E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

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Top. XXII. ‘Another, to be employed in refutation’, (i. e. of an adversary; which, real or imaginary, is always implied in refutation. The office of the ἐλεγκτικὸν ἐνθύμημα is τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα συνάγειν, ‘to conclude contradictories’, II 22. 15, and note: see also Introd. ad h. l. p. 263 and note—）‘is to take into consideration (and argue from) all contradictories, repugnances, disagreements (between your statements or conduct, and the opponent's), whatever contradiction may be derived from all times (conflicting dates), actions and words; separately (distinctly; there are three distinct modes of employing it) in the case of the adverse party, as for instance, “and he says he loves you, and yet he conspired with the Thirty”:’ the thirty tyrants namely, after Aegospotami, B. C. 404: this is from the deliberative branch: ‘and separately in your own case (as applied to your own conduct, πράξεις), “and he says that I am litigious, and yet he can't prove that I have ever brought a single case into court:” and again, distinguished from the preceding, the application of it to oneself and the opponent (in the way of a contrast of two opposite characters and modes of conduct), “and he has never lent any one a single penny, whilst I have even ransomed (got you liberated, λέλυμαι,) many of you (out of captivity).”’ This last example reminds us of the contrast drawn by Demosthenes, de F. Leg. pp. 412, 13, seq., of his own character and conduct as compared with that of the rest of the ambassadors to Philip, Aeschines, Philocrates and Phrynon: in which the ransom of captives plays an important part.

This is Cicero's locus ex repugnantibus, Top. III 11, IV 21, where it is illustrated by an example, which concludes, repugnat enim recte accipere et invitum reddere. And further, XII 53 seq. Quintilian, V 10. 74, Ex pugnantibus, Qui est sapiens stultus non est. Ib. 8. 5, ex repugnantibus.