This text is part of:
μέγιστον -- τὸ πρῶτον. The ἐπιθυμητικόν is the largest part of soul: see IV 442 A and II 379 C note σύναπτε τοίνυν κτλ. Krohn finds fault with Plato for failing to preserve the essential unity of the individual throughout this comparison (Pl. St. p. 229). But, according to Plato, the true unity of the individual is realised only through the subjection of the two lower ‘parts’ of soul to the highest (586 E note); and this subjection is described in 589 A, B.
The Republic of Plato. James Adam. 1902. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
The National Endowment for the Humanities provided support for entering this text.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.