E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

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‘Fifthly, in the correct expression (by change of termination) of many, few, and one’, followed by an example of a plural participle and verb. This is of course the due expression of the number of nouns, and the observation of the concord, or agreement of adj. with subst. or pronoun, or verb with nom. case, in number. Victorius thinks that ὀλίγα stands for what was afterwards distinguished as the dual number. Comp. Cic. de Orat. III 11. 40.

‘And, as a general rule, every written composition must be easy to read, or—which is much the same thing—to speak, or deliver’. Comp. Quint. VIII 2. 17. Demetr. περὶ ἑρμηνείας, § 193 (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. III 304), γραφικὴ δὲ λέξις (written composition) ἡ εὐανάγνωστος. αὕτη δ̓ἐστιν ἡ συνηρτημένη καὶ οἷον ἠσφαλισμένη τοῖς συνδέσμοις, i.e. written composition must be carefully and well constructed, with due regard to the conjunctions, and the connexion of sentences, or syntax in general. This is opposed to declamatory speaking, ὑποκριτικὴ λέξις, ἡ διαλελυμένη, in which the want of exact connexion—particularly asyndeton, the omission of καί—often aids the effect: comp. § 194.

‘This is wanting (in compositions in which) conjunctions and other connecting particles are numerous, and such as are not easy to punctuate, like those of Heraclitus’. This does not contradict what was said before about the necessity of conjunctions, &c., to ensure perspicuity, it only condemns the excessive use of them; a long string of connected clauses is apt to lead to obscurity: the due mean is to be observed, here as elsewhere. With what follows compare Demetrius, u. s. § 192, τὸ δὲ ἀσύνδετον καὶ διαλελυμένον ὅλον ἀσαφὲς πᾶν: ἄδηλος γὰρ ἡ ἑκάστου κώλου ἀρχὴ διὰ τὴν λύσιν, ὥσπερ τὰ Ἡρακλείτου: καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα σκοτεινὰ ποιεῖ τὸ πλεῖστον ἡ λύσις, and Theon, Progymn. περὶ διηγήματος § 187 (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. II 82), παρὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν (ambiguity arising from punctuation) τὰ Ἡρακλείτου τοῦ φιλοσόφου βίβλια σκοτεινὰ γέγονε κατακόρως αὐτῇ χρησαμένου, ἤτοι ἐπίτηδες ἢ καὶ δἰ ἄγνοιαν (the fault had been previously illustrated) Quintilian, VII 9. 7, classes this as one of the varieties of amphibolia (ambiguity), viz. per collectionem, ubi dubium est quid quo referri oporteat, exemplifying it from Virgil, Aen. I 477 lora tenens tamen. § 8, unde controversia illa, Testamento quidam iussit poni statuam auream hastam tenentem. Quaeritur, statua hastam tenens aurea esse debeat, an hasta esse aurea in statua alterius materiae?—σκοτεινά, in the above passages of Demetrius and Theon, is of course an allusion to Heraclitus' well-known sobriquet, ὁ σκοτεινός; his ‘obscurity’ was proverbial. This want of punctuation is not by any means the only, or indeed the principal, source of the obscurity of the mystic enigmatical sayings of the ‘dark’ philosopher. The remains of these have been collected by Schleiermacher, Bernays [and Bywater] in their respective tracts, and several of the most remarkable quoted by Thompson in his note on Butler's Lect. on Anc. Phil. I 313, note 10; see also Diog. Laert. IX 1, vita Heracliti.

διαστίξαι] διὰ στίζειν, (‘to prick’), is ‘to distinguish or duly distribute by pointing or punctuation’. Two examples similar to this are given in de Soph. El. c. 4, 166 a 36, in illustration of the fallacy of διαίρεσις.

