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In an excellent Review of the study of ancient Rhetoric [by Spengel], read at the celebration of the eighty-third anniversary of the foundation of the Munich Academy of Sciences, 1842, a clear account is given of the relation of these τόποι ἐνθυμημάτων that follow to the εἴδη of the first book, of which I will give a translation with very slight alterations. To the first of these he gives the name of ‘formal’, to the second of ‘material’ proofs. “Formal proofs, such as they appear in Dialectics and Rhetoric, are of an universal nature, and therefore applicable alike to all branches of science; they form the collective Topics, which Aristotle has elaborated for Dialectics with wonderful completeness in the most comprehensive of all the works of his Organon; whilst in Rhetoric, not without reference to the other, he has selected and put forward only what is most essential. Material proofs are with him such as are derived from the principles of the special sciences, the knowledge of which the orator must bring with him, ready for any occasion on which it may be properly applied. Aristotle is by no means of opinion that a mere superficial description, without thorough knowledge of the object to be described, and alien to the true spirit of it, can be called ‘rhetorical’ with propriety; on the contrary, the orator must be thoroughly imbued with the knowledge of his subject, whatever department of knowledge it may happen to belong to, and from this special science bring with him his concrete proofs, for the purpose of convincing. Accordingly, for forensic pleading the accurate study of law is indispensable, for the deliberative speaking or counselling that of Politics, the science of government, and similarly for each kind the special knowledge which belongs to it. But this special knowledge cannot be obtained from Rhetoric itself, otherwise it would carry in itself all knowledge, which is not the case: the office of Rhetoric is, to work up the proofs which the special science offers, to combine them with the ‘formal’, and so to bring the subject within the reach of universal comprehension.” On the contents of this chapter, and its connexion with the Topics, Brandis, ap. Schneidewin's Philologus [IV i.] p. 18, has the following remarks. “We now turn (c. 23) to the universal points of view (topics) most worthy of attention for the formation or refutation of enthymemes, which are briefly discussed. Before passing to this, Aristotle has already pointed out the connexion which exists between this division of the Rhetoric and the Topics (c. 22 § 10). It is perfectly conceivable however that here also (as before, referring to Rhet. I 7,) what in the Topics has met with a detailed discussion in regard of the various modes of applying them, is here only briefly referred to, and with an exclusive view to the application to be made of them in speaking.” He then illustrates this at some length from the two works; but it will be more convenient to leave these details till we come to them in the course of the notes on the topics themselves. [On the Topics, see in general Grote's Aristotle, ch. IX.] Cicero, Topica, first gives a summary classification of the various forms of these arguments under their most general heads, III 11. These are, coniugata, ex genere, ex forma, ex similitudine, ex differentia, ex contrario, ex adiunctis, ex antecedentibus, ex consequentibus, ex repugnantibus, ex caussis, ex effectis, ex comparatione maiorum aut parium aut minorum, (the last, comp. maiorum et minorum, are the topics of Rhet. I 7,) which are afterwards described in greater detail and illustrated, cc. IX 38,—XVIII 71, Haec ego argumenta, quae transferri in multas causas possunt, locos communes nominamus, de Inv. II 15. 48. Quintilian treats them, Inst. Orat. V 10, 20—94, and sums them up thus, § 94; Ergo ut breviter contraham summam, ducuntur argumenta a personis, causis, locis, tempore (cuius tres partes diximus, praecedens, coniunctum, insequens), facultatibus (quibus instrumentum subiecimus), modo (id est ut quidque sit factum), finitione, genere, specie, differentibus, propriis, remotione, divisione, initio, incrementis, summa, similibus, dissimilibus, pugnantibus, consequentibus, efficientibus, effectis, eventis, iugatis, comparatione, quae in plures diducitur species. Iugata are Cicero's coniugata, Aristotle's σύστοιχα and ὅμοιαι πτώσεις. These arguments can all（?) be turned both ways, and applied to prove either the affirmative δεικτικά, κατασκευαστικά, constructive, confirmatory; or the negative, ἐλεγκτικά, (23. 30); ἀνασκευάζειν, ἀναιρεῖν; destructive of the proposition maintained by the theorist (in philosophy), the opponent (in dialectics). Rhetoric τἀναντία συλλογίζεται [I 1. 12]. Of the first, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, this is expressly stated.
One class of demonstrative (or affirmative) enthymemes is derived from opposites: we have to consider, namely, whether the opposite (to the one) belongs to (i. e. can be said, or predicated of) the opposite (to the other). Two pairs of opposites are supposed, as in the example, temperance and licentiousness, good, i. e. profitable, and injurious: the question is whether the two opposed terms or things stand in the same relation to one another, i. e. that one can be predicated of the other, as the two first, to which they are opposed: if they can, the original proposition may be maintained, or inferred by the enthymeme; if not, it can be confuted or destroyed. The inference in either case is drawn ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, from the correctness or incorrectness, the truth or falsehood, of the assertion of compatibility or coexistence in the opposites, or that one can be predicated of the other. Thus in the example, if the opposites to the original proposition—temperance is profitable— stand in the same relation to one another as the two members of the first, so that the one can be truly predicated of the other—if the opposite, injurious, is truly predicable of licentiousness—then, so far, we infer the truth of the first: if not, the proposition may be confuted. The inference, like all other rhetorical inferences, is probable, not necessary: it can always be contradicted. Aristotle, as we have already seen (note on c. 19. 1), distinguishes four kinds of ἀντικείμενα, or opposites; contradictory, contrary (extremes under the same genus, as here σωφροσύνη and ἀκολασία are the two extremes, virtue and vice, under the genus ἦθος, moral character), relative, and ἕξις and στέρησις, state and privation. In the Topics all the four kinds in their relation to this form of argument are successively handled; in the Rhetoric, the treatment is confined to the single kind of contraries, as the most useful and plausible, and the rest passed over. See Brandis, u. s., p. 18. The passage in the Topics corresponding to this is B 8, 113 b 27, seq. [Grote's Ar. I, chap. IX pp. 422, 3]; but compare also B 2, 109 b 17; on the import and limitations of ἐναντίον Ib. c. 7; Γ 6, init. on the great advantages and wide extent of these two first topics, viz. this, and the next, τῶν συστοίχων καὶ τῶν πτώσεων. ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνδοξον τὸ ἀξιῶσαι, εἰ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, καὶ λύπην πᾶσαν εἶναι κακόν κ.τ.λ. followed by a series of illustrations: also B 9, 114 b 6. The treatment of opposites in the Topics and Rhetoric corresponds in this, that in both works it has reference solely to the art of reasoning, to the inferences affirmative or negative that may be drawn by constructive, or refutative, syllogisms and enthymemes. Cicero (who borrows a good deal from Aristotle), Topic. XI. 47, Deinceps locus est, qui a contrario dicitur. Contrariorum autem genera sunt plura: unum eorum quae in eodem genere plurimum differunt (Arist.), ut sapientia et stultitia....Haec quae ex eodem genere contraria sunt appellantur adversa. His instance is, si stultitiam fugimus, sapientiam sequamur (this in the Aristotelian form would be, If folly is to be shunned, wisdom is to be sought or pursued). He then goes through the three remaining kinds of contraria, following Aristotle. Ex contrariis, Frugalitas bonum, luxuria enim malum (enthym.). Si malorum causa bellum est, erit emendatio pax: si veniam meretur qui imprudens nocuit, non meretur praemium qui imprudens profuit. Quint. V 10. 73. In the last example, the opposites are, excuse, indulgence (for a fault), and reward (for a service), injury and benefit: the merit or desert is common to both: only in the one case it takes the form of demerit, which deserves punishment: as is also the absence of purpose, of good or ill intention. ἀναιρεῖν, ‘to take up’, passes on to the sense of removing, taking away; thence to taking off, destroying; and so finally, when it comes to logic, is applied to the argument which upsets, subverts, destroys, or refutes the adversary's argument or position. ‘Or (a second example) as it is in the Messeniac speech (of Alcidamas, on which see note on I 13. 2), “for if it is the war which is the cause of the present evils, it is by the peace (which I now propose) that they must be rectified.” συμβουλεύει ὁ Ἀλκιδάμας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις μὴ καταδουλῶσαι τοὺς ἐν Μεσσήνῃ, ἐπιχειρῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Εἰ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος, φησί, προυξένησε τάδε τὰ κακά, εἰρήνη πάλιν ταῦτα ἐπανορθώσεται (Scholiast). ‘Verba ipsa Alcidamantis scholiastes videtur conservasse.” Sauppe ad Alcid. Fragm. Messen. 2. Oratores Attici, III 154. Quintilian has borrowed this, see above [middle of p. 239]. “The four lines which follow as a third example are of uncertain authorship: Gaisford attributes them either to Agathon or Theodectes: the enthymeme ex contrario that it contains would suit either of them, since they both cultivated Rhetoric as well as the dramatic art (Wagner Trag. Gr. Fragm. III 185). To avoid the conjunction of εἰ and οὐ, Elmsley, ad Med. 87, proposes ἐπεί. Reisig, Coniect. I p. 113 (ap. Pflugk), justly replies that εἴπερ is equivalent to ἐπεί, and therefore admits the same construction. On εἰ with ἄν and the optative, see Appendix (on II 20 § 5) at the end of this book; and on εἰ followed by οὐ, see Appendix C, Vol. I p. 301. For οὐδ ἄν, Wagner proposes either ἤν or ἅν. Cicero, de Inv. I XXX 46, has adopted this: In contrariis hoc modo; nam si iis qui imprudentes laeserunt ignosci convenit, iis qui necessario profuerunt haberi gratiam non oportet, and Quintilian, V 10. 73, (above). The second quotation (example 4), is from Euripides' Thyestes, Fragm. VII (Wagner). This we learn from the Scholiast, quoted in Wagner's note. Matthiae refers to the similar paradox in Agathon's couplet, Rhet. II 24. 10.
Top. II. ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων, πτώσεων] On πτώσεις and σύστοιχα, see note on I 7. 27. πτῶσις “grammatische abbiegung,” Brandis [Philol. IV i]. ‘Another (inference may be drawn) from similar inflexions; for the inflected words (or, the inflexions of the word) must be capable of similar predication, (for instance from δίκη by inflexion, or variation of termination, are formed the πτώσεις, δίκαιος, δικαίως—as well as the grammatical cases, inflexion and declension, and if δίκαιον can be predicated of anything, then δικαίως must be predicable of the same). We may therefore argue, says the example, ‘that justice is not all good’, taking the negative side, μὴ ὑπάρχειν, good is not universally predicable of justice; otherwise good would be predicable of the πτῶσις, δικαίως, which is not true in all cases; ‘for all good is αἱρετόν, an object of choice; but a just punishment, or to be justly punished, everybody would allow not to be desirable’. This is an application of the topic to its negative, destructive, or refutative use: the inference is that the rule laid down is not true. Compare with this example, I 9. 15, where the same distinction is made: although τὰ δίκαια and δικαίως ἔργα are similarly predicable, yet this is not the case with the πάθη: ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ (this is therefore an exceptional case to which the ordinary rule of ὅμοιαι πτώσεις does not apply) ταύτῃ τῶν ἀρετῶν οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ δικαίως καλόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦ ζημιοῦσθαι αἰσχρὸν τὸ δικαίως μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδίκως. Brandis u. s. notes on this topic another difference which shews itself between the Topics and the Rhetoric, that whereas in the former the σύστοιχα are usually (not always) added to the πτώσεις in the treatment of it, they are here omitted, and the grammatical form of co-ordinates alone taken into account. The use of the topic as a dialectical argument is abundantly illustrated in the Topics, in very many places, as may be seen by consulting Waitz's Index ad Organon, s. v. The principal passage on the subject is Top. B 9,—where the πτώσεις, the grammatical co-ordinates, are properly subordinated to the more extensive σύστοιχα, things which are logically co-ordinate, 114 b 34. The latter are exemplified by δικαιοσύνη, δίκαιος, δίκαιον, δικαίως. Compare A 15, 106 b 29, on the application of them to ambiguous terms, πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενα, also Γ 3, 118 a 34, Δ 3, 124 a 10, and the rest, which indicate their various applications1. Cicero, Top. IV 12, comp. IX 38, illustrates coniugata, which is his name for Ar.'s πτώσεις, by sapiens, sapienter, sapientia; and the argument from it by, Si compascuus ager est, ius est compascere. Haec verborum coniugatio, he says, συζυγία dicitur: on which Spengel (Specim. Comm. in Ar. Lib. II 23, Heidelb. 1844) remarks, “Non Aristotelem qui semper συστοιχίαν dicit, sed posteriores, in primis Stoicos, intelligit.” In de Or. II 40. 167, they are called coniuncta. Quintilian, who treats the topic with some contempt as hardly deserving of notice, has, Inst. Orat. V 10. 85, His illud adiicere ridiculum putarem, nisi eo Cicero uteretur, quod coniugatum vocant: ut, Eos, qui rem iustam faciant iuste facere, quod certe non eget probatione; Quod compascuum est compascere licere (from Cicero).
Top. III. ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλλῃλα] The argument, from mutual relation of terms or notions. This is treated, Top. B 8, 114 a 13, under the head of oppositions or opposites, ἀντιθέσεις, or ἀντικείμενα, of which it is one of the four varieties. For example, inferences may be drawn from double to half, and vice versa, from triple to multiple and the converse; from knowing or knowledge ἐπιστήμη, to the thing known τὸ ἐπιστητόν; from sight as a sensation, to the thing seen as an object of sense. The logical objections, ἐνστάσεις, that may be brought against it are also given [Grote's Aristotle I. pp. 423, 424]. “Latina schola vocat relata. Talia sunt ista: facere pati; emere vendere; dare accipere; locare conducere: et nomina ista; pater filius; dominus servus; discipulus magister.” Schrader. He also cites as an example, Cic. Orat. XLI 142, Sin ea non modo eos ornat penes quos est, sed etiam universam rempublicam, cur aut discere turpe quod scire honestum est, aut quod nosse pulcherrimum est id non gloriosum docere: a good illustration of the argument from relatives. This topic has occurred before, II 19. 12, as one of the topics of ‘the possible’: where the parallel passages of Cic. Topic. XI 49, and de Inv. I 30. 47, will be found in the note. On the same, Quintilian, Inst. Or. V 10. 78, Illa quoque quae ex rebus mutuam confirmationem praestantibus ducuntur (quae proprii generis videri quidam volunt, et vocant ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα, Cicero ex rebus sub eandem rationem venientibus) fortiter consequentibus iunxerim (I should be bold to add to consequents): si portorium Rhodiis locare honestum est et Hermocreonti conducere; et quod discere honestum, et docere (from de Inventione, u. s.). The argument is, ‘If it may be said of one (of the two terms of the relation) that he has done rightly or justly, then the same terms may be applied to what the other has suffered (ποιεῖν and πάσχειν, agent and patient, are relative opposites2); and similarly (κελεύειν is relative to πείθεσθαι) command implies obedience, and the converse (this may be inferred as the ordinary, probable, not a necessary consequence): as Diomedon the taxcollector argued about the taxes (i. e. the farming of them) “If it is no disgrace to you to sell, neither is it to us to buy.” οἷον ὡς] This pleonasm occurs again in § 6, οἷον ὡς Ἰφικράτης. Of Diomedon, nothing is known but what we learn from the passage. ‘And if the terms fairly or justly can be applied to the sufferer, then also to the doer (or perpetrator) of the act; and conversely, if to the doer then also to the sufferer’. If there be any difference between this and the preceding, εἰ γὰρ θατέρῳ—πεπονθέναι, it is that the first is the general expression of the relation between agent and patient, the second is a particular exemplification of it, in the justification of what would otherwise be a crime. ‘But this admits of a fallacy: for though it may be true (in general, or in itself) that deserved suffering involves the justice of the punish ment, yet perhaps (it does not always follow that) you should be the agent of it, that the punishment should be inflicted by you (any particular individual)’. This fallacy is actually illustrated from Theodectes' Orestes, infra c. 24 § 3. The argument is used by Orestes in his trial for the murder of his mother Clytemnestra. In the trial scene of the Eumenides this point is taken into consideration, and the act of Orestes justified by Apollo and Athena on the general ground of the superiority of male to female; the father, the author of his existence, has a higher claim upon the son's affection and duty than the mother, and Orestes was right in avenging his father's death even upon her. Aesch. Eumen. 625 seq., 657 seq., 738—40. Comp. Eur. Orest. 528, where Tyndareus, Clytemnestra's father, says, θυγατὴρ δ᾽ ἐμὴ θανοῦς᾿ ἔπραξεν ἔνδικα: ἀλλ̓ οὐχὶ πρὸς τοῦδ̓ εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτὴν θανεῖν: and Orestes, ib. 546, defends himself on the same grounds as in Aeschylus, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἀνόσιός εἰμι μητέρα κτανών, ὅσιος δέ γ̓ ἕτερον ὄνομα, τιμωρῶν πατρί. 552, πατὴρ μὲν ἐφύτευσεν με κ.τ.λ. 562, ἐπὶ δ̓ ἔθυσα μητέρα, ἀνόσια μὲν δρῶν ἀλλὰ τιμωρῶν πατρί. Electr. 1244, (quoted by Victorius on φησὶ δ᾽ ἀποκρινόμενος—κτανεῖν,) the Dioscuri to Orestes, δίκαια μέν νυν ἥδ᾽ ἔχει: σὺ δ̓ οὐχὶ δρᾷς. The case of Orestes and Clytemnestra became one of the stock examples in the rhetorical books. Auct. ad Heren. I 10. 17, I 15. 25, 16. 26. Cic. de Inv. I 13. 18, 22. 31. Quint. Inst. Or. III 11. 4, and 11 seq., VII 4. 8. ‘And therefore a separate investigation is required, not only whether the sufferer deserved to suffer, but also whether the doer had a right to do it (as, to inflict the punishment), and then make the appropriate use of either: because sometimes there is a difference in cases of this kind (i. e. both kinds of right are not always found together: the punishment may be just, but you may not be the proper person to inflict it), and there is nothing to prevent (the case being) as it is put in Theodectes’ Alcmaeon (where this ‘division’, διαλαβόντα, is actually made): “And did no mortal abhor thy mother?” This is a question put to Alcmaeon, probably by Alphesiboea (Victorius), whose reply includes the words actually quoted, ἀλλὰ διαλαβόντα χρὴ σκοπεῖν, with, of course, a good deal more about the murder which is omitted. ‘To which (Alcmaeon) says in reply “nay but we must first distinguish, and then consider the case.”’ (The division or distinction here spoken of is well illustrated by the parallel passage, the case of Orestes, II 24. 3.) ‘And when Alphesiboea asks “How?”, he replies, “To her they adjudged death, (i. e. decided that she was justly slain,) but (decided also) that I should not have been the murderer.”’ From this reply it may be gathered that the judges in Theodoctes' play had made the requisite distinction: the death of Eriphyle they agreed was deserved, but it was not for her son to inflict the penalty. “Alcmaeon Eriphylen matrem suam interfecerat, quod haec Amphiarai mariti salutem prodiderat” (Alcmaeon's act, like that of Orestes, was justified by the implied murder of his father—the treachery which caused his death). “Alphesiboea fuit Alcmaeonis uxor.” Schrader. This fragment is quoted by Wagner, Theodect. Fragm. Alcm. I, but without a word of commentary, III 118. On Theodectes of Phaselis, the rhetorician and dramatic poet, the friend of Aristotle, who frequently refers to his compositions in both kinds, and on the rhetorical character of his writings, which is well illustrated here and in II 24. 3, see Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. ch. XXVI § 7, who refers to these passages. Also, Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX Vol. III p. 260 seq.3 To the passages there quoted on this author, add Theopomp. Hist. Phil. Lib. I, Fr. 26, ap. Fragm. Hist. Gr. (Didot) p. 282; and a ref. to his Philoctetes, Eth. Nic. VII 8, 1150 b 9. Two other examples follow, but, as Spengel (Tract on the Rhet. in Trans. Bav. Acad., Munich 1851, p. 46) justly says, they have no connexion with the preceding example from Theodectes, and the division which it exemplifies, but are illustrations of the general topic. Retaining the text (with Bekker) as it stands, we must accordingly understand the words ἔστι δ᾽ ἐν τούτῳ—μὴ κτανεῖν as parenthetical, and suppose that the author, after the insertion of this as a note, proceeds with his exemplification of the general topic. Spengel, u. s., p. 47, suggests that they may have been a later addition by the author himself, a note written on the margin, which has got out of its place. My supposition, of a note, not written on the margin, but embodied in the text as a parenthesis—which is quite in Ar.'s manner—will answer the purpose equally well, and save the text in addition. ‘And, another example, the trial of Demosthenes and those who slew Nicanor; for as they were adjudged to have slain him justly (the act), it was held that his death (the passion or suffering) was just’. This is cited by Dion. Halicarn., Ep. I ad Amm. c. 12, as a proof that Aristotle was acquainted with and quoted the speeches of Demosthenes, referring it to the case (against Aeschines) for the Crown. In doing so he omits περί. Of course ἡ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη cannot have this meaning: and it is most probable that it is not the Orator that is here referred to, but Thucydides' general, or some other person of the name. Neither is anything known of Nicanor and his murderers. On the use of Demosthenes' name in the Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 46, note 2. ‘And again, the case of him that died at Thebes; concerning whom he (the spokesman of the defendants) bade them (the judges) decide whether he (the murdered man) deserved death, since there was no injustice in putting to death one that deserved it’. “In hanc quoque historiam nunquam incidi.” Victorius. Buhle rightly refers it to the case of Euphron, introduced as an episode, and described at length by Xenophon, Hellen. VII 3. There had been one of the usual quarrels between the aristocratical (οἱ βέλτιστοι) and the popular party at Sicyon, of which Euphron took advantage, with the design of making himself master of the city. But knowing that as long as the Thebans occupied the acropolis he had no chance of success, he collected a large sum of money and went to Thebes with the intention of bribing the Thebans to assist him. Some Sicyonian exiles learning this, followed him to Thebes and murdered him in the acropolis. Here the murderers were brought to trial before the magistrates and council, who were already there assembled. The accusation of the magistrates, and the speech for the defence, are both recorded. All the accused with one exception asserted their innocence: one alone admitted the fact, and in justification of it pleaded for himself and the rest the guilt of the man that had been slain, just as Aristotle here describes it. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Θηβαῖοι ταῦτα ἀκούσαντες ἔγνωσαν δίκαια τὸν Εὔφρονα πεπονθέναι. But the Sicyonians (οἱ πολῖται), interpreting the word ‘good’ in the sense of good to them (τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἑαυτῶν), said he was a good man, and buried him in the market-place, and adore him as the (second) founder of their city (ὡς ἀρχηγέτην), like Brasidas at Amphipolis (Thuc. V. 11). The whole of this section, with the exception of the last example, καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θήβησιν ἀποθανόντος, is quoted by Dionysius l. c. in support of his view that Demosthenes' speeches had been delivered before the composition of the Rhetoric, and were accessible to its author. The difference between the text which he seems to have used and that now received is very great, and apparently unaccountable. Besides minor discrepancies, the entire quotation from Theodectes, ἐνιότε γὰρ—κτανεῖν is omitted; and the clauses preceding and following stand thus, ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογίσασθαι. οὐ γὰρ εἰ δικαίως ἔπαθεν ᾁν, καὶ δικαίως ὑπὸ τούτου πέπονθεν, ὡς ὁ φόνου ἄξια ποιήσας πατήρ, εἰ ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ ἀπάγεται, δεῖ σκοπεῖν χωρὶς......ὁποτέρως ἂν ἁρμόττῃ. ἐνιότε γὰρ διαφωνεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον. ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Ἀλκμαίωνι τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, καὶ οἷον ἡ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη κ.τ.λ. All the alterations seem to be for the worse, and in one of them, ἔπαθεν ἄν for ἔπαθέν τι, the grammatical blunder betrays corruption. The additional example of the father and son introduced by Dionysius is, as Spengel observes, not here in point. The very example for the sake of which the extract was made is mutilated, and the explanation, ἐπεὶ γὰρ— αποθανεῖν, omitted: from which Spengel very justly argues that it could not have been in the MS that he used: if he had read it there, he could not have so absurdly misapplied the example to the case for the Crown: Spengel has reviewed the two passages in connexion in the tract above cited, pp. 44—47. Our text, which is, when properly explained, perfectly consistent and intelligible, is retained by Bekker and seems to require no alteration: at all events none of Dionysius' variations could be advantageously introduced.
