ἐφ᾽ οἷς or οἷς without the prepos.; and then, what do ἐφ᾽ οἷς or οἷς and ἐπὶ τίσι, severally represent. Spengel, following MS A^{c} retains ἐφ᾽ οἷς; Bekker in his third ed., for once departs from that MS and reads οἷς, although, as it seems, none of the MSS give any various reading. It seems therefore on this ground preferable to retain ἐφ᾽ οἷς if we can; and we have next to consider how it is to be interpreted, and how distinguished from ἐπὶ τίσι. ἐφ᾽ οἷς and οἷς are equally irregular after δῆλον (see note on II 9. 11, at the end), and the grammar therefore throws no light upon the reading. As far as the grammar and interpretation are concerned there seems to be no objection to retaining ἐπί.

We have then to decide whether οἷς or τίσι stands for persons or things; either of which is possible. However if the choice is to be made between them, τίσι seems the more natural representative of persons, and οἷς of things; and so in general, throughout these analyses of the feelings, Aristotle is accustomed to designate the persons who are the objects of them by the pronoun τίνες.

Thirdly, there is no objection to ἐπὶ τίσι χαίρουσιν in the sense of ‘at’ or ‘by whom they are pleased’ (lit. upon whom their pleasure is bestowed or directed), ‘in whom they find pleasure’, though the bare τίσι is more usual (possibly this may be Bekker's reason for his alteration [of ἐφ᾽ οἷς]); and if there were any doubt about it, it would be sufficiently supported by ἐπὶ ποίοις (what sort of persons) χαίρειν, c. 9. 16. Consequently, as I can see no sufficient reason for altering the text contrary to all manuscript authority, I have retained ἐφ᾽ οἷς, understanding it of things, the occasions of joy or delight; and ἐπὶ τίσι of the persons who excite the feeling in us.

The next clause, ὡς γὰρ οὐκ ἔχοντες λυποῦνται, κ.τ.λ. presents some difficulty, and Muretus and the Vetus Translatio, followed by Schrader and Wolf, reject the negative οὐκ (or μή as it stood in the MSS employed in the older editions). This however would make the two opposite feelings of pleasure and pain the same state or disposition of mind, which I think could not possibly have been Aristotle's meaning. Victorius takes what I believe to be the right view on the point. The meaning will then be, that the negative, the contradictory, of pain, i. e. pleasure (the two never co-existing), is excited by the opposite circumstances to those which are productive of the pain of envy; if pain under particular circumstances is excited by the sight of the good fortune of another, substitute the opposite, ill fortune for good fortune in each case, and you will have the appropriate topics for giving rise to the feeling of pleasure in your audience. This, says Victorius, is ἐπιχαιρεκακία, wanton malice, malevolent pleasure in the misfortunes of others. The above interpretation is at all events free from the objection to which Schrader's is liable, namely that it makes Aristotle say that the same mental state or disposition is painful and pleasurable. The choice between the two depends mainly upon the interpretation of οἱ τοιοῦτοι and πῶς ἔχοντες. I understand by the former the φθονεροί, the common character of all the classes distinguished in the analysis; Schrader of the members of the several classes, the ambitious, the prosperous and successful; and in his view these classes must fall under the several ‘states of mind’ designated by πῶς, ὡς, οὕτως, ἔχοντες, such as ambition; though how it can be applied to others, such as ‘the prosperous and successful’, his second instance, he does not inform us. If by the ‘state of mind’ the πάθος or emotion is meant¹ (which seems to be Spengel's view), it is quite impossible that two such states, one pleasurable and the other painful, can be the same. Schrader, however, appears to take the πῶς ἔχειν in a different sense, for the character or habit of mind, the mental constitution, which tends to produce such and such feelings; and in this point of view, though ambition (his first instance) may fairly enough be called a disposition of mind, yet I cannot see how the second, the prosperous and successful men, or prosperity and success, can well be included in the designation.

In conclusion I will transcribe part of his note, that the reader may have the opportunity of deciding for himself; merely adding that manuscript and editorial authority is against his omission of the negative, and that though his interpretation is very plausible at first sight, I doubt whether it can be right, for the reasons stated. “Veritas autem huius lectionis e re ipsa quoque fiet manifesta, si per προτάσεις a § 2 ad 9 transeas, et huc illas applices. Ambitiosi e. g. dolent honore alterius, iidem, sive eodem modo affecti, gaudent alterius opprobrio. Qui res magnas gerunt, et fortuna utuntur prosperrima, dolent si alium ad eundem fortunae gradum cernant evectum: iisdem vero illi gaudent cum alios longe infra se relinqui conspiciunt.”

And now to proceed with the translation:—

‘It is plain too what are the occasions, the objects, and the states of mind of such (the envious); that is to say, that the same state of mind which is absent in the painful feeling, will be present in the joy that is excited by the opposite occasions’ (or thus, ‘whatever may be the state of mind the absence of which manifests itself in, or is accompanied by, pain, the same by its presence on the opposite occasions will give rise to pleasure’). ‘Consequently, if we ourselves (i. e. any audience) are brought into that state of mind (envy or jealousy), and those who lay claim to (think themselves deserving of) compassion from us, or any good that they want to obtain from us’ (as κριταί, judges of any kind, in a disputed claim; but it is equally true of men in general), ‘be such as the above described (i. e. objects of envy), ‘it is plain that they will never meet with compassion’ (which will apply to τυγχάνειν τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ as well as to ἐλεεῖσθαι) ‘from the masters of the situation’ (those who have the power to bestow either of them, those with whom the matter rests).

παρασκευάζειν, ‘to prepare the minds of’ the judges or audience, said of the speaker who puts them into such and such a state of mind or feeling, is rendered by κατασκευάζειν, supra II 1. 2 (see note ad loc.) and § 7, where it is applied in two somewhat different senses.