James Adam, The Republic of Plato

ἐνεῖναι δέ. The repetition of ἐνεῖναι with μέν and δέ has almost the force of a conjunction: cf. Phaed. 83 A ἀπάτης μὲν μεστὴ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὤτων. It is quite unnecessary to insert καὶ after δὲ (with Ast and Hartman). For the verbal play in κελεῦον —κωλῦον cf. III 406 B note

ὅταν ἐγγίγνηται -- παραγίγνεται. See cr. n. The present ἐγγίγνηται is, I think, necessary, and the corruption (through ἐγγίνηται) easy enough. ὄταν ἐγγένηται could scarcely mean ἑκάστοτε, which is the meaning here required. The subject to ἐγγίγνηται is τὸ κωλῦον. It is not hinted that ‘all men have not right reason’ (J. and C.), but only that there is not on every occasion a conflict between reason and desire. See 431 C and 437 D note Reason readily acquiesces when it is good to gratify desire. τὰ—ἄγοντα καὶ ἕλκοντα is translated by Jowett ‘that which bids and attracts’: but ἄγοντα is said like ἄγοντος in 439 B and ἕλκοντα is ‘dragging.’ The plural should also be retained in the translation, otherwise τὰ ἄγοντα may be identified with the ἐπιθυμητικόν, which would be a mistake, for the appetitive part of soul is certainly not produced by παθήματα of any kind. τὰ ἄγοντα καὶ ἔλκοντα are in reality ‘impulses leading and dragging’ the soul, impulses engendered by ‘particular conditions and diseases’ (not ‘passive states’ or ‘passion,’ etc. with the English translators), i.e. in other words by abnormal bodily states favourable to desires, as for example fevers etc.: cf. Phil. 45 A, B. These impulses are no doubt special instances of the action of ἐπιθυμητικόν, but should be distinguished from the appetitive principle itself.