Top. IV. The argument from greater to less—from that which is more to be expected to that which is less (Brandis)—and the converse; Top. B 10, 114 b 37 seq. To which is subjoined, § 5, εἰ μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον, where two things are compared which are equally likely or probable, and accordingly the one may be inferred from the other: of this there are three cases, ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν ἢ δοκεῖν ὑπάρχειν τριχῶς. Top. Ib. 115 a 15. Of the first there are four varieties: according as (1) the more or less is predicated of the same object—if pleasure is good, then the greater the pleasure the greater the good; and if wrong-doing is bad, the greater the wrong the worse; the fact is to be ascertained by induction—or (2) when one of two things is predicated (in the way of comparison), if that of which it is more likely to be predicated is without it (any property or quality), the same may be inferred of the less likely; or conversely, if the less likely has it, a fortiori the more likely: or (3) (the reverse of the preceding) when two things are predicated of one, if the more likely is not there, we may infer that the less likely will not, or if the less likely be found there, that the more likely will also: (4) when two things are predicated of two others, if that which is more likely is wanting to the one, the less likely will surely be wanting to the other; or, conversely, if that which is less likely to be present to the one is there, the other will be sure to have that which is more likely [Grote's Ar. I. p. 425]. These nice distinctions, though appropriate to Dialectics, are unnecessary in Rhetoric, and are therefore here omitted; but the examples will suggest the proper use of the topic. The inference in all these cases is plain and will be acknowledged by the audience, and that is all that is required. The inference from greater to less, or from more to less likely or probable, is commonly called the argumentum a fortiori; the rule omne maius continet in se minus may also be referred to the same principle, though the two are not absolutely coextensive. Cic.Topic. III 11, Alia (ducuntur argumenta) ex comparatione maiorum aut parium aut minorum. This is well exemplified in IV 23. XVIII 68, Reliquus est comparationis locus cuius...nunc explicanda tractatio est. Comparantur igitur ea quae aut maiora aut minora aut paria dicuntur: in quibus spectantur haec, numerus, species, vis, quaedam etiam ad res aliquas affectio. These four modes of application are clearly explained and illustrated in the following sections, 69—71. De Orat. II 40. 172, Maiora autem et minora et paria comparabimus sic: ex maiore; si bona existimatio divitiis praestat et pecunia tanto opere expetitur, quanto gloria magis est expetenda: ex minore; Hic parvae consuetudinis causa huius mortem fert tam familiariter; Quid si ipse amasset? quid hic mihi faciet patri? (Terent. Andr. I 1. 83): ex pari sic; est eiusdem et eripere et contra rempublicam largiri pecunias. De Inv. I 28. 41, II 17. 55, de Orat. Part. II 7, ult. Quint. V 10. 86—93, Apposita vel comparativa dicuntur quae maiora ex minoribus, minora ex maioribus, paria ex paribus probant. These are applied, subdivided, and illustrated through the remaining sections. ‘Another from the more or less, as for instance, “if not even the gods are omniscient, surely men can hardly be supposed to be so:” for that is as much as to say, if that to which something is more likely to belong wants it, plainly that which is less likely must want it too. Again (the argument) that a man who was capable of striking his father would also strike his neighbours, follows (is derived from) the (general rule or principle), that the less involves or implies the (possible existence, or capacity, δύναμις, of the) greater; in whichever way we are required to argue (the inference is required to be drawn), whether the affirmative or the negative’. This last example, as an exemplification of the inference from less to greater, has been looked upon as an error, and various corrections have been proposed, as by Vater, and Spengel in Specim. Comm. ad Ar. Rhet. II c. 23, p. 12, 1844. The latter has subsequently altered his opinion, and in 1851 (Trans. of Bav. Acad. p. 58) he admits that the explanation suggested by Victorius, and adopted by Muretus, Majoragius, and others, is sufficient to support the text; which, as usual, is retained by Bekker. No doubt, according to the ordinary interpretation of μᾶλλον and ἧττον in one of these comparisons, where the greater and less are referred to the magnitude and importance of the crime, the argument is ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον, ex maiore ad minus: the man who would strike his father (the greater) would a fortiori strike an ordinary acquaintance. But Ar. has here departed from this usual application of the topic, and makes the comparison in respect of the frequency of the crime: as it is less usual to strike one's father than one's neighbour, a man that could be guilty of the former, is much more likely to commit the latter and lesser offence: and the inference is from the less to the greater in this sense. “Aristoteles, cum boni viri officium sit nemini vim afferre, cumque iniuria ab omni abesse debeat, si tamen ibi manet ubi minus esse debebat, illic etiam existet ubi frequentius esse consuevit: et haec causa est cur εἰ τὸ ἧττον ὑπάρχει appellarit, a minore que eam significari voluerit.” Victorius. On the double reading of MS A^{c}, see Spengel, Trans. of Bav. Acad. 1851 p. 57 [and to the same effect in Spengel's ed., 1867; “in A post δέῃ δεῖξαι haec sententia alia ratione verbis τύπτει ὅτι...δεῖ δεῖξαι explicatur...duplicem sententiae formam iuxta positam melius perspiciemus: On these Aristotelian διττογραφίαι, see Torstrik, Praef. ad de Anima, p. xxi, seq.
The second branch of these inferences from comparison, is that of parallel cases. This is the argument from analogy, the foundation of induction, the observation of resemblances in things diverse, leading to the establishment of a general rule: the Socratic and Platonic Method: comp. c. 20. 4, note. Ex pari, Cic. de Inv. I 30. 47, ut locus in mari sine portu navibus esse non potest tutus, sic animus sine fide stabilis amicis non potest esse. On the argument from analogy in general, see note on c. 19. 2. ‘Again if the comparison is not of greater and less, (but of things equal or parallel): whence the saying, “Thy father too is to be pitied for the loss of his children. And is not Oeneus then, for the loss of his illustrious offspring?” ἄρα marks the inference. “Par infortunium parem misericordiam meretur.” Schrader. The verses are supposed (by Victorius, Welcker, Trag. Gr. p. 1012, and Wagner, Fr. Trag. Gr. III 185) to be taken from Antiphon's Meleager, which is quoted again § 20, and at II 2. 19. (Antiphon, a Tragic Poet contemporary with the Elder Dionysius, Rhet. II 6. 19, Clinton F. H. Vol. II. Praef. XXXIII, flourished at the end of the fifth cent. B. C. Compare note on II 2. 19.) The first of the two verses—if the story is that of Meleager—refers to the death of the two sons of Thestius, Toxeus and Plexippus, by the hand of their nephew Meleager: Oeneus was the father of Meleager, whom he too had now lost. The words are those of some one who is consoling Althea, Oeneus' wife, and perhaps belong (says Victorius) to Oeneus himself. The meaning then would be, (Oeneus to his wife,) You speak of the losses of your father whose sons are slain—are not mine as great as his, in the loss of my famous son Meleager? and do we not therefore equally deserve pity? The story is told in Diod. Sic. IV 34 (Schrader), and Ov. Met. VIII. See 86, 87, An felix Oeneus nato victore fruetur, Thestius orbus erit? melius lugebitis ambo. The conduct of Alexander or Paris in the abduction of Helen is next justified by the parallel case of Theseus, who did the same; Isocr. Helen. §§ 18—20; and every one—and more especially an Athenian audience—must allow that he was a good man and could do no wrong (οὐκ ἠδίκησεν); and of the Tyndaridae, Castor and Pollux, who carried off the two daughters of Leucippus, Phoebe and Eleaera (or Hilaira, Propert. I 2. 15), Ov. Fast. V 699, Theocr. Id. XXII 137, and these were demigods; and if Hector is not blamed for the death of Patroclus, neither should Paris be censured for that of Achilles. This is from some ἐγκώμιον or ἀπολογία Ἀλεξάνδρου, of an unknown rhetorician, similar to Isocrates' Helen. It is referred to again, § 8, and 24 §§ 7, 9. ‘And if no other artists (professors of any art or science) are mean or contemptible, neither are philosophers: and if generals are not to be held cheap because they are often defeated, neither are the sophists (when their sophistical dialectics are at fault)’. From some speech in defence of philosophy, and of the Sophists. The following is an argument, urged by an Athenian orator upon the general assembly, from the analogy of the relation of a private citizen to the state of which he is a member, to that of the same state as an individual member of the great community of the entire Greek race to the whole of which it is a part: if it be the duty of an individual Athenian to pay attention to, to study, the glory of his own country, then it is the duty of you, the collective Athenians whose representatives I am now addressing, to study in like manner the glory of the entire Greek community. Or it might be used by the epideictic orator in a Panegyric (πανηγυρικός λόγος, delivered in a πανήγυρις), pleading, like Isocrates, for the united action of the Greeks against the Barbarian.
Top. V. The consideration of time. This kind of argument, though important in Rhetoric, is inappropriate in Dialectics, and therefore receives only a passing notice in the Topics, B 4, III b 24, ἔτι ἐπὶ τὸν χρόνον ἐπιβλέπειν, εἴ που διαφωνεῖ, where the word ἐπιβλέπειν shews that it is a mere passing glance, a cursory observation, that it requires: and in Cicero's Topics it is altogether omitted [Grote's Ar. I p. 418]. The application of it in Top. B 11, 115 b 11, referred to by Brandis, is different, and indeed unsuited to rhetorical purposes. On this topic of time, and its importance in Rhetoric, Quintilian, Inst. Orat. V 10. 42 seq., after a preliminary division of time into (1) general (now, formerly, hereafter,) and (2) special or particular time, proceeds, Quorum utrorumque ratio et in consiliis (genus deliberativum) quidem, et in illo demonstrativo (τῷ ἐπιδεικτικῷ γένει) genere versatur; sed in iudiciis frequentissima est. Nam et iuris quaestiones facit, et qualitatem distinguit, et ad coniecturam plurimum confert (contributes very greatly to the establishment of the fact—the status coniecturalis or issue of fact— and especially to the refutation of the assertion of an alleged fact: this is illustrated by the cases following); ut quum interim probationes inexpugnabiles afferat, quales sunt, si dicatur (ut supra posui) signator, qui ante diem tabularum decessit: aut commisisse aliquid, vel quum infans esset, vel quum omnino natus non esset. Further, §§ 45—48, arguments may be readily drawn ex iis quae ante rem facta sunt, aut ex coniunctis rei, aut insequentibus, or from time past, present (instans), and future: and these three are then illustrated. Inferences may be drawn from what is past or present, to the future, from cause to effect; and conversely from present to past, from effect to cause. It seems that the two principal modes of applying the topic of time to Rhetoric are (1) that described by Quintilian, in establishing, or, more frequently, refuting the assertion of a fact, which is the chief use that is made of it in the forensic branch—this is again referred to, II 24. 11, on which see Introd. p. 274—the consideration of probabilities of time in matters of fact: and (2) the καιρός, the right time, the appropriate occasion, which may be employed by the deliberative orator or politician in estimating the expediency, immediate or prospective, of an act or course of policy; and by the panegyrist to enhance the value and importance of any action of his hero, or of anything else which may be the object of his encomium. On this use of καιρός comp. I 7. 32, I 9.38, and the notes. For illustrations, see Top. Γ 2, 117 a 26—b 2. ‘Another from the consideration of time, as Iphicrates said in the case (subaudi δίκῃ) against Harmodius, “Had I before the deed was done laid claim to the statue, provided I did it, you would have granted it me; will you then (the inference) refuse to grant it me now that I have done it? Do not, then, first make the promise in anticipation, and then, when you have received the benefit, defraud me of it.”’ The case, or speech, as it is here called ‘against Harmodius’, is also known by the name of ἡ περὶ τῆς εἰκόνος: this was the statue which was granted him in commemoration of the famous defeat of the Lacedaemonian μόρα in B. C. 392. Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 243, Ask the judges why they made the presents, and set up the statues, to Chabrias, Iphicrates, and Timotheus. The answer is, Ἰφικράτει ὅτι μόραν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπέκτεινεν. [Dem. Lept. 482 § 84, τιμῶντές ποτε Ἰφικράτην οὐ μόνον αὐτὸν ἐτιμήσατε...ib. § 86, οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑμῖν ἁρμόττει δοκεῖν παρὰ μὲν τὰς εὐεργεσίας οὕτω προχείρως ἔχειν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτοὺς τοὺς εὐεργέτας τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνων φίλους, ἐπειδὰν δὲ χρόνος διέλθῃ βραχύς, καὶ ὅσα αὐτοῖς δέδωκατε ταῦτ᾽ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι]. The speech here referred to was attributed by some —as Pseudo-Plutarch vit. Lys. συνέγραψε δὲ λόγον καὶ Ἰφικράτει: τὸν μὲν πρὸς Ἁρμόδιον—to Lysias4, which is denied by Dionysius, de Lysia Iud. c. 12, on two grounds, first the inferiority of the style, which was unworthy of Lysias; and secondly, because Lysias died seven years before the deed for which the statue was granted. Aristotle plainly ascribes it to Iphicrates himself. The speech περὶ τῆς εἰκόνος, is quoted again, § 8. See also Clinton Fasti Hellenici II 113, sub anno 371. It was not till after Iphicrates had resigned his military command, and retired into private life, ἀποδοὺς τὰ στρατεύματα ἰδιώτης γίνεται, that he claimed his statue, μετὰ Ἀλκισθένην ἄρχοντα, i. e. in the archonship of Pharsiclides, B. C. 371. The grant was opposed by Harmodius, a political antagonist. ‘And again to induce the Thebans to allow Philip to pass through their territories into Attica, it is argued that, “had he made the claim (or preferred the request) before he helped them against the Phocians (when they wanted his aid), they would have promised to do so; and therefore it would be monstrous for them now to refuse it, because he threw away his chance (then）’;—behaved liberally or with reckless generosity (so Vict.) on that occasion, and neglected to avail himself of his opportunity, (see the lexicons, s. v. προίεσθαι）—‘and trusted to their honour and good faith’. The former event occurred in B. C. 346, when Philip allied himself with the Thebans and overran Phocis, and so put an end to the Phocian war. An embassy was sent to the Thebans after the capture of Elataea B. C. 339, to request that Philip's troops might be allowed to march through their territory to attack Attica; but was met by a counter-embassy from Athens, proposed and accompanied by Demosthenes, who prevailed upon the Thebans to refuse the request, and conclude an alliance with Athens. κατὰ Λυσιμαχίδην ἄρχοντα, Dionys, Ep. 1 ad Amm. c. 11. On this embassy and the proposals there made, see Demosthenes himself, de Cor. §§ 311, 313, from which it would seem that the words here quoted are not Philip's, but an argument used by his ambassadors. Comp. also § 146, οὔτ᾽ εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐλθεῖν δυνατός... μήτε Θηβαίων διιέντων: and Aesch. c. Ctes. § 151, καὶ γράψειν ἔφη ψήφισμα (ὁ Δημοσθένης)...πέμπειν ὑμᾶς πρέσβεις αἰτήσοντας Θηβαίους διόδον ἐπὶ Φίλιππον, (referred to by Spengel, Specim. Comm. ad Ar. Rhet. Heidelb. 1844, p. 15). In the following year, 338 B. C. ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Χαιρώνδου, was fought the battle of Chaeronea. M. Schmidt (On the date of the Rhet. Halle, 1837, p. 16) uses this passage in fixing the date of Ar.'s work. [See Introd. p. 38.] Dionys., ad Amm. c. 11, cites the whole of this topic. The only important variations are two manifest blunders; the omission of εἰς before Φωκεῖς, and διέσπευσεν μὴ δώσουσιν for ἐπίστευσε μὴ διήσουσιν.
