James Adam, The Republic of Plato

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κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ shews that Plato is contradicting a common view: cf. IX 577 D. Most men would of course admit that a perfect scheme must usually be modified if it is to be put in force. But they would not allow that λέξις has more truth than πρᾶξις; for the truth of a theory—they would say —is best tested by experience. Not so Plato, according to whom the world of Mind is not only more perfect, but truer than the world of Matter: cf. ἡ παντελῶς ἀληθής VI 502 D and note ad loc. The pointed ἀλλὰ σύ invites the assent of Glauco as a Platonist: cf. infra 475 E.

δεῖν κτλ. δεῖν is tautological after ἀνάγκαζε, but the addition of τοῦτο μέν makes it easier. Π has δεῖ, perhaps a mistake for δή, which was read by Stobaeus Flor. 43. 109. For γιγνόμενα Bywater (J. Ph. X p. 73) would write γιγνόμεν᾽ ἄν or ἂν γιγνόμενα. The categoric statement is however more in harmony with ἆρ᾽ οἷόν τέ τι—ἐφάπτεσθαι. ‘Do not compel me to shew that what we described in words is in all respects reproduced by experience.’ See also on ἐπιτάττεις below.

φάναι: infinitive for imperative as in VI 508 B, 509 B, all of them examples of φάναι, although Plato is not averse to φάθι (VI 508 E) and ξύμφαθι (VII 523 A). The imperatival infinitive is very common in Attic inscriptions (Meisterhans^{3} p. 244).

ἐπιτάττεις: sc. γίγνεσθαι. It is hardly possible to understand ἐξευρεῖν ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι (with J. and C.). As in γιγνόμενα above, so also here Socrates represents Glauco as requiring that the city should be made into a reality: cf. ἣν σὺ πόλιν οἰκίζεις in 470 E.