E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ φαίνεται φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσι, κ.τ.λ.] Cic. de Orat. II 42. 178, nihil est enim in dicendo maius quam ut faveat oratori is qui audiet, utique ipse sic moveatur ut impetu quodam animi et perturbatione magis quam iudicio aut consilio regatur. Plura enim multo homines iudicant odio aut amore aut cupiditate aut iracundia aut dolore aut laetitia aut spe aut timore aut errore aut aliqua permotione mentis quam veritate aut praescripto aut iuris norma aliqua aut iudicii formula aut legibus. And on this importance of εὔνοια, that is, the conciliation of it in the audience by making your own good will apparent in the speech, compare Demosth. de Cor. § 277, p. 318, κἀκεῖνο δ᾽ εὖ οἶδ̓, ὅτι τὴν ἐμὴν δ̀εινότητα—ἔστω γάρ: καίτοι ἔγωγ̓ ὁρῶ τῆς τῶν λεγόντων δυνάμεως τοὺς ἀκούοντας τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος κυρίους ὄντας: ὡς γὰρ ἂν ὑμεῖς ἀποδέξησθε καὶ πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔχητ̓ εὐνοίας, οὕτως ὁ λέγων ἔδοξε φρονεῖν κ.τ.λ.

τὸ παράπαν ἕτερα...τὸ μέγεθος ἕτερα] (‘either altogether different’, different in kind; ‘or in magnitude and amount’, different in degree.) This clause (to τοὐναντίον) is explanatory of the effect of the πάθη upon the audience, (not of the ἦθος,) as appears from the example chosen, φιλία and μῖσος being πάθη, II 4: and it belongs especially, though not exclusively—for in such cases as the public speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines it might be usefully, and in fact was, employed—to forensic practice; the result being in this case either complete acquittal from a charge (οὐκ ἀδικεῖν) or a lenient construction of it, and a mitigation of the penalty (ἢ μικρὰ ἀδικεῖν). The next (after τοὐναντίον) refers principally to the deliberative branch of Rhetoric, as is shewn by the future time—the time of the deliberative speaker is the future, I 3. 2—τὸ ἐσόμενον, καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι; and accordingly for the use of speakers in this branch the emotions appealed to must be different and adapted to a different purpose. The two which will be most serviceable to the public speaker are desire (ἐπιθυμία) and hope (ἐλπίς): those who are under the excitement of such feelings will be more likely to assent to the course of policy proposed, and so ensure the success of the speaker who recommends. It is singular however that neither of these is found in the list of πάθη which follows: ἐπιθυμία occurs amongst them in Eth. Nic. II 4; and hope may possibly be included under πάρσος, as the opposite of φόβος, in the analysis of τὸ θαῤῥάλεον and θάρσος, Rhet. II 5. 16, to the end. This is partially confirmed by II 5. 16; after telling us that confidence is the opposite of fear, he adds ὥστε μεͅτὰ φαντασίας ἡ ἐλπὶς τῶν σωτηρίων ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄντων, as if ‘the hope of near approaching safety’ were convertible with, or the ground of, confidence, and therefore a πάθος opposed. to φόβος. In the same way εὔνοια, in the three ‘ethical’ virtues to be exhibited in the speech, is included in φιλία.

‘And to one who feels a desire for anything, or is in a sanguine frame of mind, the future result (announced by the speaker), if it be pleasant, appears to be both certain and good; whilst to any one who has no (such) feeling, or is in a bad humour, the contrary (is true, is the case)’.