Top. VI. This topic, “the retort which turns the point of what has been said against ourselves upon him who said it,” viz. the adverse party in the law-court or assembly, belongs, as Brandis also remarks, u. s., p. 19, exclusively to Rhetoric. “Cum argumentum ducitur ex iis quae ex moribus vitaque ipsorum dicta sunt, admodumque ipsis congruunt, adversus illum ipsum qui dixit: eminet autem, inquit, hic inter alios, ac vim maximam semper habere existimatus est.” Victorius. That κατά in the definition means ‘against’ and not ‘of’ (in respect of) appears from the example. Iphicrates asks Aristophon, who had accused him of taking bribes to betray the fleet, “Would you have done it yourself? No; I am not like you. Well then, as you admit that you, Aristophon, are incapable of it, must not I, Iphicrates, (your superior in virtue and everything else,) be still more incapable of it?” As Ar. adds, the argument is worth nothing unless the person who uses it is conscious of his own moral superiority, and knows that the audience whom he addresses shares his conviction: employed against an ‘Aristides the Just’, it would be simply ridiculous. διαφέρει δὲ ὁ τρόπος κ.τ.λ.] This is interpreted by Spengel, Specim. Comm. u. s., p. 16 [and ed. 1867], “Mores sunt qui in hac re in discrimen vocantur; mores enim et vita eminet et litigantes discernit.” I doubt if τρόπος, standing thus alone, can mean mores: nor, I think, is the mention of character and manners appropriate in this place: further on it would be suitable. Gaisford's explanation and connexion seem to be upon the whole most satisfactory. “Verba οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ—εἴπειεν puto esse διὰ μέσου. His certe seclusis belle procedunt omnia. Sententiae nexus hic est; Excellit autem hic modus (vel locus—reading τόπος), Sed ad fidem accusatori detrahendam.” And in that case, Quintilian's words, V 12. 19, Aristoteles quidem potentissimum putat ex eo qui dicit, si sit vir optimus &c., may be a translation of διαφέρει ὁ τρόπος. διαφέρειν, if thus understood, denotes ‘pre-eminence, distinction above others’. οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ] This is no doubt Sophocles' tragedy of that name: of which four fragments (and one doubtful one) still survive. See Wagner, Fragm. Tr. Gr. 1 388, 9. “Quum Ar. ubi poetarum nomina omisit tantummodo clarissimos quosque respexerit, facile inducimur ut eum Sophoclis Teucrum dixisse credamus.” And Spengel, Spec. Comm. u. s., p. 16 [and ed.] “Sophoclis puto; si alius esset, nomen addidisset.” The same play is quoted again, III 15. 9, whence it appears that Ulysses was one of the characters. In an altercation with Teucer, the latter must be supposed to have used a similar argument, or retort, founded upon his own acknowledged superiority in moral character5. See Wagner l. c. who gives a long account of the subject of the play, and compares it with Pacuvius' play of the same name, supposed to be borrowed from Sophocles. Aristophon was already celebrated as an orator in 403 B. C. (Clinton, F. H., sub anno.) His fame may be inferred from the frequent and respectful mention of him by Demosthenes especially (see for instance, de Cor. § 219, de Fals. Leg. § 339), Aeschines and Dinarchus. See Baiter et Sauppe, Orat. Att., Ind. Nom. s. v., p. 21, Vol. III. He was an Azenian, Ἀζηνιεύς, and thereby distinguished from his namesake of Collytus, de Cor. § 93. The speech to which Iphicrates here replies was delivered in “the prosecution of Iphicrates by him and Chares for his failure in the last campaign of the Social war, Diod. XVI 15. 21,” (Clint. F. H. sub anno,) in the year 355 B. C., at an already advanced age. See also Sauppe, Fragm. Lys. 65, Or. Att. III 190: and note on Rhet. III 10. 6. He died before 330, the date of the de Corona, Dem. de Cor. § 162. On the speech ὑπὲρ Ἰφικράτους προδοσίας ἀπολογία, attributed to Lysias (rejected by Dionysius, de Lys. Iud. c. 12, comp. note on § 6 supra. on that against Harmodius), from which Iphicrates' saying against Harmodius is supposed to have been extracted, see Sauppe, Fragm. Lys. LXV, (Orat. Att. III 190): and comp. ibid. p. 191, Aristid. Or. 49, who quotes the same words somewhat differently, and, like Aristotle, attributes them directly to Iphicrates, and not to Lysias. [A. Schaefer, Dem. und seine Zeit, I 155.] Quintilian, V 12. 10, borrows this example, referring it however to a different class of arguments, probationes quas παθητικάς vocant ductas ex affectibus, (he means the ἦθος,) § 9. After quoting the nobilis Scauri defensio, (on which see Introd. p. 151, note 1,) he adds, cui simile quiddam fecisse Iphicrates dicitur, qui cum Aristophontem, quo accusante similis criminis reus erat, interrogasset, an is accepta pecunia rempublicam proditurus esset? isque id negasset; Quod igitur, inquit, tu non fecisses, ego feci? Comp. Spalding's note ad locum. εἰ προδοίη ἄν] εἰ = πότερον; see Appendix, On ἂν with the optative after certain particles [printed at the end of the notes to Book II]. δεῖ δ᾽ ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ.] ‘But (the person who employs the argument) must have this advantage on his side, that the other (the opponent) would be thought more likely to have done the wrong: otherwise, it would seem absurd, for a man to apply this to an Aristides (the model of justice and integrity) when he brings a charge;—(not so), but only for the discrediting (throwing a doubt upon, making the audience distrust, the credibility) of the accuser: (if ἀλλά be connected with what immediately precedes, to complete the sense, something must be supplied, such as οὐχ οὕτω, ἀλλὰ χρηστέον6), and this, because as a general rule the accuser pretends to be (would be if he could) a better man than the defendant: this (assumption) then always requires confutation’. Should not ἀεί be δεῖ?7 βούλεται] βούλεσθαι like ἐθέλειν frequently implies a tendency, design, intention, or aspiration, real or imaginary—the latter in things inanimate—wants to be, would be, would like to be, if it could; and hence here it denotes the assumption or pretension of superior goodness, ‘he would be better’. Zell, ad Eth. Nic. III 1. 15 (III 2, 1110 b 30, Bk.), Stallbaum ad Phaed. 74 D. Ast ad Phaedr. 230 D, p. 250. Thompson ad eundem locum. Viger, pp. 263, 264, n. 77. Eth. N. III 2, 1110 b 30, τὸ δ᾽ ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις κ.τ.λ. ‘won't be called’, ‘don't choose to be called’, as if it had the choice. Hist. Anim. I 16. 11 [495 a 32], θέλει γὰρ εἶναι διμερής (wants to be, would be if it could; of a general tendency, intention or plan, not completely carried out) ὁ πλεύμων ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτόν: ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. [the Index Aristotelicus does not quote this passage, either under θέλειν or under διμερής, though it is given under πλεύμων]. Ib. VII 3. 4 [583 b 26], αἱ καθάρσεις βούλονται...οὐ μὴν ἐξακριβοῦσί γε κ.τ.λ. (the same); de Part. Anim. IV 10, 29, θελει, Ib. III 7. 2, ὁ ἐγκέφαλος βούλεται διμερὴς εἶναι. de Gen. An. II 4, 9, 10 (bis eodem sensu). Ib. V 7. 17, [787 b 19], τὰ δ᾽ ὀστᾶ ζητεῖ τὴν τοῦ νεύρου φύσιν is used in the same sense. This I believe to be a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον, [no instance is given in the Index Aristotelicus, s. v. ζητεῖν, where even the passage just quoted is not cited]). de part. An. IV 2. 10, βούλεται, ‘is designed to be’; so Eth. N. V 7, 1132 a 21, ὁ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον δίκαιον ἔμψυχον, animated justice, the embodiment of abstract justice—this is what he is intended to be, though he often falls short of it. Ib. c. 8, 1133 b 14, βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον. de Anima A 3, 407 a 4, βούλεται, Plato means or intends. Topic. Z 5, 142 b 27, τὸ δὲ γένος βούλεται τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνειν. Ib. c. 13, 151 a 17. Pol. II 6, 1265 b 27, ἡ σύνταξις ὅλη β. εἶναι (πολιτεία) ‘is designed, or intended, to be’. Ib. 1266 a 7, ἐγκλίνειν β. πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. Ib. I 5, 1254 b 27, c. 6, 1255 b 3, c. 12, 1259 b 6, et saepe alibi. [“Saepe per βούλεται εἶναι significatur quo quid per naturam suam tendit, sive id assequitur quo tendit, sive non plene et perfecte assequitur.” Index Aristotelicus, where more than forty references are given.] So Latin velle; Cic. Orat. XXXIII 117, quem volumus esse eloquentem. Hor. A. P. 89, versibus exponi tragicis res comica non vult. καθόλου δ᾽ ἄτοπός ἐστιν κ.τ.λ.] Und. ὁ τρόπος (or ὁ τόπος) from above: not as Victorius, who supposes it to mean an absurd man. ‘And in general the use of it is absurd whenever a man censures (taxes) others for something which he does himself, or would do (if he had the opportunity), or exhorts them to do what he does not do now himself, and never would do (under any circumstances)’. The first of these two cases is that of Satan rebuking sin; the second that of one who preaches what he does not practise.
Top. VII. Definition. The definition of terms is the basis of all sound argument, and the ambiguity of terms one of the most abundant sources of fallacy and misunderstanding. A clear definition is therefore necessary for intelligible reasoning. To establish definitions, and so come to a clear understanding of the thing in controversy, was, as Aristotle tells us, the end and object of the Socratic method. The use of the definition in dialectics is treated in the Topics, A 15, 107 a 36 —b 5 [Grote's Ar. I p. 404], B 2, 109 b 13 seq. and 30 seq. Cic. Topic. V 26—VII 32. De Inv. II 17. 53—56. Orat. Part. XII 41. De Orat. II 39. 164. Quint. V 10. 36, and 54 seq. The first example of the argument from definition, is the inference drawn by Socrates at his trial from the definition of τὸ δαιμόνιον, Plat. Apol. Socr. c. 15. Meletus accuses him of teaching his young associates not to believe in the gods recognized by the state, and introducing other new divinities, ἕτερα δαιμόνια καινά, in their place. Socrates argues that upon Meletus' own admission he believes in δαιμόνια divine things (27 C); but divine things or works imply a workman; and therefore a belief in δαιμόνια necessarily implies a belief in the authors of those works, viz. δαίμονες. But δαίμονες are universally held to be either θεοί or θεῶν παῖδες (27 D), and therefore in either case a belief in δαιμόνια still implies a belief in the gods. The conclusion is τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι (E). In Xenophon's apology this argument is entirely omitted; and Socrates is represented as interpreting the καινὰ δαιμόνια (which he is accused of introducing) of τὸ δαιμόνιον, the divine sign which checked him when he was about to do wrong; and this is referred to the class of divine communications—oracles, omens, divination and so forth. As to the status of the δαίμονες opinions varied: but the usual conception of them was, as appears in Hesiod, Op. et D. 121, and many passages of Plato, Timaeus, Laws (VIII 848 D, θεῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἑπομένων θεοῖς δαιμόνων), IV 713 B, οὐκ ἀνθρώπους ἀλλὰ γένους θειοτέρου τε καὶ ἀμείνονος, δαίμονας, and elsewhere, that they were an order of beings, like angels, intermediate between men and gods, and having the office of tutelary deities or guardian angels to the human race. So Hesiod, u. s., Theogn. 1348 (of Ganymede), Plat. Phaedo 108 B, 107 D, 113 D. Aristotle seems to imply the same distinction when he says, de Div. per Somn. 1 2, init., that dreams are not θἐπεμπτα, because they are natural, δαιμόνια μέντοι: ἡ γὰρ φύσις δαιμονία, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ θεία. This argument of Socrates is repeated, III 18. 2, more at length, and with some difference of detail. The second example is taken from Iphicrates' speech upon the prosecution of Harmodius, the δίκη πρὸς Ἁρμόδιον, supra § 6, “cum Harmodius generis obscuritatem obiiceret, definitione generosi et propinqui fastum adversarii repressit et decus suum defendit.” Schrader. Harmodius had evidently been boasting of his descent from the famous Harmodius, and contrasting his own noble birth with the low origin of Iphicrates. The latter replies, by defining true nobility to be merit, and not mere family distinction (comp. II 15, and the motto of Trinity College, virtus vera nobilitas [Iuv. VIII. 20 nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus]); ‘for Harmodius (himself) and Aristogeiton had no nobility anterior to their noble deed’. Next as to the relationship which Harmodius claimed: he himself is in reality more nearly related to Harmodius than his own descendant: true kinsmanship is shewn in similarity of actions: ‘at all events my deeds are more nearly akin to those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton than thine’. This is still more pointedly expressed in Plutarch's version, Ἀποφθέγματα βασιλέων καὶ στρατηγῶν Iphicr. έ, p. 187 B, πρὸς δὲ Ἁρμόδιον, τὸν τοῦ παλαιοῦ Ἁρμοδίου ἀπόγονον, εἰς δυσγένειαν αὐτῷ λοιδορούμενον ἔφη: τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ἀπ᾽ ἐμοῦ γένος ἄρχεται, τὸ δὲ σὸν ἐν σοὶ παύεται. This seems to be taken, with alterations, from a speech of Lysias, ap. Stob. flor. 86. 15, quoted by Sauppe, Fragm. Lys. XVIII. Or. Att. III 180. Another form of Iphicrates' saying, briefer still, is found in Pseudo-Plut. περὶ εὐγενείας c. 21 (ap. Sauppe u. s.), Ἰφικράτης ὀνειδιζόμενος εἰς δυσγένειαν: ἐγὼ ἄρξω, εἶπε, τοῦ γένους. The third is taken from the Alexander of some unknown apologist, quoted before, § 5, and § 12; and c. 24. 7 and 9. On this Schrader; “sententia illius videtur haec esse: Paridem intemperantem habendum non esse, una quippe Helena contentum. Argumentum e definitione temperantis (temperantiae) petitum.” Similarly Victorius, “μὴ κόσμιος est qui una contentus non est...sed quot videt formosas mulieres tot amat. Cum sola Helena ipse contentus vixerit, non debet intemperans vocari.” ἑνός therefore is ‘one only’, and ἀγαπᾶν ‘to be satisfied with’. ἀπόλαυσις, of sensual enjoyment, Eth. N. I 3, sub init., ὁ ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος, the life of a Sardanapalus. Ib. III 13, 1118 a 30, ἀπολαύσει, ἡ γίνεται πᾶσα δἰ ἁφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις. VII 6, 1148 a 5, τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις. The fourth is, the reason that Socrates gave for refusing to go to pay a visit to Archelaus; that it would be ignominious to him, to receive favours from a man, and then not to have the power of requiting the benefits (good treatment) in the same way as one would injuries (ill treatment). This was a new definition, or an extension of the ordinary one, of ὕβρις, which is “wanton outrage,” supra II 2. 5, an act of aggression. ὕβρις usually implies hostility on the part of him who inflicts it; in this case the offer of a supposed benefit is construed as inflicting the ignominy. The abstract ὕβρις, for the concrete ὑβριστικόν, occurs often elsewhere, as in Soph. Oed. Col. 883, ἆρ᾽ οὐχ ὕβρις τάδ̓; KP. ὕβρις: ἀλλ᾽ ἀνεκτέα. Arist. Ran. 21, εἶτ᾽ οὐχ ὕβρις ταῦτ̓ ἐστί; Lysistr. 658, Nub. 1299. Similarly Ter. Andr. I 5. 2, quid est si hoc non contumelia est? (Reisig ad loc Soph.) And in other words; ὦ μῖσος (i. e. μισητόν hated object) εἰς Ἕλληνας, Eur. Iph. T. 512; ὦ μῖσος, Med. 1323, and Soph. Philoct. 991. ἄλγος for ἀλγεινόν, Aesch. Pr. Vinct. 261. Eur. Ion, 528 γέλως for γελοῖον, and Dem. de F. L. § 82, ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα γέλως, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἀναισχυντία δεινή. Arist. Acharn. 125, ταῦτα δῆτ᾽ οὐκ ἀγχόνη. The contempt of Archelaus implied in this refusal is noticed by Diog. Laert., Vit. Socr. II 5. 25, ὑπερεφρόνησε δὲ καὶ Ἀρχελάου τοῦ Μακεδόνος...μήτε παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἀπελθών; and see Schneider's note on Xenophon, Apol. Socr. § 17, on Socrates' ordinary conduct in respect of the acceptance of fees and gratuities and favours in general. On Archelaus and his usurpation of the throne of Macedonia, and his tyranny and crimes, see Plato Gorg. c. XXVI p. 470 C—471 C. ‘For all these first define the term (they are about to use), and then, having found its true essence and nature, they proceed to draw their inference (conclude) from it on the point that they are arguing. The ὅρος or ὁρισμός, ‘definition’, is itself defined at length, Metaph. Δ 12, 1037 b 25, seq.: and more briefly Top. A 8, 103 b 15, 101 b 39, Z 6, 143 b 20. The definition of a thing is its λόγος, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνων, that which expresses the formal cause of a thing; the what it was to be; the essence of it, or that which makes it what it is. Only εἴδη or species can, strictly speaking, be defined: the definition of the εἶδος gives the γένος, the essentials, together with the διαφορά, or specific difference: and these two constitute the definition; which is here accordingly said to express τὸ τί ἐστί, ‘the, what the thing really is’. On the definition see Waitz, Organ. II p. 398, and Trend. El. Log. Ar. § 54, et seq. This topic of definition afterwards became the στάσις ὁρική, nomen or finitio; one of the legal ‘issues’, on which see Introduction, Appendix E to Bk III pp. 397—400.
Top. VIII. ἐκ τοῦ ποσαχῶς] Between the topics of definition and division (§ 10) is introduced this topic of ambiguous terms, or words that are susceptible of many and various senses, such as good (Top. A 15, 106 a 4 [Grote's Ar. I p. 402]); which must be carefully examined to see whether or no they are all of them applicable to the argument. It is treated at great length in Top. A 15, and again B 3; and is inserted here (between definition and division) because it is equally applicable to both (Brandis). The exhaustive treatment bestowed upon it in the Topics supersedes the necessity of dwelling on it here; and we are accordingly referred to that treatise for illustration of it. Brandis, u.s., p. 19, objects to περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς, “that there is nothing in the Topics which throws any light upon the enigmatical ὀρθῶς;” and proposes περὶ τοῦ εἰ ὀρθῶς ‘upon the right use of the terms’, i. e. whether it can be applied properly in any one of its various senses or not. But surely the reading of the text may be interpreted as it stands in precisely the same meaning: οἷον ἐν τοπικοῖς (λέλεκται, or διώρισται) περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς (χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ), ‘as in the Topics (we have treated) of the right use of the terms’. Muretus has omitted the words in his transl. as a gloss: and Victorius, followed by Schrader and Buhle, understands it as a reference, not directly to the Topics, but to the ‘dialectical art’, as elsewhere, II 22. 10, for instance— see Schrader's note on II 25. 3. “Disciplina Topica intelligenda est.” Buhle. It seems to me to be a direct and explicit reference to the passages of the Topics above mentioned, in which the right way of dealing with these ambiguous terms is described.
