The list of virtues here given is very incomplete, and a mere extract or sample of that given in the Nic. Eth. II 7, which is itself anything but a complete or satisfactory enumeration of them. A longer list is to be found in c. 9 § 5, which includes the two intellectual virtues, σοφία and φρόνησις, but still omits several of those which are distinguished in the table of the Ethics. All the virtues here mentioned are analyzed in detail in Eth. N. III, IV, V, justice being treated separately at great length in the fifth book. ἕξις, the genus of the definition of virtue, is an acquired, developed, confirmed habit or state, physical, mental or moral—the last of the three, of course, when applied to virtue. It is properly opposed to διάθεσις, as a settled and permanent state, opposed to a temporary and changeable disposition. It is developed out of the πάθη by the operation of ἔθος, habit or association, till it has acquired a fixed tendency and direction and a confirmed character, which shews itself in the constant exercise of similar ἐνεργεῖαι, and is now no longer liable to change and the opposite tendency to vice. On the growth of virtue, and the formation of the ἕξις, see Eth. Nic. II 1—5, particularly 4 and 5. Also Sir A. Grant, Ess. on Ethics, I p. 120 seq. (1st Ed.) [=p. 164, 3rd Ed.] Trendel. on de Anima p. 311, and 366. Kategorienlehre, p. 95.
Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Edward Meredith Cope. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1877.
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