‘And those we should (otherwise, on general considerations) like to be friends, provided they manifest the same inclination—make it clear’ (φαίνωνται emphatic,) ‘that they wish it (on their side); and such are the good in respect of moral virtue’, (men may be good or excel in other things, as the βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος excellent in shouting, and πὺξ ἀγαθὸς Πολυδεύκης in boxing); ‘and men who are held in repute, either by every one, or by the best, or by those whom we ourselves admire and respect, or by those who respect and admire us’. If we read ἐν οἷς θαυμάζουσιν αὐτούς (Bekker retains τοῖς) with A^{c}, Q, Y^{b}, Z, which Spengel adopts, these four last particulars will be all neuters. ‘And those who are distinguished, either in every thing (‘admirable Crichtons’), or in the best things (qualities, pursuits, studies, accomplishments, or rank, wealth, power, according to taste), or in things which we ourselves respect and admire, or in those things which they admire in us (lit. in those things in which they admire us)’.
Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Edward Meredith Cope. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1877.
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