Top. IX. ἐκ διαιρέσεως] the topic of division. This is the division of a genus into its εἴδη or species; as appears from the example, the three motives to crime, from which the inference is drawn. Finitioni subiecta maxime videntur genus, species, differens, proprium. Ex his omnibus argumenta ducuntur. Quint. V 10. 55. Top. B 2, 109 b 13—29. Γ 6, 120 a 34 [Grote's Ar. I p. 435]. On διαίρεσις in demonstration, use and abuse, see Anal. Pr. I 31. Trendel. El. Log. Ar. § 58, p. 134 seq. Cic. Topic. V 28, XXII 83, de Orat. II 39. 165, Sin pars (rei quaeritur) partitione, hoc modo: aut senatui parendum de salute rei publicae fuit aut aliud consilium instituendum aut sua sponte faciendum; aliud consilium, superbum; suum, adrogans; utendum igitur fuit consilio senatus. Quint. V 10. 63, 65 seq. Ad probandum valet, et ad refellendum, § 65. Periculosum; requires caution in the use, § 67. The example, which illustrates the topic by the three motives to crime or wrong-doing, pleasure, profit, and honour, is taken from Isocrates' ἀντίδοσις, §§ 217—220, as Spengel points out, Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 20, note. All the three are successively applied to test the accusation (of corrupting youth) that his enemies have brought against him, and all of them are found to be unsuitable to explain the alleged fact. He therefore concludes by the method of exhaustion, that having no conceivable motives, he is not guilty. It must however be observed that Ar.'s διὰ δὲ τὸ τρίτον οὐδ᾽ αὐτοί φασιν, is not supported by anything in Isocrates' text. The causes and motives of actions have been already divided in I 10, with a very different result. The same terms are there employed, διελώμεθα § 6, and διαιρέσεις § 11. For an example of this topic, see II 23. 22 in the note. On the inference from ‘disjunctive judgments’, see Thomson, Laws of Thought, § 90, p. 160.
Top. X. ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς] The rudimentary kind of induction, of which alone Rhetoric admits: two or three similar cases being adduced to prove a general rule, from which the inference is drawn as to the present case. It is the argument from analogy, or cases in point. This and the following, says Brandis, u. s., naturally find nothing corresponding to them in the Topics. Cic. de Or. II 40. 168, ex similitudine; si ferae partus suos diligunt, qua nos in liberos nostros indulgentia esse debemus? &c. Quint. V 10. 73, est argumentorum locus ex similibus; si continentia virtus, utique et abstinentia: Si fidem debet tutor, et procurator. Hoc est ex eo genere quod ἐπαγωγήν Graeci vocant, Cicero inductionem. ἐκ τῆς Πεπαρηθίας] δίκης; comp. § 6, ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἁρμόδιον. An extract ‘from the well-known Peparethian case’, about the parentage of a child; the speaker adduces two analogous cases, or cases in point, to prove the rule which he wishes to establish, that it is the mother who is the best judge of the parentage of the child. Gaisford quotes Homer, Od. A 215, μήτηρ μέν τ᾽ ἐμέ φησι τοῦ ἔμμεναι, αὐτὰρ ἔγωγε οὐκ οἶδ̓: οὐ γάρ πω τις ἑὸν γόνον αὐτὸς ἀνέγνω: on which Eustathius; δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει τὰ εἰρημένα ὀρθῶς ἔχειν. Πεπαρηθίας8] “Concionis (ut puto) sive alterius generis scriptionis nomen est Peparethia,” Victorius. But in that case it would be masc. (with λόγος understood), not feminine: and the analogy of § 6 is also in favour of the ellipse of δίκης. Otherwise we might understand ἐπαγωγῆς, or γυναικός. The meaning is, ‘Another topic of inference is induction; as, for instance, it may be inferred as a general rule from the Peparethian case, that in the case of children (as to the true parentage of children) women always distinguish the truth better (than the other sex)’. And the same rule has been applied, from a similar induction, in two other recorded cases; ‘for, in the first, (on the one hand), at Athens, in a dispute in which Mantias the orator was engaged with his son (about his legitimacy), the mother declared the fact (of the birth, and so gained the cause for her child); and in the second, at Thebes, in a dispute between Ismenias and Stilbo (for the paternity of a child), Dodonis (the mother) made a declaration that it belonged to Ismenias; and in consequence Thettaliscus was always regarded as Ismenias' son’. ‘Mantias the orator’, whose name does not appear in Smith's Biogr. Dict., may be the same person who is mentioned as the father of Mantitheus and Boeotus, of the deme of Thoricus, Dem. Boeot. de nom. §§ 7, 10; comp. §§ 30 (bis), 37. [‘Mantias proposed that Plangon should declare on oath before an arbitrator, whether Boeotus and Pamphilus were her sons by Mantias or not. She had assured him privately that if the oath in the affirmative were tendered to her, she would decline to take it...She, however, unexpectedly swore that they were her sons by Mantias.’ From Mr Paley's Introd. to Dem. Or. 39, Select Private Orations, I p. 131. Comp. supplementary notes on pp. 134 and 182]. Ismenias, whose name likewise is wanting in Smith's Dict., was in all probability the one somewhat celebrated in Theban history, as leader, with Autoclides, of the anti-Lacedaemonian party at Thebes, mentioned by Xenophon, Hellen. V 2. 25 seq. He was accused by his opponent Leontiades, tried, and put to death by a court appointed for the purpose by the Lacedaemonians, who were then (383 B. C.) in occupation of the Cadmeia, Xen. Ib. §§ 35, 36, Grote, Hist. Gr. X pp. 80, 85, 86 [chap LXXVI]. His name is also associated by Mr Grote, H. G. X 380, 387, 391 [chap. LXXIX], with that of Pelopidas, as one of the ambassadors to the court of Artaxerxes at Susa in 367 B. C.; and again, as taken prisoner with him by Alexander of Pherae in the following year. The authority for these statements appears to be Plutarch, Artax. XXII for the first; and Id. Pelopid. XXIX sub fin. for the second: Xenophon does not mention him in this connexion. At all events, it was not the same Ismenias, that was put to death in 383, and accompanied Pelopidas, as ambassador and captive, in 367 and 3669. Of Stilbon, and the other persons named, I can find no further particulars. ‘And another instance from Theodectes' “law”—if to those who have mismanaged other people's horses we don't entrust horses of our own, or (our ships) to those who have upset the ships of others; then, if the rule hold universally, those who have ill guarded or maintained the safety and well-being of others, are not to be employed in (entrusted with) the preservation of our own’. Sauppe, Fragm. Theod. Νόμος (Or. Att. III 247), thinks with every appearance of probability that Theodectes' ‘law’ “（declamationem) ad rationes militum mercenariorum lege ab Atheniensibus accurate ordinandas pertinuisse.” Both the fragments quoted by Aristotle, here, and again § 17, agree perfectly with this view. The extract here stigmatizes the folly shewn by the Athenians in entrusting their interests to mercenaries—like Charidemus and his fellows—who have already shewn their incapacity and untrustworthiness whilst in the employment of others—foreign princes and states—who have used their services. The other extract, § 17, is to shew that by their gross misconduct and the mischief they have already done, most of them—with the exception perhaps of men like Strabax and Charidemus—have entirely disqualified themselves for employment. From the example in Theodectes' ‘law’, the general principle may be inferred, that it is folly to entrust with the care of our own interests and the management of our affairs such as have already shewn themselves incapable by previous failures in like cases. The argument from the analogy of trades and professions is quite in the manner of Socrates and Plato. On Theodectes himself and his works, see note on II 23. 3, and the references there. Ἀλκιδάμας] Of Alcidamas and his writings, see note on I 13. 2, and the reff. This fragment is referred by Sauppe, Fragm. Alcid. 5, to Alcidamas' Μουσεῖον; of which he says, on fragm. 6, that he supposes it to have been: “promptuarium quoddam rhetoricum, quod declamationes de variis rebus contineret” [“Alkidamas...sein mannigfaltige rhetorische Probestücke umfassendes Buch μουσεῖον nannte,” Vahlen, der Rhetor Alkidamas, p. 495]. Alcidamas' Μεσσηνιακὸς λόγος is quoted, I 13. 2, and II 23. 1. Πάριοι γοῦν—ἡ πόλις] translated in Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. 9, Vol. III. p. 267. τοὺς σοφούς] are here the great ‘wits’, men of genius; men distinguished (not here specially as artists, but) for literature, learning, or wisdom in general. Of Archilochus, his life, character, and writings, a good account is to be found in Mure, Hist. Gr. Lit. Vol. III. p. 138 seq. (Bk. III. ch. iii), in which the βλασφημία noted by Alcidamas, as well as his great celebrity, is abundantly illustrated. See also Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. XI §§ 6—10, and 14. Archilochum proprio rabies armavit iambo, Hor. A. P. 79 (with Orelli's note). Parios iambos, Ib. Ep. I 19. 23 seq. οὐκ ὄντα πολίτην] This, the vulgata lectio, is retained by Bekker, and even (for once) by Spengel, though A^{c} has πολιτικόν. In favour of this, the reading of the best MS, it may be urged, that πολίτην would represent the Chians as disclaiming Homer as their fellow-citizen, quite contrary to the pertinacity with which they ordinarily urged their claim to the honour of his birthplace. This was carried so far, that Simonides in one of his fragments, Eleg. Fragm. 85 line 2 (Bergk), says of a quotation from Homer, Χῖος ἔειπεν ἀνήρ. Comp. Thucyd. III 104. On this ‘Ionic’ claim, see further in Mure, Hist. Gk. Lit. Vol. II p. 202. On the other hand οὐ πολίτην may mean—as Müller supposes, Hist. Gk. Lit. ch. V § 1—that they claimed, not Homer's birth, but merely his residence among them. The other reading πολιτικόν affords an equally good sense; that his Chian fellow-countrymen conferred honours upon Homer, though not upon the ordinary ground of public services, or active participation in the business of public life; as the Athenians—had they so pleased—might have dealt with Plato. καί περ γυναῖκα οὖσαν] “Sappho so far surpassed all other women in intellectual and literary distinction that her fellow-countrymen, the Mytileneans, assigned to her the like honours with the men, whom she equalled in renown; admitted by her countrymen of every age to be the only female entitled to rank on the same level with the more illustrious poets of the male sex.” Mure, H. G. L. Vol. III p. 273, Sappho. He refers to this passage. Chilon, Mure, Ib. p. 392. Diog. Laert., vit. Chil. 68, substitutes the ephory for the seat in the γερουσία as the honour conferred on Chilon by the Lacedaemonians. φιλολόγοι] ‘of a literary turn’. Ἰταλιῶται] (Σικελιῶται) Greek settlers in Italy (and Sicily). Victorius remarks that these are properly distinguished from Ἰταλοί, the original inhabitants, who would not have understood Pythagoras' learning, or institutions, or moral precepts. Pythagoras, according to the received account, as reported by Diogenes Laertius, vit. Pyth., was a native of Samos, to which after various travels he was returning, when, finding it oppressed by the tyranny of Polycrates, he started for Croton in Italy; κἀκεῖ νόμους θεὶς τοῖς Ἰταλιώταις ἐδοξάσθη σὺν τοῖς μαθηταῖς, οἳ πρὸς τοὺς τριακοσίους ὄντες ᾠκονόμουν ἄριστα τὰ πολιτικά, ὥστε σχεδὸν ἀριστοκρατίαν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν, § 3. In what way the honour of his new fellow-citizens was expressed rather by respect and admiration, than by substantial rewards, may be gathered from the famous αὐτὸς ἔφα of his pupils, and from a notice in Diogenes, § 14, οὕτω δ᾽ ἐθαυμάσθη κ.τ.λ. Anaxagoras was a native of Clazomenae in Ionia, but, τέλος ἀποχωρήσας εἰς Λάμψαχον αὐτόθι κατέστρεψεν. Diog. Laert., Anaxagoras, § 14, a custom held in his honour, Ib. τελευτήσαντα δὴ αὐτὸν ἔθαψαν ἐντίμως οἱ Λαμψακηνοὶ καὶ ἐπέγραψαν: Ἐνθάδε, πλεῖστον ἀληθείης ἐπὶ τέρμα περήσας οὐρανίου κόσμου, κεῖται Ἀναξαγόρας, § 15. καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι] ita vulg. et vet. transl. Lat. “ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι, A^{c} apud Vict. et Gaisf.” Spengel. Accordingly Bekker, Ed. 3, Spengel and Vahlen now read ὅτι Ἀθ. preceded by the mark of something omitted. And in fact, as Spengel observes, what follows is not a proper continuation of the preceding quotation from Alcidamas, but a new example of the general topic of induction. The general rule which is derived from the two following instances has fallen out, or something suggesting it, to which ὅτι refers, has been omitted either by a copyist, or possibly in his haste by the author himself. Aristotle is capable of this; continuing perhaps to quote from Alcidamas, he may have neglected to supply the proper connexion. The general principle that is to be inferred from the induction may be the Platonic paradox that the true statesmen are philosophers: this appears from the three examples, ‘that the Athenians flourished and were happy under the laws of Solon, and the Lacedaemonians under those of Lycurgus; and at Thebes, the prosperity (or flourishing condition) of the city was coeval with the accession of its leaders to philosophy’. I have rendered the last words thus to express ἐγένοντο. But the meaning of the whole is doubtless as Victorius gives it, that the happiness of Thebes, that is, its virtue and glory, began and ended with the philosophy of its leaders. This is inadequately expressed by ἐγένοντο, which only conveys the beginning of the coincidence: and, if the explanation of the suppressed rule be right, would have been better represented by ἅμα οἱ φιλόσοφοι προστάται ἐγένοντο. The last word is a correction of Victorius from MS A^{c} for the vulgata lectio ἐλέγοντο. (The leaders here referred to are Epaminondas and Pelopidas.)
Top. XI. This is an inference ἐκ κρίσεως, ‘from an authoritative judgment or decision already pronounced upon the same question, or one like it, or the opposite’ (opposites may always be inferred from opposites); ‘either universally and at all times’ (supply οὕτω κεκρίκασιν) ‘or, in default of that, by the majority, or the wise—either all or most— or good’. This topic, like the last, is naturally wanting in the dialectical Topics, to which it is inappropriate. Brandis, u. s. Cicero, Top. XX 78, mixes up this topic with the authority of character, the ἦθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι, which ought not to be confounded though they have much in common; the authority being derived from the same source, intellectual and moral pre-eminence, but employed in different ways. The former of the two is made supplementary to the other, sed et oratores et philosophos et poetas et historicos: ex quorum et dictis et scriptis saepe auctoritas petitur ad faciendam fidem. Quintilian omits it in his enumeration, V 10. We have here, and in the following sentence, a classification of ‘authorities’ from whose foregone decisions we may draw an inference as to the truth of a statement, or the rectitude of a principle, act, or course of policy which we have to support; or the reverse. Such are the universal consent of mankind10, quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus: short of that, the judgment of the majority: or of the ‘wise’, especially professional men, experts, pre-eminently skilled in any art, science, practice, pursuit, or the majority of them: or, lastly, the good, the right-minded, and therefore sound judging; whose minds are unclouded by passion or partiality, unbiassed by prejudice, clear to decide aright: men of φρόνησις who have acquired the habit of right judgment in practical business and moral distinctions. The good, or virtuous man, the φρόνιμος or ἀγαθός, or the ὀρθὸς λόγος, appears again and again in Aristotle's Moral and Political writings as the true standard of judgment. Comp. Rhet. I 6. 25, ἀγαθόν, ὃ τῶν φρονίμων τις ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν προέκρινεν, and see note and references there. The wise, as authorities; particularly judges and legislators, as well as poets, philosophers, statesmen, prophets and seers, and the like; are one class of μάρτυρες (as attesting the truth of a statement or principle) of the ἄτεχνοι πίστεις, I 15. 13, seq.: where Homer, Periander, Solon, Themistocles (as an interpreter of oracles), and Plato, are selected as examples. ἢ εἰ αὐτοὶ οἱ κρίνοντες] again κεκρίκασιν. ‘Or again, (special classes of authorities,) if the judges themselves, or those whose authority they accept (have already pronounced upon the point); or those whose decision we have no power of opposing, such as our lords and masters (any one that has power, controul, over us, with whom it is folly to contend); or those whose decision it is not right to oppose, as gods, father, pastors and masters’ (whom we are bound in duty to obey). ‘An instance of this is what Autocles said in his speech on the prosecution of Mixidemides’ (this is lit. ‘as Aut. said, what he did say against M.’）’ ‘that’ (before εἰ supply δεινὸν εἶναι aut tale aliquid, ‘it was monstrous that, to think that’—) ‘the dread goddesses’ (the Eumenides or Erinnyes) ‘should be satisfied to bring their case11 before the Areopagus, and Mixidemides not!’ That is, that the authority of the courthad been proved by the submission of the Eumenides, Mixidemides was therefore bound to submit in like manner: the jurisdiction and its claims had been already decided. Of the circumstances of the case nothing further is known: but it seems from the allusion here, that Mixid. had first refused to submit to the Court of Areopagus the trial of some charge against him, on which he was subsequently, and consequently, prosecuted in one of the ordinary courts of Autocles. The appearance of the σεμναὶ θεαί as prosecutors in the court of the Areopagus is of course a reference to their prosecution of Orestes in Aeschylus' Eumenides. Of Mixidemides we know but the name. Autocles was a much more important personage. He was an Athenian, son of Strombichides, Xen. Hellen. VI 3. 2, one of the seven ambassadors sent to the congress at Sparta in 371 B.C., in the spring before the battle of Leuctra, Xen. l. c., who reports his speech § 7. Xenophon (u. s. § 7) calls him μάλα ἐπιστρεφὴς ῥήτωρ, ‘a very careful orator’ (so Sturz, Lex. Xen. and Lexx. but I think rather, ‘dexterous’, one who could readily turn himself about to anything, ‘versatile’: and so apparently Suidas, who renders it ἀγχίνους). Autocles was again employed in 362—361 “in place of Ergophilus (Rhet. II 3. 13) to carry on war for Athens in the Hellespont and Bosporus.” (Grote.) Xenophon's Hellenics do not reach this date. His operations against Cotys in the Chersonese, and subsequent trial, are mentioned by Demosth. c. Aristocr. § 104 and c. Polycl. § 12, and his name occurs, pro Phorm. § 53 [A. Schaefer's Dem. u. s. Zeit I pp. 64, 134 and III 2. p. 158]. See Grote, H. G. X 223 [c. LXXVII], and 511 seq. [c. LXXX]. Another Autocles, ὁ Τολμαίου, is mentioned by Thuc. IV 53, and again c. 119: and another by Lysias, πρὸς Σίμωνα § 12: and a fourth by Aeschines, de F. Leg. § 155. ‘Or (another example) Sappho's saying, that death must be an evil: for the gods have so decided; else they would have died themselves’: using the gods as an authority for the truth of her dictum. ‘Or again, as Aristippus to Plato, when he pronounced upon some point in—as he, Aristippus, thought—a somewhat too authoritative tone, “Nay but,” said he, “our friend”—meaning Socrates—“never used to speak like that.”’ Aristippus draws an inference from the authority of their common master—who never dictated, but left every question open to free discussion, always assuming his own ignorance, and desire to be instructed rather than to instruct—to the proper rule in conducting philosophical discussion. On Aristippus see Grote's Plato, Vol. III. p. 530, seq. ch. XXXVIII. On this passage, see Grote, Plato, III 471, and note. In qualification of what is there said of Plato's ‘arrogance’, so far as it can be gathered from our text, take Victorius' commentary on ὡς ᾤετο, with which I entirely agree: “quae sequuntur verba modestiam Platonis defendunt, et paene declarant sine causa Aristippum arrogantiae eum insumulasse: addit enim ὡς ᾤετο, ut opinio illius erat.” I will not however deny that Plato may even in conversation have been occasionally guilty of dogmatizing: in his latest writings, such as the Timaeus and Laws, and to a less degree in the Republic, such a tendency undoubtedly shews itself: but by far the larger portion of his dialogues, which represent probably nearly three-fourths of his entire life, are pervaded by a directly opposite spirit, and are the very impersonation of intellectual freedom. Following the method and practice of his master, he submits every question as it arises to the freest dialectical discussion, so that it is often impossible to decide which way (at the period of writing any particular dialogue) his own opinion inclines; and always presents in the strongest light any objections and difficulties in the thesis which he is maintaining. I think at all events with Victorius that Aristotle at any rate lends no countenance here to Aristippus' charge of dogmatic assumption. So far as his outward bearing and demeanour were concerned, I can conceive that he may have been haughty and reserved, possibly even morose: but a habit of ‘laying down the law’, or of undue assumption and pretension in lecturing and discussion—which is what Aristippus appears here to attribute to him—seems to me to be inconsistent with what we known from his dialogues to have been the ordinary habit of his mind, at least until he was already advanced in life12. ἐπαγγελτικώτερον] ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι is to ‘announce’, ‘make public profession of’, as of an art, pursuit, business, practice. Xen. Memor. I 2. 7, ἐπ᾽ ἀρετήν, of the Sophists, who ‘made a profession of teaching virtue’. So Πρωταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα, Rhet. II 24. 11. This ‘profession’ may or may not carry with it the notion of pretension without performance, imposture, sham, φαινομένη σοφία, show without substance: and it is by the context and the other associations that the particular meaning must be determined. Thus when Protagoras says of himself, τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὦ Σ., τὸ ἐπάγγελμα ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι, he certainly does not mean to imply that he is an impostor: when Aristotle l. c. applies the term to him, this is by no means so certain; judging by his account of the Sophists, de Soph. El. I, 165 a 19 seq. Instances of both usages may be found in Ast, Lex. Plat. There can be no doubt that undue assumption or pretension is meant to be conveyed by Aristippus in applying the word to Plato's tone and manner. ‘And Agesipolis repeated the inquiry of the God at Delphi, which he had previously made (of the God) at Olympia (Apollo at Delphi, Zeus at Olympia), whether his opinion coincided with his father's; assuming or inferring’ (ὡς sc. from the obvious duty of respecting the authority of a father) ‘the disgracefulness of pronouncing the contrary’. For v. l. Ἡγήσιππος Victorius and Muretus had proposed to substitute Ἀγησίπολις, from Xen. Hellen. IV 7. 2, which has been adopted in the recent editions of Bekker and Spengel; being also confirmed by a variation in the old Latin Transl., which has Hegesippus polis. See Spengel in Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 53. Gaisford in Not. Var. and Victorius. Xenophon in the passage cited tells the whole story. Agesipolis is the first of the three kings of Sparta of that name, who came to the throne in 394 B.C. (Clinton, F. H. II p. 205). His expedition into Argolis, to which the consultation of the oracle was preparatory, was in 390 (Clinton, F. H. sub anno). This Agesipolis has been not unnaturally confounded with his more distinguished fellow-citizen and contemporary Agesilaus, to whom Plutarch, Reg. et Imper. Apophthegm., Agesilaus 7, p. 191 B, erroneously ascribes this saying as an apophthegm (Gaisford). And similarly Diodorus, XIV 97, has substituted the latter name for the former in his account of (apparently) the same event that Xenophon is relating in the passage above cited. See Schneider's note ad locum. ‘And Isocrates’ argument about Helen, to shew that she was virtuous and respectable, (as she must have been) since (εἴπερ, if—as he did) she was approved by Theseus (Theseus decided, or gave judgment in her favour)’. Aristotle's ἔκρινεν expresses Isocrates' ἀγαπήσαντας καὶ θαυμάσαντας. See ante, I 6. 25. The passage of Isocrates referred to occurs in his Helen §§ 18—22. Compare especially §§ 21, 22. He concludes thus, περὶ δὲ τῶν οὕτω παλαιῶν προσήκει τοῖς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον εὖ φρονήσασιν ὁμονοοῦντας ἡμᾶς φαίνεσθαι, to give way to their authority. ‘And the case of Alexander (Paris) whom the (three) goddesses (Juno, Minerva, Venus) preferred’ (selected, decided, by preference; πρό, before all others; to adjudge the prize of beauty). This instance is given before, with the preceding, in I 6. 25. ‘And—as Isocrates says, to prove that (ὅτι) Evagoras was a man of worth—Conon, at all events after his misfortune, left all the rest and came to Evagoras’. Evagoras, the subject of Isocrates' panegyric, Or. IX, was king of Salamis in Cyprus. In the spring of 404 B.C., after the defeat of Aegospotami (δυστυχήσας), he fled for refuge to Evagoras, Xen. Hellen. II 1. 29; the words δυστυχήσας ὡς Εὐαγόραν ἦλθε are a direct quotation from the Oration, § 52. This incident of Conon's forced visit is absurdly embellished, exaggerated, and distorted from its true significance by the voluble panegyrist, § 51 seq.
