E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

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A third are ‘those who revile and express contempt for things in which the aggrieved parties are themselves most interested (or, to which they are earnestly devoted, or in which they most desire to distinguish themselves, or in which they most value themselves; the last of the four referring to such things as ἰδέα, personal beauty, the second example); as those who are eager and ambitious of distinction in the pursuit of philosophy are especially indignant at any slight, any slur cast upon their favourite study; or those who value themselves upon their personal appearance, if that be called in question; and similarly in all other cases’. This topic expresses the specially angry feeling that is called forth by any ridicule or contempt directed against a man's profession, his studies, his order, any class or society to which he belongs, and is carried even to the extent of a national feeling: any reflexion, in short, upon what he is particularly interested in and attached to or values himself upon, any association with which he is bound up, and on whose credit his own credit and importance in some measure depend. “Je me suis souvent despité, en mon enfance,” says Montaigne (du Pédantisme, Livre I Ch. 24), “de veoir en comedies italiennes tousiours un Pedante pour badin, et le surnom de Magister n'avoir guères plus honorable signification parmy nous: car leur estant donné en gouvernement, que pouvois-je moins faire que d'estre jaloux de leur reputation?”

τῇ ἰδέᾳ] ‘the form’, the primary sense of the word¹, Plat. Protag. 315 E, τὴν ἰδέαν πάνυ καλός, Phaed. 73 A, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει, Ib. D, τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδός, 76 C, ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει, 109 B, περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοῖλα καὶ παντόδαπα καὶ τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, Pind. Olymp. 10 (11). 123, ἰδέᾳ καλός, et alibi. So εἶδος, Arist. Pol. I 2, 1252 b 26, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἑαυτοῖς ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.