E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

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ἐπεὶ δ̓] has either no apodosis at all—which is highly probable in itself, and seems to be Bekker's view, who retains the full stop at ὑπολαμβάνομεν: or else we may suppose with Vater that the apodosis is τρία δ᾽ ἐστίν...; in which case δὲ may be added to the examples of the apodotic δὲ in note on I 1. 11, or omitted with MSS Q, Y^{b}, Z^{b}. According to Vater's view the connexion will be, that whereas ὀλιγωρία is an expression of contempt for somebody or something supposed to be worthless, whether it be so or not in reality, there are accordingly three kinds of ὀλιγωρία each expressing contempt, but in three different forms, or modes of manifestation. To the three kinds of ὀλιγωρία here distinguished ἀναι- σχυντία is added in c. 6 § 2. In Dem. de F. L. § 228 it follows ἀναιδεία as its ordinary companion (compare Shilleto's note).

ἐνέργεια δόξης] represents the opinion, hitherto dormant or latent, as roused into active exercise as a realised capacity, a δύναμις become an ἐνέργεια. The mere opinion of the worthlessness of so and so, has now become developed into ὀλιγωρία, and assumed the form of an active or actual expression of the contempt by the outward token of ‘slight regard’.

ὀλιγωρία therefore shews ‘indifference’, as to something that we do not care for at all, or regard as something so contemptible, so devoid of all positive character, that it is not worth forming an opinion about: what is positively good or bad is always worthy of ‘earnest attention’, or ‘serious anxiety.’ On σπουδή ‘earnest’, as opposed to παιδιά ‘sport’ (Plat. Phaedr. 276 D, compared with E, Rep. X 602 B, alibi), and on σπουδαῖος ‘serious’, ‘earnest’, ‘of solid worth or value’, opposed to φαῦλος ‘light’, ‘trifling’, ‘frivolous’, ‘unsubstantial’, ‘worthless’, and hence morally ‘good’ and ‘bad’, see note on I 5. 8.

καὶ τὰ συντείνοντα] ‘as well as everything that has that tendency’; viz. to good and bad. ‘There are three kinds of slight, or contemptuous indifference, contempt, spite and wanton outrage’. First, ‘contempt involves ὀλιγωρία; because people despise men and things that they regard as worthless, and ὀλιγωρία, slight esteem, contemptuous indifference, is directed to the same objects’, whence it appears that they have a common element, and that καταφρόνησις is ὀλιγωρία τις, a kind of slight.