James Adam, The Republic of Plato

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καὶ κτλ. καί begins the apodosis: ‘then too’ etc. The general idea is that when experience proved that it was better to take exercise in a nude condition, nudity also ceased to be ludicrous. Plato thus prepares the way for the identification to be presently made (see next note). The particle δή (‘forsooth’) hints that the eye is less trustworthy than the reason; and the contrast is further accentuated by the somewhat artificial balance between ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς and ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. D. and V. wrongly make the apodosis begin with καὶ τοῦτο (where τοῦτο is of course nominative).

μάταιος κτλ. I have (with the Oxford editors) retained the text of A. It at least affords an intelligible sense, and none of the numerous variants or emendations is at all convincing. The general drift of the passage is clear enough. Nothing is γελοῖον except what is κακόν (μάταιος—κακόν), and, conversely, nothing is σπουδαῖον except what is ἀγαθόν (καὶ καλοῦ—ἀγαθοῦ. σπουδαῖον is involved in σπουδάζει). Both inferences are expressed in such a way as to suggest a personal reference: cf. χαριέντων in B, and see App. I. γελωτοποιεῖν, especially after κωμῳδεῖν just above, points to the comic stage: and Aristophanes is perhaps intended. See on 452 B. The whole sentence means: ‘Foolish is the man who identifies the laughable with anything but the bad, and he who attempts to raise a laugh by looking at any spectacle as laughable except the spectacle of folly and evil aims in all seriousness also at another standard of beauty, which he has set up for himself, than the standard of the good.’ The analysis of τὸ γελοῖον, so far as it goes, is in harmony with Phil. 48 A ff.: cf. especially 49 A. With στησάμενος we must supply αὐτόν, i.e. τὸν σκοπόν. On the difficulties of this passage see App. II.