‘For to punctuate Heraclitus' writing is a hard matter (a difficult job, a business), owing to the uncertainty as to which of the two (words), the preceding or following, (any particular word) is attached; as for instance, at the commencement of his (αὐτοῦ, masc.) composition, where he says, “Of this reason constant (being) ever (reading τοῦδ᾽ ἐόντος ἀεί) men come into being devoid of understanding”; for this leaves it uncertain to which of the two (ἐόντος or ἀξύνετοι γίγνονται) the word ever should be attached by the punctuation’. Bekker, who in his first edition reads τοῦ δέοντος, has in the third altered it to τοῦδ᾽ ἔοντος. Spengel retains the former—which is the reading of MS A^{c} (or A). τοῦδ᾽ ἐόντος, which had been already proposed by Victorius from a passage of Sext. Empir., is undoubtedly right. The words are quoted also by Clemens Alex. Strom. V 14, p. 716, by Eusebius, Praep. Evang. XIII, and by Sextus Empiricus adv. Math. VII 132, who extracts several lines, reading τοῦδε ἐόντος, and omitting ἀεί, which are cited and commented on by Schleiermacher in his tract on the fragments of Heraclitus, No. 47, p. 482. Clemens and Eusebius have τοῦ δέοντος (Schleierm.). The λόγος, according to Sextus— and this is confirmed by Heraclitus' context, which he quotes—is the universal reason, ὁ θεῖος λόγος, of which men are unconscious, depending rather upon sense, though it is the true κριτήριον. τοῖτον δὴ τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ θεῖον, καὶ οὗ κατὰ μετοχὴν γινόμεθα λογικοί, κριτήριον ἀληθείας φησὶν ὁ Ἡράκλειτος. This interpretation of course requires ἔοντος. An additional argument in its favour is suggested by Schleiermacher, that if δεόντος had been the reading in Aristotle's copy of Heraclitus, he would have found no difficulty in the reference of ἀεί. The title of his σύγγραμμα—which is omitted by Diogenes in his life, IX I, though the σύγγραμμα itself is twice mentioned, §§ 6, 7, and some of its contents quoted in the 7th and follow ing sections—seems to have been περὶ φύσεως; the ordinary title of works upon similar subjects by the earlier cosmical speculators, as Empedocles, Anaxagoras, &c.

ἔργον] of something hard, difficult of execution, laborious—in the same sense as ἐργώδης, operosus, which is derived from it—occurs occasionally in various Greek writers, though it is exemplified by only one instance in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon. It is used sometimes with, sometimes without, χαλεπόν. Arist. Ran. 1100, χαλεπὸν οὖν ἔργον διαιρεῖν. A number of instances of ἔργον in this sense and ἐργώδης are to be found in the fragments of the Comic poets, Menander, Diphilus, Posidippus, Apollodorus; for instance, ἔργον—ἄνοιαν ἡμέρᾳ μεταστῆσαι μία: ἔργον ἐστὶ μακρὰν συνήθειαν—λῦσαι: ἔργον ἐκ λόγου πίστιν λαβεῖν, κ.τ.λ. See the Ind. to Meineke's Fragm. Comic. Gr. s. v. Xen. Mem. IV 7. 9, ἔργον εἶναι εὑρεῖν ἰατρόν κ.τ.λ. Plat. Symp. 187 E, μέγα ἔργον...καλῶς χρῆσθαι, Ib. Tim. 28 C, τὸν ποιητήν...εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὑρόντα, κ.τ.λ. Demosth. de Rhod. Lib. § 34, ἀλλ᾽ ἀφ̓ ὁποίων λόγων—τοῦτ̓ ἔργον εὑρεῖν. It occurs more frequently in Aristotle, and is, I think, almost confined to the later of the classical Greek writers. Arist. Pol. II 7, 1266 b 13, ἔργον γὰρ μὴ νεωτεροποιοὺς εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους. III 15, 1286 a 35, ἐκεῖ δ᾽ ἔργον ἅμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. Eth. Nic. V 13, 1137 a 13, τοῦτο δὲ πλέον ἔργον (a harder task) ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι. Ib. c. 3, 1130 a 8. Topic. E c. 4, 133 b 16, c. 5, 134 a 19, Θ 3, 159 a 5, c. 11, 161 b 32, πλέονος ἔργου δεομένων. Hist. Anim. II 6, ὥστε ἔργον εἶναι ἰδεῖν. Ib. VI 20. 7, 30. 2, IX 40. 29, ἔργον δ᾽ ἐστὶ λαθεῖν. ἐργώδης occurs, Eth. N. I 13, 1102 a 25, IX 2, sub finem, c. 7, 1168 a 24, c. 10, 1171 a 5, and Top. Z I, 13 b 9, ἐργωδέστερον. In Latin we have negotium similarly employed, and nullo negotio; and Virgil has opus; Hoc opus, hic labor est, Aen. VI 129.

ὁποτέρῳ διαστίξαι. Bekker in margin of 4to. edition “an δεῖ στίξαι?” He (and Spengel) has now returned to the vulgata lectio διαστίξαι, subaudi δεῖ. Gaisford conjectured δεῖ διαστίξαι.