Top. XII. ἐκ τῶν μερῶν] the argument from the parts to the whole. This topic, so briefly dispatched here, is much more clearly and fully set forth in the Topics, B 4, 111 a 33 seq. [Grote's Ar. I p. 417], to which we are referred; the same example being given in both. The parts and whole, are the species and genus. Anything of which the genus or whole can be predicated must likewise fall under one of its species, because the species taken together make up the genus; if knowledge for instance be predicable of something, then some one of its parts or branches—grammar, music or some other species of knowledge—must needs be predicable of the same; otherwise it is no part of knowledge. And the same applies to the declensions—παρωνύμως λεγόμενα, the same root or notion with altered terminations—of the words representing the genus; what is true of ἐπιστήμη &c. is equally true of ἐπιστήμων, γραμματικός, μουσικός. If then all the parts of the genus are or can be known (this is assumed in the text), we have to consider when any thesis is proposed, such as, the soul is in motion (τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖσθαι, meaning, that the soul is motion), what the kinds of motion are, and whether the soul is capable of being moved in any of them; if not, we infer, ‘from part to whole’, that the genus motion is not predicable of soul, or that the soul is devoid of motion. κίνησις is usually divided by Aristotle into four kinds, (1) φορά, motion of translation, motion proper; (2) ἀλλοίωσις, alteration; (3) αὔξησις, growth; and (4) φθίσις, decay. De Anima I 3, 406 a 12. Again Metaph. Λ 2, 1069 b 9, κατὰ τό τι ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποῦ, where γένεσις ἁπλῆ καὶ φθορά are added to the list, and distinguished from αὔξησις and φθίσις, but still included in four divisions; γένεσις καὶ φθορά, κατὰ τόδε or τὸ τί; αὔξησις καὶ φθορά, κατὰ τὸ ποσόν; ἀλλοίωσις, κατὰ τὸ πάθος, or ποιόν; and φορά, κατὰ τόπον, or ποῦ. In Phys. VII 2 sub init. there are distinguished φορά, ποσόν, ποιόν. Categ. c. 14, 15 a 13, six, γένεσις, φθορά, αὔξησις, μείωσις, ἀλλοίωσις, ἡ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή. Plato gives two, Parmen. 138 C, (1) motion proper or of translation and (2) change. To which, p. 162 E, is added as a distinct kind the motion of revolution or rotation, (1) ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, alteration, change of character, κατὰ τὸ πάθος, τὸ ποιόν; (2) μεταβαίνειν, change of place; and (3) στρέφεσθαι, revolution. And in Legg. X c. 6, 893 B seq., where the distinctions are derived from a priori considerations, ten is the total number, 894 C. (Comp. Bonitz ad loc. Metaph., Waitz ad l. Categ.) Cicero treats this topic of argument, under the general head of definitio, Top. V 26, seq., afterwards subdivided into partitio and divisio; and under the latter speaks of the process of dividing the genus into its species, which he calls formae; Formae sunt hae, in quas genus sine ullius praetermissione dividitur: ut si quis ius in legem, morem, aequitatem dividat, § 31: but does not go further into the argument to be derived from it. Quintilian, V 10. 55, seq., follows Cicero in placing genus and species under the head finitio, § 55, comp. § 62; in distinguishing partitio and divisio, as subordinate modes of finitio § 63; and points out the mode of drawing inferences, affirmative or negative, from the division of the genus into its parts or species, as to whether anything proposed can or can not be included under it, § 65. These are his examples. Ut sit civis aut natus sit oportet, aut factus: utrumque tollendum est, nec natus nec factus est. Ib. Hic servus quem tibi vindicas, aut verna tuus est, aut emptus, aut donatus, aut testamento relictus, aut ex hoste captus, aut alienus: deinde remotis prioribus supererit alienus. He adds, what Aristotle and Cicero have omitted; periculosum, et cum cura intuendum genus; quia si in proponendo unum quodlibet omiserimus, cum risu quoque tota res solvitur. ‘Example from Theodectes' Socrates: “What temple has he profaned? To which of the gods that the city believes in (recognises, accepts) has he failed to pay the honour due?”’ The phrase ἀσεβεῖν εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς occurs twice (as Victorius notes) in Aesch. c. Ctes. §§ 106, 107. Theodectes' “Socrates,” which is (most probably) quoted again without the author's name § 18, was one of the numerous ἀπολογίαι Σωκράτους of which those of Plato and Xenophon alone are still in existence. We read also (Isocr. Busiris § 4) of a paradoxical κατηγορία Σωκράτους by Polycrates (one of the early Sophistical Rhetoricians, Spengel Art. Script. pp. 75—7. Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX vol. III 281—2), which was answered by an ἀπολογία Σωκράτους from Lysias, Speng. op. cit. p. 141. On this see Sauppe, Lys. Fragm. CXIII Or. Att. III 204: which is to be distinguished from another and earlier one, also by Lysias Sauppe, u. s. Fr. CXII p. 203. [Blass, Att. Bereds. I, p. 342, II, pp. 337, 416.] Theodectes is here answering the charge of Meletus, οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, Xen. Mem. I 1. 1, Apol. Socr. § 11, Plat. Ap. Socr. 26 B. To this Xenophon, like Theodectes, replies by a direct contradiction, and affirmation of the contrary, Mem. I 1. 2, θύων τε γὰρ φανερὸς ἦν, κ.τ.λ. comp. § 20; and sim. Apol. Socr. § 11 seq. How the charge is met by Plato in his Apology cc. XIV, XV, and dialectically argued, has been already intimated, supra § 8,—see note, and comp. III 18. 2. The difference of the mode of treatment severally adopted by the two disciples in the defence of their master is remarkable. The inference implied in Theod.'s argument is this:—You accuse Socrates of impiety and disbelief in the gods. Has he ever profaned a temple? Has he neglected to worship them and do them honour, by sacrifice and other outward observances? The indignant question, implying that the speaker defies the other to contradict him and prove his charge, assumes the negative. But such offences as these are the parts of impiety which indicate disbelief in the gods—the orator in his excitement takes for granted that the enumeration is complete, that there is nothing else which could prove disbelief in the gods—and if he is not guilty of any of them, neither can he be guilty of the impiety which includes these, and these alone, as its parts; the whole or genus is not predicable of him13. §§ 14, 15. Top. XIII. Argumentum ex consequentibus; ἐκ τῶν ἑπομένων τινὶ ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, which Vict. found as a title to the topic in one of his MSS. On ἕπεσθαι and ἀκολουθεῖν, and their various senses, dialectical and in the ordinary language, see note on I 6. 3. The general meaning of them seems to be ‘concomitant’; that which constantly waits or attends upon something, either as antecedent, simultaneous, or subsequent. There are two topics of consequents, XIII and XIV. The first is simple. Most things have some good and some bad consequent usually or inseparably attached to them, as wisdom and the envy of fellow-citizens are the ordinary results of education. In exhortation, defence, and encomium (the three branches of Rhetoric) we urge the favourable consequence—the resulting wisdom in the case proposed—if we have to dissuade, to accuse, to censure, the unfavourable; each as the occasion may require. The second is somewhat more complex. Here we have two opposites (περὶ δυοῖν καὶ ἀντικειμένοιν) to deal with—in the example public speaking falls into the two alternatives of true and fair speaking, and false and unfair. These are to be treated ‘in the way before mentioned’, τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ τρόπῳ: that is, in exhorting or recommending we take the favourable consequent, in dissuading the unfavourable. But the difference between the two topics lies in this (διαφέρει δέ); that in the former the opposition (that must be the opposition of the good and bad consequent, for there is no other) is accidental—that is, as appears in the example, there is no relation or logical connexion between wisdom and envy; they may be compared in respect of their value and importance as motives to action, but are not logical opposites—but in the latter, the good and the bad consequences are two contraries (τἀναντία) love and hatred, divine and human. In the example of the second topic, the dissuasive argument which comes first assigns evil consequences (hatred) to both alternatives of public speaking: that in recommendation, the contrary, love. The topic of consequences, in the general sense, as above explained, has been already applied in estimating the value of goods absolute, I 6.3; and in the comparison of good things, I 7.5. In Dialectics it does not appear in this simple shape, though it is virtually contained in the application of it to the four modes of ἀντίθεσις or opposition, Top. B 8; and in the comparison of two good things, Top. Γ 2, 117 a 5—15. Brandis u. s. [Philologus IV 1] observes of the two Rhetorical topics, that they could not find an independent place and treatment in the Topics. Cicero speaks of the general topic of consequence dialecticorum proprius ex consequentibus antecedentibus et repugnantibus, omitting the simple form in which it appears in Rhetoric. His consequentia are necessary concomitants, quae rem necessario consequuntur. Top. XII 53. The mode of handling it is illustrated, XIII 53. Quint. V 10. 74, Ex consequentibus sive adiunctis; Si est bonum iustitia, recte iudicandum: si malum perfidia, non est fallendum. Idem retro. § 75, sed haec consequentia dico, ἀκολουθά; est enim consequens (in Cicero's sense) sapientiae bonitas; illa sequentia, παρεπόμενα, quae postea facta sunt aut futura. And two other examples of the application of the argument, §§ 76, 77. Quintilian naturally, like Aristotle, gives only the rhetorical, and omits the dialectical use of the topic. Note by the way the redundant ὥστε in συμβαίνει ὥσθ᾽ ἕπεσθαι. See Monk on Eur. Hippol. 1323, Κύπρις γὰρ ἤθελ᾽ ὥστε γίγνεσθαι τάδε. And add to the examples there given, Thuc. I 119, δεηθέντες ὥστε ψηφ., VIII 45, ἐδίδασκεν ὥστε, Ib. 79, δόξαν ὥστε διαναομαχεῖν Ib. 86, ἐπαγγελλόμενοι ὥστε βοηθεῖν. Herod. I 74, III 14. Plat. Protag. 338 C, ἀδύνατον ὥστε, Phaed. 93 B, ἔστιν ὥστε, 103 E, (Stallbaum's note,) Phaedr. 269 D (Heindorf ad loc. et ad Protag. l. c.). Dem. de F. L. § 124 (Shilleto's note). Aesch. de F. L. p. 49, § 158, ἐάσετε...ὥστε. Arist. Polit. II 2, 1261 a 34, συμβαίνει ὥστε πὰντας ἄρχειν (as here), Ib. VI (IV) 5, 1292 b 12, συμβέβηκεν ...ὥστε. Ib. VIII (V) 9, 1309 b 32, ἔστιν ὥστ᾽ ἔχειν. Pind. Nem. V 64, Soph. Oed. Col. 1350 (D), δικαιῶν ὥστε...Eur. Iph. T. 1017 (D), πῶς οὖν γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ὥστε... Ib. 1380. The example of Top. is taken from the passage of Eur. Med. 294, already employed in illustration of a γνώμη, II 21. 2. Education of children has for its inseparable attendants wisdom or learning as a good, and the envy of one's fellow-citizens as an evil: we may therefore take our choice between them, and argue either for or against it, persuading or dissuading. (Note a good instance of μὲν οὖν, as a negative (usually) corrective, ‘nay rather’; this of course comes from the opponent who is arguing on the other side, that education is advantageous. Also in § 15.) ‘The illustration of this topic constitutes the entire art of Callippus— with the addition (no doubt) of the possible, (the κοινὸς τόπος of that name,) and all the rest (of the κοινοὶ τόποι, three in number), as has been said’, in c. 19, namely. The two notices of Callippus and his art of Rhetoric in this passage and § 21, are all that is known to us of that rhetorician. He is not to be confounded with the Callippus mentioned in I 12. 29. Spengel, Art. Script. 148—9, contents himself with quoting the two passages of this chapter on the subject. He was one of the early writers on the art of Rhetoric; and it is possible that a person of that name referred to by Isocrates—who was born in 436 B. C.—as one of his first pupils, περὶ ἀντιδόσεως § 93, may have been this same Rhetorician Callippus.
