James Adam, The Republic of Plato

ἀλλά γε ἓν ἀνθ̓ ἑνός . ἀλλά γε is extremely rare in Attic prose: in the Platonic corpus it occurs—according to the best manuscript authority—here and in Rep. VIII 543 C, Phaed. 86 E, Hipp. Maior 287 B, Phaedr. 262 A (ἀλλά γε δή), Phaed. 116 D (id.). In some of these passages ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε has been conjectured — wrongly, as I think (with Schneider), at all events in the passage from the Republic:—but ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε cannot be read in the Phaedrus and Hippias Maior. There is no a priori objection to the collocation, which is also implied in ἀλλὰ γάρ (γ᾽ ἄρα); and in later Greek ἀλλά γε aroused no objection. The meaning is ‘but still,’ originally ‘yes, but’: as Schneider says, “γε in his dictionibus concedit aliquatenus praecedentia, sed magis urget sequentia.” There is perhaps also a dramatic motive for putting ἀλλά γε into the mouth of Cephalus: see on οὐ μέντοι γε in 329 E. Against the reading of Stobaeus (Flor. 94. 22) ἀλλὰ ἕν γε ἀνθ᾽ ἑνός, we may urge the further objection that the idiomatic phrase ἓν ἀνθ᾽ ἑνός (‘setting one thing against another,’ as Jowett correctly translates it) seems to depend for its peculiar force (like μόνος μόνῳ and the like) on the juxtaposition of its two parts: cf. Phil. 63 B (ἓν ἀνθ᾽ ἑνός) and Laws 705 B (ἀνθ᾽ ἑνὸς ἕν). The passage quoted by Stallbaum from Euripides Orest. 651 ἓν μὲν τόδ᾽ ἡμῖν ἀνθ᾽ ἑνὸς δοῦναί σε χρή is quite different and does not mean ‘hoc praecipue,’ but ‘one thing in return for one thing,’ as is clear from lines 646 f.

οὐκ ἐλάχιστον is not adverbial (as Hartman and others suppose), but belongs to τοῦτο: ‘setting one thing against another, I should regard this as not the least important object for which wealth is most useful to a man of sense.’ The emphasis is characteristic: cf. 329 C, 331 A.