E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

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τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τῶν πρὸς δόξαν] the real and the apparent or sham; τὸ εἶναι and τὸ δοκεῖν, τὸ ὄν and τὸ φαινόμενον; the solid, genuine, substantial reality contrasted with the mere outside show and ‘appearance’; or truth as absolute certainty, and probable opinion. Top. Γ 3, 118 b 20, καὶ <*>ἰ τὸ μὲν δἰ αὑτὸ τὸ δὲ διὰ τὴν δόξαν αἱρετόν (αἱρετώτερόν ἐστιν), οἷον ὑγίεια κάλλους. (τὴν μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν δἰ αὑτὴν αἱρούμεθα κἂν μηδεὶς εἴσεσθαι μέλλῃ, τὸ δὲ κάλλος διὰ τὴν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ δόξαν: μάταιον γοῦν δοκεῖ τὸ κάλλος εἶναι μὴ γνωριζόμενον. Alex. Aphrod. ad loc.) Aesch. Sept. c. Th. 592, of Amphiaraus the just, οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν δίκαιος ἀλλ᾽ εἶναι θέλει. This topic is No. 3, in Bacon's Colours of Good and Evil (Works, ed. Ellis and Spedding, VII 79). It is shewn to fail in the case of virtue; the virtuous man ‘will be virtuous in solitudine, and not only in theatro’.

ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν κ.τ.λ.] Top. l. c. b 21, ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν τὸ μηδενὸς συνειδότος μὴ ἂν σπουδάσαι ὑπάρχειν. ‘The distinguishing mark or characteristic of that which is directed to mere opinion (is found in) anything that a man would not choose if he were sure that it would not be known or recognised by others’. And the same thing is expressed in the Topics, ‘anything which a man would not be anxious to possess if no one else was to be privy to it’. It is the credit of possessing the thing, in the eyes of others, and not the mere possession for its own sake, that gives it its value and superiority. Compare with this ὰ μὴ λανθάνει κ.τ.λ. § 40, which gives the other side of the question.

In the example, the superiority of receiving to conferring a benefit, the words δόξειεν ἄν suggest that we need not take this for granted; it can be ‘made to appear’ that it is true, but the real truth lies on the other side of the question; from a higher point of view, to confer is better than to receive a benefit.