Tiresias, ap. Phoen. 968, ὅστις δ᾽ ἐμπύρῳ χρῆται τέχνῃ μάταιος: ἢν μὲν ἐχθρὰ σημῄνας τύχῃ, πικρὸς καθέστηχ̓ οἷς ἂν οἰωνοσκοπῇ. ψευδῆ δ̓ ὑπ̓ οἴκτου τοῖσι χρωμένοις λέγων ἀδικεῖ τὰ τῶν θεῶν, is compared by Victorius14 with the example in the second topic. This second topic of consequences differs from the preceding in these particulars. In the first, which is simple, the consequences of the thing which is in question are twofold—bad and good, and these are unconnected by any reciprocal relation between them. The second is more complicated, and offers contrary alternatives, which are set in opposition ἀντιτίθεται τἀναντία, as δίκαια and ἄδικα λέγειν in the example—and then, ‘proceed as before’, τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ τρόπῳ; that is, state the consequence of each, (favourable in exhortation or recommendation, unfavourable in dissuasion,) and bring the two into comparison in order to strike the balance of advantage or disadvantage between them. In public speaking, for instance, the alternatives are, true and fair, and false and unfair, words and arguments: if your object is to dissuade from it, you adduce the ill consequences of both, and contrast them, so as to shew which is the greater. ‘But that is all one with the proverb, to buy the marsh with the salt’: i. e. to take the fat with the lean; the bad with the good; the unprofitable and unwholesome marsh (palus inamabilis, Virg. G. IV 479, Aen. VI 438) with the profitable salt which is inseparably connected with it. An argument pro and con, but only of the first kind, Top. XIII, by comparing the good and the bad consequence, according as you are for or against the purchase. An Italian proverb to the same effect is quoted in Buhle's note, comprare il mel con le mosche; and the opposite, the good without the bad, appears in the Latin, sine sacris haereditas, Plaut. Capt. IV 1. 5 (Schrad.). [We may also contrast the proverb μηδὲ μέλι, μηδὲ μελίσσας: ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ βουλομένων παθεῖν τι ἀγαθὸν μετὰ ἀπευκτοῦ (Diogenianus, cent. vi, 58). Cf. Sappho, fragm. 113.] There is an evident intention in the association of ἕλος and ἅλας: the alliterative jingle, as in so many other proverbs (παθήματα μαθήματα, safe bind safe find), sharpens the point, and helps its hold on the memory. Some MSS have ἔλαιον for ἕλος, which is expressed in the Vet. Tr. Lat., ‘olim (oleum) emi et sales,’ and by other interpreters; and also adopted by Erasmus, Adag., oleum et salem oportet emere; ‘to be in want of oil and salt,’ implying insanity, against which this mixture was supposed to be a specific. Victorius, referring to the Schol. on Arist. Nub. 1237, ἁλσὶν διασμηχθεὶς ὄναιτ᾽ ἂν οὑτοσί, who notes τοὺς παραφρονοῦντας ἁλσὶ καὶ ἐλαίῳ διέβρεχον, καὶ ὠφελοῦντο, supposes that some copyist having this in his mind altered ἕλος into ἔλαιον. At all events the proverb in this interpretation has no meaning or applicability here. In the following paragraph (καὶ ἡ βλαίσωσις...ἑκατέροις) the meaning of βλαίσωσις, the application of the metaphor, and its connexion with what follows, which appears to be intended as an exemplification or explanation of the use of βλαίσωσις, are, and are likely to remain, alike unintelligible. The Commentators and Lexicographers are equally at fault; Spengel in his recent commentary passes the passage over in absolute silence: Victorius, who reasonably supposes that βλαίσωσις (metaphorically) represents some figure of rhetorical argument, candidly admits that nothing whatsoever is known of its meaning and use, and affords no help either in the explanation of the metaphor, or its connexion with what seems to be the interpretation of it. Buhle, and W. Dindorf, ap. Steph. Thes. s. v. praevaricatio; Vet. Lat. Tr. claudicatio; Riccoboni inversio. Vater discreetly says nothing; and Schrader that which amounts to nothing. After all these failures I cannot hope for any better success; and I will merely offer a few remarks upon the passage, with a view to assist others as far as I can in their search for a solution. βλαισός and ῥαιβός, valgus and varus, all of them express a deformity or divergence from the right line, or standard shape, in the legs and feet. The first (which is not always explained in the same way15) seems to correspond to our ‘bow-legged’, that is having the leg and foot bent outwards: for it was applied to the hind legs of frogs, βλαισοπόδης βάτραχος, poet. ap. Suidam. And Etym. M. (conf. Poll. 2. 193,) interprets it, ὁ τοὺς πόδας εἰς τὰ ἔξω διεστραμμένος (with his feet distorted so as to turn outwards) καὶ τῷ Λ στοιχείῳ ἐοικώς; so that it seems that it may represent the act of straddling. The adj. itself and some derivatives not unfrequently occur in Ar.'s works on Nat. Hist.; likewise in Galen, once in Xenophon, de re Eq. I 3, and, rarely in other authors; but βλαίσωσις appears to be a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον. ῥαιβός is the opposite defect to this, ‘bandy-legged’, where the legs turn inwards. And to these correspond valgus and varus: the first, qui suras et crura habet extrorsum intortas, of which Petronius says, crura in orbem pandit; and Martial, crura... simulant quae cornua lunae. Huic contrarius est varus, qui introrsus pedes et crura obtorta habet. “Vari dicuntur incurva crura habentes.” Festus (ap. Facc.). Heindorf ad Hor. Sat. I. 3, 47. G. Dindorf (in Steph. Thes.) explains it by praevaricatio, quoting Cic. Orat. Partit. XXXVI 126, (praevaricator definitur) ex nomine ipso, quod significat eum qui in contrariis caussis quasi vare (Edd. varie) esse positus videatur16. If we revert to the derivation, and apparently the original meaning, of the word, following Cicero, and understand it as ‘a deviation from the right’ course or path, by a metaphor from bent or distorted legs, praevaricatio might be taken as expressing by a similar metaphor the general meaning of βλαίσωσις; but in its ordinary acceptation of ‘the betrayal of his client by an advocate, and collusion with his opponent’—in which Buhle and the Translators must be supposed to understand it, since they offer no other explanation—it seems altogether inappropriate. So however Rost and Palm, in their Lexicon. The translation, as the passage stands, is ‘and the βλαίσωσις is, or consists in, this, when each (either) of two contraries is followed (accompanied) by a good and an ill consequence, each contrary to each’, (as in a proposition of Euclid). This is a generalisation of the example in Top. XIV: the two contraries are the fair and unfair speaking; each of which has its favourable and unfavourable consequence; truth, the love of God and hatred of men; falsehood, the love of men and hatred of God. But how this is connected with βλαίσωσις I confess myself unable to discover. The nearest approach I have been able to make to it—which I only mention to condemn—is to understand βλαίσωσις of the straddling of the legs, the Λ of the Etymol. M., which might possibly represent the divergence of the two inferences pro and con deducible from the topic of consequences: but not only is this common to all rhetorical argumentation, and certainly not characteristic of this particular topic, but it also loses sight of the deviation from a true standard, which we have supposed this metaphorical application of the term to imply.
Top. XV. This Topic is derived from the habit men have, which may be assumed to be almost universal, of concealing their real opinions and wishes in respect of things good and bad, which are always directed to their own interests, under the outward show and profession of noble and generous sentiments and of a high and pure morality. Thus, to take two examples from de Soph. El. c. 12, they openly profess that a noble death is preferable to a life of pleasure; that poverty and rectitude, is better than ill-got gains, than wealth accompanied with disgrace: but secretly they think and wish the contrary. These contrary views and inclinations can always be played off one against the other in argument, and the opponent made to seem to be asserting a paradox: you infer the one or the other as the occasion requires. This is in fact the most effective (κυριώτατος) of all topics for bringing about this result. The mode of dealing with the topic is thus described in de Soph. El. l. c. 173 a 2, “If the thesis is in accordance with their real desires, the respondent should be confronted with their public professions; if it is in accordance with them [the latter], he should be confronted with their real desires. In either case he must fall into paradox, and contradict either their publicly expressed, or secret opinions.” Poste, Transl. p. 43. This is for dialectics: but it may be applied equally well to rhetorical practice, in which there is nearly always a real or (as in the epideictic branch) imaginary opponent. The author proceeds, Ib. 173 a 7, further to illustrate this by the familiar opposition of φύσις and νόμος, nature and convention or custom, which is to be handled in the same way as the preceding, and is πλεῖστος τόπος τοῦ τὰ παράδοξα λέγειν: referring to Callicles' well-known exposition of the true doctrine of justice conventional and natural, in Plato's Gorgias, c. 38, foll. This topic does not occur in Cicero's tract, which is confined to dialectics; nor is it found amongst the rhetorical topics of Quintilian's tenth chapter of Book V, which has supplied us with so many illustrations of Aristotle. ‘Another; whereas in public and in secret men praise not the same things, but openly most highly extol what is just and right, yet secretly (privately, in their hearts,) prefer their own interest and advantage, from these (i. e. from premisses derived from the one or the other of these two modes of thought and expression, whichever it be that the opponent has given utterance to,) we must endeavour to infer the other: for of all paradoxical topics (topics that lead to paradox, which enable us to represent the opponent as guilty of it,) this is the most effective (most powerful, mightiest, most authoritative)’. If the opponent has been indulging in some high-flown moral commonplaces about virtue and honour, by an appeal to the real but secret feelings of the audience on such matters, we must shew that such sentiments are paradoxical, or contrary to common opinion; or conversely, if we have occasion to assume the high moral tone, make our appeal to those opinions which they openly profess, and shew that it is a paradox to assume with the opponent that men are incapable of any other motives than such as are suggested by sordid self-interest.
Top. XVI. ‘Another (inference may be drawn) from the proportion of so and so (ταῦτα）’. This is the argument from analogy in its strict and proper sense, the ‘analogy of relations’. See Sir W. Hamilton, quoted at II 19. 2, and on the argument from analogy in general. The analogy or proportion here is the literal, numerical or geometrical, proportion, 2 : 4 :: 8 : 16. “Analogy or proportion is the similitude of ratios.” Eucl. El. Bk. v def. 8. This topic also does not appear in the dialectical treatise, where it is inappropriate; nor in Cicero and Quintilian, except so far as the ordinary and popular analogy (see again the note above referred to) is recognised under the names of similitudo (C) and similia (Q). Similitude is between two, proportion requires four terms. Eth. N. V 6, 1131 a 32, ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων (equality or parity of ratios), καὶ ἐν τέταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις. And comp. the explanation of the ‘proportional’ metaphor in Poet. XXI 11, and the examples, §§ 12, 13. Accordingly of the two examples each has four terms, and the inference is drawn from the similitude of the two ratios. ‘As Iphicrates, when they (the assembly, ψηφιοῦνται,) wanted to force upon his son the discharge of one of the liturgies’ (pecuniary contributions to the service of the state, ordinary and extraordinary, of a very onerous character), ‘because he was tall, though he was younger than the age (required by law), said that if they suppose tall boys to be men, they will have to vote short men to be boys’: the proportion being, Tall boys : men :: short men : boys. Two ratios of equality. The argument is a reductio ad absurdum. The first ratio is hypothetical. If tall boys are really to be regarded as men, then by the same ratio, &c. ‘And Theodectes, in the “law”’ (which he proposes, in his declamation, for the reform of the mercenary service, see above § 11, note) ‘you make citizens of your mercenaries, such as Strabax and Charidemus, for their respectability and virtue, and won't you (by the same proportion) make exiles of those who have been guilty of such desperate (ἀνήκεστα) atrocities?’ Of these ‘mercenaries’ who swarmed in Greece from the beginning of the fourth century onwards, the causes of their growth, their character and conduct, and the injury they brought upon Greece, see an account in Grote, Hist. Gr. Vol. XI p. 392 seq. [chap. LXXXVII]. Charidemus, of Oreus in Euboea, in the middle of that century, was perhaps the most celebrated of their leaders. He was a brave and successful soldier, but faithless, and profligate and reckless in personal character. Theopomp. ap. Athen. X 436 B. C. Theopomp. Fr. 155, Fragm. Hist. Gr., ed. C. and Th. Müller, p. 384 b (Firmin Didot). διὰ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν, therefore, is not to be taken as an exact description of Charidemus' character, but is the assumption upon which the Athenians acted when they conferred these rewards. His only real merit was the service he had done them. He plays a leading part in Demosthenes' speech, c. Aristocratem; who mentions several times, §§ 23, 65, 89, the citizenship conferred on him by the Athenians in acknowledgment of his services, as well as—somewhat later—a golden crown, § 145, πρῶτον πολίτης, εἶτα πάλιν χρυσοῖς στεφάνοις ὡς εὐεργέτης στεφάνωται, § 157, presents, and the name of ‘benefactor’, 185, and 188. Besides the Athenians, he was employed by Cotys and his son Cersobleptes, kings of Thrace, and by Memnon and Mentor in Asia. A complete account of him and his doings is to be found in Weber's Proleg. ad Dem. c. Aristocr. pp. LX—LXXXIII. Of the other mercenary leader, Strabax, all that we know is derived from Dem. c. Lept. § 84, that through the intervention or by the recommendation (διὰ) of Iphicrates he received a certain ‘honour’ from the Athenians, to which Theodectes' extract here adds that this was the citizenship. We learn further from Harpocration and Suidas that Strabax is—an ὄνομα κύριον. “De commendatione Iphicratis, ornatus Strabax videri potest Iphicratis in eodem bello (sc. Corinthiaco) adiutor fuisse.” F. A. Wolff, ad loc. Dem.
Top. XVII. Inference from results or consequents to antecedents, parity of the one implies parity or identity of the other17: if, for instance, the admission of the birth of the gods equally with that of their death, leads to the result of denying the eternity of their existence—in the former case there was a time when they were not, as in the other there is a time when they will not be—then the two assertions (the antecedents) may be regarded as equivalent, or the same in their effect, and for the purposes of the argument ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσεβοῦσιν, because they both lead to the same result or consequent; so that one can be put for the other, whichever happens to suit your argument. On Xenophanes, see note on I 15. 29, and the reff. On this passage, Müllach, Fr. Phil. Gr., Xenoph. Fragm. Inc. 7, “Hoc dicto veteres poetae perstringuntur, qui quum diis aeternitatem (potius immortalitatem) tribuerent, eos tamen hominum instar ortos esse affirmabant eorumque parentes et originem copiose enarrabant.rdquo; And to nearly the same effect, Karsten, Xenoph. Fr. Rell. XXXIV. p. 85. The saying against the assertors of the birth of the gods is not found amongst the extant fragments, but the arguments by which he refuted this opinion is given by Aristotle (?) de Xenoph. Zen. et Gorg. init. p. 974. 1, seq. and by Simplicius, Comm. in Phys. f. 6 A, ap. Karsten p. 107, comp. p. 109. For καὶ—δέ, see note on 1 6. 22. ‘And in fact, as a general rule, we may always assume’ (subaudi δεῖ, χρή, aut tale aliquid) the result of either of two things to be the same with that of the other (ἑκατέρου), (or with ἑκάστου, as A^{c}, adopted by Spengel, the result of anything, i. e. any things, two or more, that we have to argue about) ‘as in the example, “what you are about to decide upon is not Isocrates, but a study and practice, whether or not philosophy deserves to be studied.”’ Whether you decide upon Isocrates or his pursuit and study, the inference or result is the same (ταὐτόν), and can be deduced equally from both. I have here adopted Spengel's emendation of Isocrates for Socrates, “quam emendationem,” as Spengel modestly says, “Victorius si integram vidisset Antidosin nobis non reliquisset”. It is given in his Specim. Comm. in Ar. Rhet., Munich, 1839, p. 37. A comparison of this passage with Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδόσεως, § 173, οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἐμοῦ μέλλετε μόνον τὴν ψῆφον διοίσειν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, ᾧ πολλοὶ τῶν νεωτέρων προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν, certifies the emendation. Even Bekker has accepted it. At the same time the vulgata lectio Σωκράτους, as Victorius interprets it, yields a very sufficient sense, thus more briefly expressed by Schrader, “Socrate damnato simul damnabitur studium sapientiae: Socrate servato servabuntur sapientiae studia;” Socrates and his study or pursuit stand or fall together; to condemn Socrates, is to condemn philosophy: and might even be thought to be confirmed by κρίνειν, which more immediately suggests a judicial decision. ‘And that (the result, effect, consequence of) giving earth and water is the same as, equivalent to, slavery’. The demand of ‘earth and water’ by the Persian monarchs from a conquered prince or state, in token of submission, and as a symbol of absolute dominion or complete possession of the soil—therefore equivalent to slavery, δουλεύειν—is referred to frequently by Herodotus, IV 126, Darius to Idanthyrsus, the Scythian king, δεσπότῃ τῷ σῷ δῶρα φέρων γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ. V 17, the same to Amyntas king of Macedonia, Ib. 18, the same to the Athenians, Ib. 73, VII 131, 133, 138, 163. Plut. Themist. c. 6. Plin. N. H. XXII 4 (ap. Bähr), Summum apud antiquos signum victoriae erat herbam porrigere victos, hoc est terra et altrice ipsa humo et humatione etiam cedere: quem morem etiam nunc durare apud Germanos scio. It appears from Ducange, Gloss. s. v. Investitura, that this custom was still continued in the transmission of land during the middle ages (Bähr). ‘And participation in the general peace (would be equivalent to) doing (Philip's) bidding’. The Schol. on this passage writes thus: Φίλιππος κατηνάγκασε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἵν᾽ εἰρηνεύωσιν μετ̓ αὐτοῦ ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι χῶραι, ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἀντιπίπτων λέγει ὅτι τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης μετὰ τοῦ Φιλίππου ἡμᾶς, ὡς καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας, ἐστι τὸ ποιεῖν ὅ προστάττει ὁ Φίλιππος. Spengel was the first to point out (Specim. Comm. u. s. p. 39) that the κοινὴ εἰρήνη here referred to is the same of which mention occurs several times in a speech περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν—attributed to Demosthenes, but more probably by Hyperides; see the Greek argument, and Grote, H. Gr. [chap. XCI] XII 21 and note— §§ 10, 11, 17, 19, 30. The κοινὴ εἰρήνη, and the συνθῆκαι πρὸς Ἀλέξ. both denote the convention at Corinth of the deputies of all the Greek states, with the exception of the Lacedaemonians who refused to appear, in 336 B. C., “which recognised Hellas as a confederacy under the Macedonian prince (Alexander, not Philip) as imperator, president, or executive head and arm.” Grote, u. s. p. 18. The speech π. τ. π. Ἀλέξ. ς., according to the same authority, p. 21, was delivered in 335. But neither Aristotle's quotation, nor the Scholiast's comment, can refer to this speech, as Spengel himself observes. If the Scholiast is right in describing the opposition of Demosthenes as directed against Philip, it must be referred to a different speech delivered by him against the former agreement of a similar kind with Philip, after Chaeronea, which took place two years earlier than that with Alexander, in 338. Grote, u. s., p. 17. Comp. XI 700. [A. Schaefer, Dem. u. s. Zeit, III 186—193.] This passage has been already referred to in the Introduction, on the question of the date of publication of the Rhetoric, p. 28; and again, 46 note 2, on the references to Demosthenes in the same work. ‘Of the two alternatives (the affirmative or negative side, whether the result is or is not the same, either may be taken, whichever happens to be serviceable’. Or, as Victorius, ‘of the two alternatives, which though in themselves different, yet in the result are the same, we may always take that which best suits our argument’.
Top. XVIII. ‘Another (is derived from the natural habit or tendency of mankind) that the same men don't always choose the same things’ (Spengel omits τοὺς αὐτοὺς with A^{c}; Bekker, as usual, retains it) ‘after as before (something intermediate, act, occurrence, period), but conversely’ (i. e. do the second time what they have avoided the first, or vice versa); ‘of which the following enthymeme is an example’. ἢ quaere ᾗ? which expresses ‘as’ (in the way in which), much more naturally than ἤ. This seems to be the required sense: and so I think Victorius understands it, “non eadem iidem homines diversis temporibus sequuntur.” The same meaning is very awkwardly expressed, if indeed it is expressed, by rendering ἤ ‘or’. In that case ὕστερον and πρότερον must be ‘at one time or another’: Riccobon ‘posterius vel prius’ ‘after or before’: ‘sooner or later’. I will put the question, and leave it to the judgment of others. Which is the more natural expression, the more usual Greek, and more in accordance with the example? ‘The same men don't always choose the same things after as before’, i. e. the second time, when they have to repeat some action or the like, as the first time, when the circumstances are perhaps different: or, if ἤ be or, ‘men don't always choose the same things after or before, sooner or later’. Surely the alternative is here out of place; in this case it should be καί, not ἤ. ἐνθύμημα] Victorius interprets this “argumentum ex contrariis conclusum:” on which see Introd. pp. 104, 5, Cic. Top. XIII 55. This is the sense in which it is found in the Rhet. ad Alex., Cicero and Quintilian, and was in fact the common usage of it. But, as far as I can recollect, it never occurs in this special sense, at all events, in Aristotle's Rhetoric; and is in fact one of the leading distinctions between it and the Rhet. ad Alex. Neither was there any occasion to depart here from his ordinary use of the term: for enthymemes, i. e. rhetorical inferences in general, are exactly what he is employed in illustrating throughout this chapter. The original sentence of Lysias begins with, δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ κ.τ.λ. ‘For monstrous would it be, men of Athens, if when we were in exile we fought for our return (to be restored to our) home, and now that we have returned (been restored) we shall fly to avoid fighting’. We were eager to fight before (this was, as will appear afterwards, with the Lacedaemonians who aided the Thirty), shall we now after our restoration shrink from it? The example is an instance of what men are in the habit of doing, viz. changing their minds without reason: the argument, that it is unreasonable, and monstrous at all events to do it now. κατελθεῖν, to return from exile, prop. ‘down’, κατά, viz. to the shore or harbour, at which almost all returned exiles would naturally arrive; either from the interior of the country, ἀναβαίνειν καταβαίνειν; or from the open sea into port, ἀνάγεσθαι contrasted with κατάγεσθαι, προσσχεῖν. Aesch. Choeph. 3, and his own commentary, Arist. Ran. 1163—5. This is followed by Aristotle's explanation, which is certainly more obscure than what it professes to explain. ‘That is to say (γάρ), at one time (before) they preferred staying (where they were, ‘maintaining their ground’) at the price of fighting; at another (after their restoration) not fighting at the expense of not staying’, i. e. the second time, they preferred not staying, quitting the city, to avoid fighting. It is necessary to interpret ἀντί in this way, not ‘instead of’—if the reading be sound, to bring the explanation into conformity with the example; and thus no alteration is required. The words quoted by Ar. are taken from a speech of Lysias, of which Dionysius, de Lys. Iud. c. 33, has preserved a long fragment; printed amongst Lysias' speeches as Orat. 34. Baiter et Sauppe Or. Att. I 147. [Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit I p.441 and Jebb's Attic Orators I p. 211.] Dion. gives an account of the occasion of it in the preceding chapter. He doubts if it was ever actually delivered. The title of it is, περὶ τοῦ μὴ καταλῦσαι τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν Ἀθήνῃσι; and its object was to prevent the carrying into effect of a proposal of one Phormisius, one of the restored exiles μετὰ τοῦ δήμου,—this was after the expulsion of the Thirty in 403 B. C., when the demus had been restored and recovered its authority, and the other party were now in exile—to permit the return of the present exiles, but to accompany this by a constitutional change, which should exclude from political rights all but the possessors of land; a measure which would have disfranchised 5000 citizens. The passage here quoted refers to a somewhat different subject. The Lace daemonians, who were at hand with their troops, were trying to impose the measure upon them by force, dictating, and ordering, κελεύουσιν, προστάττουσιν, § 6, and apparently preparing to interfere with arms. Lysias is accordingly exhorting the Athenians to resist manfully, and not to give way and quit the city again, after their restoration, for fear of having to fight: and Aristotle—and this is a most striking instance of the difficulty that so frequently arises from Aristotle's haste and carelessness in writing, and also of his constant liability to lapses of memory—quoting from memory, and quoting wrong, and neglecting to mention the occasion of the speech and the name of the author, which he had probably forgotten for the time,—has both altered the words and omitted precisely the two things—δεινὸν ἂν εἴη, which shows what the inference is intended to be, and Λακεδαιμονίοις—which would have enabled his readers to understand his meaning. The passage of Lysias runs thus: δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ὅτε μὲν ἐφεύγομεν, ἐμαχόμεθα Λακεδαιμονίοις ἵνα κατέλθωμεν, κατελθόντες δὲ φευξόμεθα ἵνα μὴ μαχώμεθα. And it is now pretty clear what the intention of the writer of the fragment was, namely to stimulate the Athenian assembly not to submit to the dictation of the Lacedaemonians and to encounter them if it were necessary in battle, by urging the inconsistency and absurdity of which they would be guilty, if, whilst they were ready to fight before their restoration to their city, now that they were in actual possession of it they should quit it and return into exile, merely to avoid fighting.
