ἐλευθεριότης] The principal difference between the views taken of the virtues in the Ethics and Rhetoric respectively, is that in the latter they are regarded solely on the side of their utility to society—a political view—in the Ethics they are confirmed habits or states resulting from a due regulation of the elementary πάθη out of which they are formed and developed. They are ‘relative means’, μεσότητες πρὸς ἡμᾶς, mean states varying in individuals according to the special character of each, lying at a variable distance between two extremes of the πάθη out of which they grow, the proper mean in any given case being determined by the φρόνησις or practical wisdom, the objective standard being the collective judgment of those who are specially endowed with this faculty, the φρόνιμοι. Consequently here ‘liberality’ in expense is represented as a dis position or habit inclined to do good, to make oneself useful in dealing with money.
Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Edward Meredith Cope. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1877.
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