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‘In distinguishing or analysing wrong and right acts, let us commence with the following consideration’ (or, let us take the following for our starting-point). On δικαίωμα here ‘an <*>ust act’, the opposite of ἀδίκημα, and its various senses, see note on. I 3. 9, p. 56. ‘Accordingly the definition of justice and injustice has reference to two kinds of “law” (§ 2), and two kinds of persons (§ 3)’. The divisions of just and unjust depend upon their relation to two kinds of law, and two kinds of persons: πάντα ὁρίζεται τῷ τέλει.
Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Edward Meredith Cope. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1877.
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