Top. XIX. The wording of this is also very obscure from the extreme brevity. The title of the topic in one of Victorius' MSS is ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν σκόπον τοῦ λαβόντος, συμβαίνειν, ‘inference, from the issue being contrary to the aim or intention of the receiver,’—i. e. a mistake on the part of the receiver of a gift, who takes it as offered with an intention different from the real motive. This however is only a single instance of the application of the topic, and derived solely from the illustration, οἷον εἰ δοίη κ.τ.λ. The true interpretation is, as Brandis expresses it, u. s., p. 20, the general one, “An inference from the possible, to the real, motive,” as appears from the examples. Two readings have to be considered: v. l. followed and explained by Victorius εἰ μὴ γένοιτο, which Bekker (ed. 3) has retained; and, Vater's conjecture, ἢ γένοιτο, following the Schol., οὕτινος ἕνεκα εἶναι, ἤτοι, διὸ δίδωμί σοι νομίσματα (this again refers exclusively to the first example). ἢ γένοιτο, ἤτοι ἔδωκα: which at all events seems to shew that he read ἢ γένοιτο: this is also expressed in Muretus' version, ‘cuius rei causa aliquid est, aut fieri potest,’ and adopted by Spengel in his recent edition. To this in what follows εἶναι ἢ γεγενῆσθαι properly corresponds. The translation will then be, ‘To say, that the possible reason for a fact (εἶναι) or motive for an action (γίγνεσθαι), (lit. that for which anything might be, or be done), that is the (true) reason or motive of the fact or action; as in the case of one giving another something, in order to cause him pain by afterwards taking it away (withdrawing it)’. Here is an ostensible motive—a gift being usually intended to cause pleasure—which conceals the real motive, which is to cause pain; and this is the inference, you infer from the apparent fact or possible motive to the real one; the object of the topic being to assign a motive which suits your argument. Such then is the general meaning of the topic: the examples are all of the possible concealed motive or intention—which may be bad or good as your argument requires—that being the form in which it is more likely to be of use in Rhetoric. οὗ ἕνεκ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἢ γένοιτο ‘that for which so and so would, could, or might be, or be done’, (would be naturally or generally, might be possibly,) expresses the conditionality or possibility of the fact, motive, or intention, a meaning which is confirmed by ἐνδέχεται γάρ κ.τ.λ., in the explanation of the third example. (I call it the third, οἷον εἰ δοίη ἄν—λυπήσῃ being an illustration.) On Victorius' interpretation of εἰ μὴ γένοιτο, ‘cuius rei caussa aliquid esse potest, quamvis factum non sit,’ Vater says, “sed hoc quamvis factum non sit, ad rem non satis facit, neque in exemplis quae sequuntur eo respicitur an haec caussa vera sit necne:” but whether that be so or not, I think that a still better reason may be given for rejecting it, that εἰ μὴ γένοιτο cannot be rendered quamvis &c., which would require εἰ καί, or καὶ εἰ (κεἰ) μὴ γένοιτο. Victorius seems to mean, though the Greek (even independently of εἰ for quamvis) would hardly I think bear such an interpretation, ‘to assert that what may be the cause of a thing (i. e. an act) really is so, although it has not been (or, were not) done at all’; in other words, ‘though it is not’: and this, though I cannot think it the right rendering, can scarcely be said to be altogether ‘beside the point.’ On εἰ δοίη ἄν, see Appendix on εἰ δύναιτ᾽ ἄν, c.20.5, ‘On ἄν with Optative after certain particles’ [printed at the end of the notes to this Book]. In conformity with the explanation there given, δοίη ἄν, the conditional, is joined with εἰ, just as the future might be, of which in fact the conditional (as the tense is in French and Italian) is a mere modification. The first example, from an unknown Tragic poet (Wagner, Fragm. Tragic. Gr. III 186), warns us that ‘Heaven bestows on many great successes or prosperity, which it offers not out of good will, with no kind or benevolent intent, but that the disasters that they (afterwards) meet with may be more marked and conspicuous’—a contrast of the apparent with the real intention, from which an inference may be drawn and applied to a parallel case. Victorius compares Caes. de B. G. I 14 (ad Helvet. legatum) Consuesse deos immortales, quo gravius homines ex commutatione rerum doleant, quos pro scelere eorum ulcisci velint, his secundiores interdum res et diuturniorem impunitatem concedere. [Cf. Claudian's tolluntur in altum, ut lapsu graviore ruant (in Rufinum I. 22, 23).] ‘And another from Antiphon's Meleager’. Referred to above, II 2. 19, where some account is given of the author, and the story of his play. The author of the Meleager is Antiphon the Tragic poet. See also note on II 23. 5, where the lines quoted are probably from some play. Wagner, Fr. Tr. Gr. III 113. Antiph. Fr. 3. Conf. Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. I 315. He suggests κάνωσι for κτάνωσι (καίνειν is found several times in Soph., twice in Aesch., and once in Xen. Cyrop.): Gaisford, Not. Var. 327, with much less probability οὐχ ὡς κτάνωσι18. ‘(The intention is) not to slay the beast, but that Meleager may have witnesses of his valour in the eyes of all Greece’. “Qui locus,” says Meineke, l. c., “ex prologo fabulae petitus videtur. Fortissimi quique Graecorum heroes (ita fere apud poetam fuisse videtur) convenerunt, non quo ipsi aprum Calydonium interficiant, sed ut Meleagri virtutem Graecis testificentur.” A third from Theodectes' Ajax (Aj. Frag. 1, Wagner, u. s., p. 118); cited again § 24, and III 15. 10, where the same passage of the play is referred to. It is there employed in illustration of the interpretation of a fact or a motive, favourable or unfavourable according to the requirements of the argument; exactly as in the topic now under consideration. Ar. there explains in much plainer terms its use and application: κοινὸν δὲ τῷ διαβάλλοντι καὶ τῷ ἀπολυομένῳ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται πλειόνων ἕνεκα πραχθῆναι, τῷ μὲν διαβάλλοντι κακοηθιστέον ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐκλαμβάνοντι (putting an unfavourable construction upon the act and its motive), τῷ δὲ ἀπολυομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ βελτιον (the reverse). The same explanation will apply to both quotations alike. Theodectes' play contained no doubt a rhetorical contest—which would be quite in his manner, like Ovid's— between Ajax and Ulysses for the arms of Achilles, in which the argument from the construction of motives would be applied to the fact, by the competitors, in the two opposite senses. Ulysses would refer to the ‘preference’ (προείλετο occurs in both the passages), shewing a sense of his superior merit, implied by Diomede when he chose him out of all the Greeks to be his companion in the hazardous exploring expedition to Troy by night (Hom. Il. K. 227 seq. Ovid. Met. XIII 238 seq. Est aliquid de tot Graiorum millibus unum A Diomede legi, line 241); Ajax would retort that this was not the real motive of Diomede's choice, but it was that ‘the attendant might be inferior to himself’ (II 23. 20) or (as it is expressed in III 15. 10,) ‘because he alone was too mean to be his rival’, to compete with him in his achievements, and to share in the renown to be thereby acquired. Of ἐνδέχεται, as illustrating εἰ δοίη ἄν, I have already spoken.
Top. XX. ‘Another, common to counsellors (in deliberative rhet.) as well as the two parties in forensic pleadings’. This seems to imply that the preceding topic is confined to the forensic branch; and to this, of the three, it is no doubt, most applicable; the suggestion and construction of motives and intentions being there most of all in request. Still in an encounter of two opponents in the public assembly, as in that of Dem. and Aesch., it is almost equally available; and in the remaining branch even more so, as a topic of panegyric or censure. The present topic, like the five preceding, with the partial exception of Top. XV, which appears also amongst the ‘fallacies’ of the de Soph. El., is applicable to Rhetoric alone and does not appear in the dialectical treatise. It embraces arguments, which may be used in the deliberative kind in exhorting to some act or course of policy, or dissuading from it; and in judicial practice in the way of accusation or defence; in which ‘we have to inquire, first what are the motives and incentives to action, and what things on the contrary deter men from acting. The things which, if they be on our side or are favourable to us, ἐὰν ὑπάρχῃ, supply motives for action, are such as possibility, facility, advantage, either to self or friends, (of accomplishing or effecting anything); or anything injurious (hurtful, damaging: that is, the power of injuring) and’ (bringing loss upon, on this form of adj. see note on I 4.9) ‘involving loss to enemies, or (if or when) the (legal) penalty (for doing something) is less than the thing (that is, the thing done, the success of the deed and the profit of it’, (‘fructus voluptasque quae inde percipitur’: ‘quod cupiebant quod sequebantur et optabant.’ Victorius). The construction of the last words, ἢ ἐλαττων ἡ ζημία τοῦ πράγματος seems to be, if construction it can be called, that ἡ ζημία is continued as an apposition to the preceding nominatives; ‘the penalty being less than the profit’ is another incentive to action. ‘From such cases as these, arguments of exhortation or encouragement are drawn, dissuasive from their contraries (impossibility, difficulty, disadvantage, injury, &c.). From these same are derived arguments for accusation and defence: from dissuasives or deterrents, of defence; from persuasives, of accusation’. That is to say, in defending a client from a charge of wrong-doing, you collect all the difficulties, dangers, disadvantages and so on, to which the accused would be exposed in doing what he is charged with, and infer from them the improbability of his guilt: in accusing, you urge all or any of the opposite incitements to commit a crime, above enumerated. To these last, the inducements to the com mission of crime, may be added the topic cui bono, ‘Cassianum illud’ [Cic. Phil. II § 35]. Compare with this the passage upon the various motives and inducements to crime and wrong-doing, in I 10. 5 seq., which is there mixed up with a general classification of all sources and causes of action. ‘And of this topic the entire “art” of Pamphilus and Callippus is made up’. Of Callippus it has been already stated, supra § 14, that nothing is known but these two notices of Aristotle. It is likely, as I have there pointed out [pp. 271—2], that he was one of the earliest pupils of Isocrates mentioned in his ἀντίδοσις, § 93. Pamphilus, the rhetorician, is mentioned by Cicero, de Orat. III 21. 82, together with Corax, in somewhat contemptuous terms, Pamphilum nescio quem, and of his Rhetoric, it is said, (tantam rem) tamquam pueriles delicias aliquas depingere. It is plain therefore that Pamphilus, like Callippus, belonged to the early school of Rhetoricians of the age of Gorgias and the Sophists, and treated his art like them in a ‘puerile’ and unworthy manner. Another, and very brief notice of him occurs in Quintilian, III 6. 34, a chapter on the status or στάσεις; he rejected finitio, the ὁρικὴ στάσις. Spalding in his note describes the contents of Pamphilus' ‘art’ from the passage of the Rhet., and then discusses, without coming to a conclusion, the question whether or no this Pamphilus can be identified with a painter of the same name, mentioned in Quint. XII 10. 6, Pliny in several places, and Aristoph. Plut. 385, and the Schol. Spalding has no doubt that Quint.'s Pamphilus, III 6. 34, is the rhetorician. Spengel, Art. Script. p. 149, note 83, thinks that he cannot be the same as Aristotle's, (erat itaque ille P. non ante Hermagorae tempora,) in consequence of his acquaintance with στάσεις, which were of much later invention, and the name of them unknown even to Ar. The same doubt occurred to myself: but I laid the evil spirit by the consideration that though Aristotle was unacquainted with the technical terms and classification of the στάσεις, he yet was familiar with the thing, which he frequently refers to; and the technical expression may belong to Quintilian and not to Pamphilus. Nine times the name of Pamphilus occurs in the Orators, (Sauppe, Ind. Nom. p. 109, ad Orat. Att. vol. III,) but the rhetorician is not among them.
Top. XXI. The object of this topic is (says Brandis, u. s., p. 20) to weaken the force of arguments from probability. “In incredibilibus provocatur ad effectum, qui si conspicuus sit, resisti non potest quin, quod incredibile videbatur, iam probabile quoque esse fateamur.” Schrader. ‘Another (class of arguments) is derived from things which are believed to come to pass (γίγνεσθαι, actually to take place or happen) but (still) are beyond (ordinary) belief, (you argue, namely) that they would not have been believed at all, had they not actually been or nearly so’: i. e. either been in existence, or come so near to it, made so near an approach to it, as to enable us by a slight stretch of imagination to realize it so as to be convinced of its existence. Any case of very close analogy, for instance, to the thing in question might produce this conviction. ἢ ἐγγύς is a saving clause; ‘fact or nearly so’. Rhetorical argument does not aim at absolute truth and certainty: it is content with a near approach to it within the sphere of the probable, which is enough for complete persuasion. ‘Nay even more’, (we may further argue that these at first sight incredible things are even more likely to be true than those that are at first sight probable. Supply δοκοῦντά ἐστι for the constr. and (μᾶλλον) ἀληθῆ or ὄντα ἐστί τῶν εἰκότων καὶ πιθανῶν for the sense): ‘because men believe in (suppose, assume the existence of,) things either actual, real or probable: if then it (the thing in question) be incredible and not probable, it must be true; because its probability and plausibility are not the ground of our belief in it’. The argument of the last clause is an exemplification of Topic IX, § 10, supra, see note there. It is an inference ἐκ διαιρέσεως, ‘from division’; a disjunctive judgment. All belief is directed to the true or the probable: there is no other alternative. All that is believed—and this is believed—must therefore be either true or probable: this is not probable; therefore it must be true. ἀληθές more antiquae philosophiae identifies truth and being: ἀληθές here = ὄν. In other words, the antecedent improbability of anything may furnish a still stronger argument for its reality than its probability. Anything absolutely incredible is denied at once, unless there be some unusually strong evidence of its being a fact, however paradoxical. That the belief of it is actually entertained is the strongest proof that it is a fact: for since no one would have supposed it to be true without the strongest evidence, the evidence of it, of whatever kind, must be unusually strong. The instance given is an exemplification of the topic in its first and simplest form. ‘As Androcles of Pitthus’ (or Pithus, whence ὁ Πιθεύς; an Attic deme, of the tribe Cecropis) ‘replied in the charge he brought against the law, to the clamour with which he was assailed by them’ (the assembly, before which he was arraigning the existing state of the law) ‘for saying “the laws require a law to correct them and set them right” which they thought highly improbable—“why so do fish require salt (to keep them from corruption), though it is neither probable nor plausible that bred as they are in brine (the salt sea) they should require salt: and so does oil-cake’ (στέμφυλα, the cake or mass of olives remaining after the oil has been pressed out) ‘require oil (for the same reason), though it is highly improbable that the very thing that produces oil should require oil itself’. Here we have an improbable statement which is shewn by two close analogies to be after all very near (ἐγγύς) the truth. Of Androcles, and the time and circumstances of his proposed alteration of the laws, nothing is known but what appears in our text. The names of three Androcleses occur in the Orators, (Sauppe, Ind. Nom. p. 13, Or. Att. III) of which the first, mentioned by Andocides περὶ μυστηρίων § 27, may possibly be the speaker here referred to. The Androcles of Thuc. VIII 65, (comp. Grote, H. G. VIII 43 [c. LXII], Plut. Alcib. c. 19,) the accuser and opponent of Alcibiades, assassinated in 411 B. C. by the agents of Pisander and the oligarchical party, is most likely identical with Andocides; the time of the events referred to in both authors being nearly the same. I think upon the whole that it is not improbable that Thucydides, Andocides and Aristotle may mean the same person19. στέμφυλα] Ar. Nub. 45, Equit. 806, was a common article of food in Attica. It denoted not only the cake of pressed olives, but also of grapes from which the juice had been squeezed. Phrynichus, s. v., has οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τὰ τῶν βοτρύων ἐκπιέσματα ἀμαθῶς: οἱ δ᾽ Ἀττικοί στέμφυλα ἐλαῶν. Suidas, on the other hand, τὸ ἔκδυμα τῆς σταφυλῆς ἢ τῶν ἐλαῶν, οἷς ἀντὶ ὄψων ἐχρῶντο, and to the same effect, Hesychius. Also Galen, ap. Lobeck, note. Lobeck settles the matter by quoting Geoponic. VI 12. 435, εἰδέναι χρὴ ὅτι στέμφυλα οὐχ, ὥς τινες νομίζουσι, τῶν ἐλαιῶν μόνον ἐστὶ πυρῆνες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τῶν σταφυλῶν γίγαρτα. (πυρῆνες must surely be a mistake; no amount of pressing could ever convert grape-stones or olive-kernels into an ὄψον, a dainty or relish, and moreover what is here said, that the oil proceeds from the στέμφυλα, shews that the cake is made of the olives themselves, and not of the mere stones.) The word occurs frequently, as might be expected, in the fragments of the Comic writers: see the Index to Meineke's Collection.
