καλόν] See note on c. 7, 24. Eth. Eudem. VII 15. 3, τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν πάντων τέλη ἐστίν, ἃ αὐτὰ αὑτῶν ἕνεκά ἐστιν αἱρετά. τούτων δὲ καλὰ ὅσα δἰ αὑτὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐπαινετά ἐστιν. ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἐφ᾽ ὧν αἵ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταὶ καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπαινετά, δικαιοσύνη καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ αἱ πράξεις κ.τ.λ. It has either a moral aspect (marked by the characteristic ἐπαινετόν; on praise and blame, approbation and disapprobation, as characteristic of virtue and vice, see Introd. on ἔπαινος, Append. B, p. 212, seq.), what is right and noble, an end in itself, δἰ αὑτό; or is physical and sensual, what is beautiful, in which pleasure always accompanies that which is otherwise good. The ugly may be good in the sense of useful, but gives no pleasure. Virtue therefore must of necessity be καλόν, because it comes under the first definition of it, it is good in itself, beneficial to the individual and to society, and also has the stamp and seal of general ‘approbation’.
Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Edward Meredith Cope. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1877.
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