Top. XXII. ‘Another, to be employed in refutation’, (i. e. of an adversary; which, real or imaginary, is always implied in refutation. The office of the ἐλεγκτικὸν ἐνθύμημα is τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα συνάγειν, ‘to conclude contradictories’, II 22. 15, and note: see also Introd. ad h. l. p. 263 and note—）‘is to take into consideration (and argue from) all contradictories, repugnances, disagreements (between your statements or conduct, and the opponent's), whatever contradiction may be derived from all times (conflicting dates), actions and words; separately (distinctly; there are three distinct modes of employing it) in the case of the adverse party, as for instance, “and he says he loves you, and yet he conspired with the Thirty”:’ the thirty tyrants namely, after Aegospotami, B. C. 404: this is from the deliberative branch: ‘and separately in your own case (as applied to your own conduct, πράξεις), “and he says that I am litigious, and yet he can't prove that I have ever brought a single case into court:” and again, distinguished from the preceding, the application of it to oneself and the opponent (in the way of a contrast of two opposite characters and modes of conduct), “and he has never lent any one a single penny, whilst I have even ransomed (got you liberated, λέλυμαι,) many of you (out of captivity).”’ This last example reminds us of the contrast drawn by Demosthenes, de F. Leg. pp. 412, 13, seq., of his own character and conduct as compared with that of the rest of the ambassadors to Philip, Aeschines, Philocrates and Phrynon: in which the ransom of captives plays an important part. This is Cicero's locus ex repugnantibus, Top. III 11, IV 21, where it is illustrated by an example, which concludes, repugnat enim recte accipere et invitum reddere. And further, XII 53 seq. Quintilian, V 10. 74, Ex pugnantibus, Qui est sapiens stultus non est. Ib. 8. 5, ex repugnantibus.
Top. XXIII. The title of this topic ‘in scripto quodam libro’ apud Victorium, is ἀπὸ τοῦ λεγομένης τῆς αἰτίας λύεσθαι διαβολήν. ‘Another, for’ (the benefit of; the dative seems to follow λέγειν;) ‘those that have been previously brought into suspicion or odium, (whether by actual calumny) or suspected’ (thought to be, having the appearance of being, δοκοῦσι, guilty of something wrong, for some other reason —so Vater, reading ἢ δοκοῦσι), ‘both men and things, is to state the reason for the (otherwise) unaccountable circumstance: for there must be some reason (δἰ ὅ is the αἰτία,) for this appearance (of guilt)’. MS A^{c} has μὴ δοκοῦσι, which Victorius adopts and defends. All the recent edd. have ἤ. Victorius understands by μὴ δοκοῦσι a qualification of προδιαβεβλημένοις, to express the unexpected, apparently unreasonable, nature of the calumny or suspicion, which seems to be quite unsuitable to the character and circumstances of the object of it: “quae tamen nullo modo haerere ipsis videatur, quod alienae ab ea sint.” This agrees extremely well with the παραδόξου following, and this reading and explanation is deserving at all events of consideration. It supposes only one case to be contemplated, that of unjust suspicion and consequent calumny. Vater on the contrary thinks that there are two cases intended, direct calumny, and suspicion for any other reason; and that this requires ἢ δοκοῦσι. His transl. is, “Homines significantur, qui propter calumniam vel alia de caussa videantur aliquo modo affecti esse.” This is not very clear; but I suppose his meaning to be what I have said. In this case we must understand ἀδικῆσαι, or something equivalent, after δοκοῦσι. Spengel, in his recent edition, says that Victorius' reading and interpretation is refuted by the sense of the passage—which I cannot agree with—and that διαβεβλῆσθαι must be understood after ἢ δοκοῦσιν. But what is the meaning of ‘apparent’ calumny? and how is it distinguished from the other? There is another point which has hitherto escaped observation, viz. the interpretation of καὶ ἀνθρώποις καὶ πράγμασι. Victorius interprets it as in apposition to τοῖς διαβεβλημένοις, ‘qui valet ad purgandas aliquas et personas et res,’ which at first sight seems the most natural and obvious explanation, and I have adopted it in my translation. But then, what are the things that can be calumniated or brought under suspicion? One might suppose that it means human actions: but Victorius renders it res; and in fact actions are necessarily included in τοῖς διαβεβλημένοις; they are the things that are subject to misinterpretation; and therefore there is no ground for a distinction between men and their actions, so far at least as they are subject to calumny. I will venture to suggest, though not with complete confidence, that we might give the words a different construction, and understand them thus, “for the benefit of those who have been unjustly—we must in this case read μὴ δοκοῦσιν, unlikely to be guilty—subjected to suspicion, by men (by human agency, directly) or by circumstances” (indirectly; which would be equivalent to Vater's second case). At all events it makes very good sense. We now come to a still greater difficulty, the interpretation of ὑποβεβλημένης in the example. A^{c} reads διαβεβλημένης τινὸς πρὸς τὸν υἱόν ‘when a certain woman had been brought into suspicion with respect to (i. e. as to her conduct or dealings with) her son’, which gives a very sufficient sense, but is rejected by Victorius as well as Bekker and Spengel and modern editors in general. Victorius' rendering—and no other Commentary that I have seen has a word on the subject—is as follows; I must give it in his own words as it will hardly bear translation. “Ceu cum mater quaedam filium subiisset, corporique ipsius corpus suum supposuisset, ut commode eum osculari posset, in eo habitu corporis spectata visa est stuprum cum adolescente exercere.” ὑποβεβλημένης is translated literally. I see no other meaning that can be attached to the words as the text at present stands, but it must be observed that ὑποβεβλημένης τὸν αὑτῆς ϝἱόν is very strange Greek for supposuisse filium corpori suo, and I do not see how it can be justified. The accus after ὑποβάλλειν represents not the thing under which you throw something, but the thing that you throw under something else: and the passive ὑποβεβλημένης meaning ‘throwing herself under’, is possible perhaps, but by no means usual, Greek. The ordinary construction of ὑποβάλλειν with two objects, appears in these examples. The object thrown is in the accus.; the object under which it is thrown is either in the dat. or has a prepos. introduced before it. ὑποβάλλειν πλευροῖς πλευρά, Eur. Or. 223, ὑποβ. ἀμφὶ μαστὸν σποδόν, Suppl. 1160. Xen. Oecon. 18. 5, ὑπ. τὰ ἄτριπτα ὑπὸ τοὺς πὀδας. Plut. Brut. 31, ὑπ. τοῖς ξίφεσιν τὰς σφαγάς, and similarly in the metaph. applications of it (from Rost and Palm's Lex.) On the genit. ὑποβεβλημένης see note on II 8. 10. The general meaning of the whole is, that a mother had been seen in this position which she had assumed for the purpose of embracing her own son—which was not known to the witness—was accordingly subjected to the suspicion of illicit intercourse with him: and we are to suppose further, that her character hitherto had been unimpeachable: when the true reason was explained or stated, the calumny was at once quashed (dissolved or unloosed as a knot). On this sense of λύειν, διαλύειν, &c. see note in Introd. on II 25, p. 267, note 1. A second example is taken from the argument between Ajax and Ulysses in the contest for the arms of Achilles, in Theodectes' tragedy ‘the Ajax’, already referred to § 20 supra. where Ulysses tells Ajax ‘why (the reason, which explains the paradox), though he is really braver than Ajax, he is not thought to be so.’ What the reason was we are not told; nor does Ovid. Met. XIII supply the deficiency. On διότι and its three senses, see note on I 1.11.
Top. XXIV. ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰτίου] the inference ‘from cause to effect.’ ‘If the cause be there (its effect which necessarily follows, must be there too, and) the fact (alleged) is so: if absent, then (its effect is absent too, and) it is not so: for cause and effect always go together, and without a cause (i. e. its proper cause) nothing is’. Brandis, u. s., p. 20, observes, that this like the preceding topics is confined to Rhetoric. Cicero, Top. §§ 58—67, treats of cause in general and its varieties: but has nothing exactly corresponding to this, though he speaks of the great importance of the general topic to orators (65—7). Quintilian, observing that the “argumentatio, qua colligi solent ex iis quae faciunt ea quae efficiuntur, aut contra, quod genus a causis vocant,” is nearly akin to that of antecedent and consequent, V 10. 80, exemplifies it in the four following sections. ‘Leodamas, for instance, said in his defence, when charged by Thrasybulus with having had his name inscribed on the column (as a mark of infamy) in the Acropolis, only he had struck (or cut) it out in the time of ‘the Thirty’, replied that it was impossible; for the Thirty could have trusted him more if the record of his hatred of the people had remained engraved on the column’. The fact is denied on the ground of the absence of a sufficient cause: an example of the second case, the negative application of the topic, ἂν μὴ ὑπάρχῃ. On Leodamas, see on I 7. 13, and the reff. Sauppe, ad Orat. Fragm. XVI, Or. Att. III 216, thinks it impossible that the two Leodamases mentioned by Ar., here and I 7. 13, can be the same [‘mit Recht’, A. Schaefer, Dem. u. s. Zeit. I p. 129 n.]. He argues that the Leodamas whose name was inscribed on the column as a ‘traitor’ (in proditorum indice inscr.), according to Thrasybulus, before the domination of the Thirty, that is, not later than 404 B. C. (he says 405), when he must have been about thirty years old20, could not have been the Leodamas mentioned by Demosth. c. Lept. § 146, as one of the Syndics under the Leptinean law, in 355 B.C., and consequently, that the latter, the famous orator of Acharnae, must have been a different person, because he would then have been nearly 90. Clinton, F. H. II 111, sub anno 372—3, merely says, quoting Rhet. II 23. 25, “From this incident it appears that Leodamas was already grown up and capable of the duties of a citizen in B.C. 404, which shews him far advanced in years at the time of the cause of Leptines, in B.C. 355.” And this appears to me to be a sufficient account of the matter. Thrasybulus' accusation of Leodamas is mentioned likewise by Lysias, c. Evandr. § 13, et seq. The circumstances referred to in this accusation and defence, and the meaning and intention of the inscription which Leodamas is said to have effaced, are not quite clear. The use of the στήλη or pillar here referred to was twofold: the object of it in either case was the same, to perpetuate the memory of some act or character to all future time. But the fact or character commemorated might be either good or evil; and in the former case it was the name of a public benefactor, in the latter of some signal malefactor or public enemy, that was inscribed. It is usual to apply the latter explanation to the case here in question, which is probably what is meant; and then it seems the story must be this:—At some uncertain time previous to the expulsion of the thirty tyrants and their Lacedaemonian supporters by Thrasybulus and his friends, the recovery of the city, and restoration of the demus in 403 B.C., the name of Leodamas had been inscribed as a mark of infamy—as a traitor to his country, as Sauppe u. s. and Herm. Pol. Ant. § 144. 11 interpret it—according to custom on a pillar erected in the Acropolis for that purpose. Now if it was ‘hatred to the demus’ that was engraved on it (ἐγγεγραμμένης) as the sign and cause of his imputed infamy, it follows that it must have been erected at some period when the popular party was in the ascendant; Leodamas of course being a supporter of the oligarchs. When his friends were in power and he had the opportunity, Thrasybulus charges him, inter alia of course, with having ‘struck or cut it out’ to efface the record. He denies the possibility of their effect by arguing the absence of all assignable cause, which could have produced it: for this permanent record of his ‘hostility to the people’ would have been an additional recommendation to the Thirty, who would have trusted him all the more for it. Thrasybulus, says Victorius, was accusing Leodamas of being an enemy and a traitor to his country; and one of the arguments he brought forward was the existence of this inscription, the subsequent disappearance of which he attempted to explain. He likewise cites in illustration of the use of the topic Cic. pro Mil. § 32, cum ostendere vellet insidiatorem fuisse Clodium. quonam igitur pacto probari potest insidias Miloni fecisse Clodium? satis est quidem in illa tam audaci tam nefaria bellua docere magnam ei caussam, magnam spem in Milonis morte propositam, magnas utilitates fuisse. And, as Cic. goes on to remark, this is Cassianum illud, cui bono fuerit. Of στήλη the pillar, and στηλίτης, the person whose name is engraved on it, in its unfavourable sense, where the inscription is a record of infamy—which may be compared with our use of the pillory, the custom of posting the name of a defaulter at the Stock Exchange, or a candidate who has disgraced himself in an examination; the object in each case being the same, exposure of the culprit, and a warning to others21; the difference between the ancient and modern usages, that the latter are temporary, the other permanent—the following are examples: Andoc. περὶ μυστ. § 78, in a ψήφισμα: Lycurg. c. Leocr. § 117, ποιήσαντες στήλην, ἀναγράφειν τοὺς ἀλιτηρίους καὶ τοὺς προδότας: Demosth. Phil. Γ § 42, where an historical example is given, and the whole process described. Isocr. περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους, § 9, στηλίτην ἀναγράφειν. Of the favourable sense, Victorius quotes an instance from Lys. c. Agorat. § 72, προσγραφῆναι εἰς τὴν στήλην ὡς εὐεργέτας ὄντας. Herm. Pol. Ant. u. s. See also Sandys' note on Isocr. Paneg. § 180. ἐκκοψαι] Ar. seems here to have arbitrarily departed from his original constr. Having begun with κατηγορεῖν and ὅτι ἦν, he abruptly changes to the infin. as if λέγειν and not κατηγορεῖν had preceded: so that we must supply λέγειν to explain the government of the infinitive. It cannot be the optative.
Top. XXV. ‘Another, to consider whether it ever was, or is still, possible to improve (do better, more advantageously, under more favourable conditions,) in any other way (by following any other course, by any alteration of time, place, conditions, circumstances), any (bad) advice (which the counsellor is charged with having given, Vict.), or anything which he is doing, or ever has done (anything wrong that he is either meditating or has committed), (you infer) that, if this be not so (if he has not taken advantage of these possible improvements, which would have contributed to the success of his advice or design), he is not guilty at all; because (no one would ever neglect such opportunities if he had it in his power to avail himself of them) no one, intentionally and with full knowledge, ever prefers the worse to the better.’ It seems from the omission of συμβουλεύει and πράττει, and the prominence given to πέπραχεν the past act in the explanation of the reason, that although this topic may be applied to deliberative oratory, it is much more usual and useful in defending yourself or a client in a court of law. You say, My client cannot be guilty of the act with which you charge him, for he could have done it much better, would be much more likely to have been successful, in some other way; at some other time, and place, or under other circumstances: therefore, since he has not chosen to do the thing in the best way that he could, and at the same time had full knowledge of what was the best way of doing it, it is plain that he has not done it now under less favourable circumstances. This is excellently illustrated by Victorius from another passage of Cic. pro Mil. XVI 41. In retorting upon Clodius the charge of lying in wait to assassinate, he first enumerates several favourable opportunities which Milo had previously neglected to avail himself of, and asks whether it was likely that, having acted thus, he should now choose an occasion when time and circumstances were so much less favourable, to carry out such a design: Quem igitur cum omnium gratia noluit (occidere), hunc voluit cum aliquorum querela? quem iure, quem loco, quem tempore, quem impune non est ausus, hunc iniuria, iniquo loco, alieno tempore, periculo capitis, non dubitavit occidere? ‘But there is a fallacy in this: for it often does not become clear till afterwards (after the commission of the act) how the thing might have been better done, whereas before it was anything but clear’.
Top. XXVI. ‘Another, when anything is about to be done opposed to what has been done already (by the same person), to look at them together’: i. e. to bring together things that had been hitherto separate, and so to be able to compare them—παράλληλα φανερὰ μᾶλλον infra § 30; παράλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι, III 2. 9, 9. 8, 11. 9, 17. 13, παράλληλα μᾶλλον τἀναντία γνωρίζεται—a process which clearly brings out the contradiction. Brandis u. s. [Philologus IV i] p. 20 thus expresses the argument of the topic, “to detect a contradiction in the action in question.” It seems in itself, and also from the example selected, to be most appropriate in giving advice. ‘As Xenophanes, when the Eleates (his present fellow-citizens) consulted him, asked his advice, whether they are to offer sacrifices and dirges to Leucothea, or not; advised them, if they supposed her to be a goddess not to sing dirges (a funeral lament implying death and mortality); if a mortal, not to offer sacrifices’. Xenophanes here, by bringing the two practices into immediate comparison—if the example is meant to represent literally the statement of the topic, we must suppose that the Eleates had already done one of the two; deified her most likely; and now wanted to know whether they should do the other—makes the contradiction between sacrificing to (which they had done), and lamenting as dead (which they were about to do), the same person. Of Xenophanes—of Colophon, but then living at Elea, or Velia, where he founded the Eleatic school—we have already had notice in I 15. 29, and II 23. 18. εἰ θύωσι] εἰ being here equivalent to πότερον, admits equally with it of construction with the deliberative conjunctive: compare the same deliberative conjunctive in interrogation, as a modified doubtful future; τί ποιῶμεν; ‘what are we to do?’ instead of the direct, ‘what shall we do?’ Matth. Gr. Gr. 526. This passage is cited by Lobeck, Aglaophamus, Eleus. § 21, Vol. I. p. 167. Plutarch refers more than once to this dictum of Xenophanes, but supposes it to have been addressed to the Egyptians, about the worship of Osiris, and the propriety of θρῆνοι in his honour. De Superst. c. 13, p. 171 E, Amator. c. 18, 763 D, de Is. et Osir. c. 70, 379 B. Wyttenbach ad loc. de Superst. Athen. XV 697 A, quoting Aristotle, ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ, εἰ μὴ κατέψευσται ὁ λόγος: apud eundem. Ino, daughter of Cadmus and Harmonia, and wife of Athamas, in a fit of madness inspired by Hera, threw herself and her son Melicertes— two sons, Eur. Med. 1289; see the whole passage, 1279—1292—into the sea. Both of them became sea deities: she under the name of Leucothea, Melicertes of Palaemon. Virg. Georg. I 436—7. The stories of Athamas and Ino are told under those two names in Smith's Dict. Biogr. Cic. Tusc. Disp. I 12. 28. de Nat. D. III 15. 39 in Graecia multos habent ex hominibus deos—Leucotheam quae fuit Ino, et eius Palaemonem filium cuncta Graecia.
Top. XXVII. ‘Another, from mistakes made; to be employed in accusation or defence’. The example is an illustration of both; the accusers convert the mistake that Medea made in sending away her children into a charge of having murdered them; Medea retorts the same argument from another mistake which she could have committed had she done what they allege, of which however she is incapable. Brandis, “in any mistake that has been made to find a ground of accusation or defence.” ‘For instance, in Carcinus' Medea, the one party (of the disputants in the play) charge her with the death of her children—at all events (say they) they no where appear: because Medea made a mistake in (in respect of) sending away her children (instead of merely sending them away, they argued that she had made away with them, since they were no where to be found): her defence is, that it was not her children, but Jason, that she would have killed (if she had killed any one); for she would have made a mistake in failing to do this, if she had done the other too’: and of such a mistake she never could have been guilty. “Quasi dicat, quomodo tam stulta fuissem' (how could I have made such a mistake?) ‘ut innocentes filios necassem; perfidum autem coniugem e<*> auctorem omnium meorum malorum relinquerem?” Victorius. Carcinus, a tragic poet contemporary with Aristophanes, and his sons, Philocles, Xenotimus, and Xenocles, are often mentioned by Aristophanes, never without ridicule. See Vesp. 1501—12, Nub. 1261, Pac. 782, 864, and in Holden, Onom. Arist. Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. XXVI § 2, passes him over with very slight notice, “known to us chiefly from the jokes and mockeries of Aristophanes.” Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 505 seq., Fragm. Comic. Vol. I., has a long and learned discussion, principally with the object of distinguishing this Carcinus from others of the same name. There was at all events one other tragic poet of the name, whom Meineke supposes to have been the grandson of the former, p. 506, being said by Suidas to be the son of Xenocles (or Theodectes). This Carcinus flourished according to Suidas ‘before the reign of Philip of Macedon’, in the first half of the 4th cent. B.C. Some fragments of his Achilles, Semele, and Tereus, are given by Wagner in his collection, Fragm. Trag. Gr. III 96, seq. with some others of uncertain plays: but he has omitted all those that are mentioned by Aristotle, the Medea here, the Oedipus in III 16. 11, the Thyestes, Poet. 16. 2. In Poet. 17. 2, there is a reference to a character, Amphiaraus, in a play of his not named, with which Ar. finds fault. Athen. I 22 A. See also Clinton, F. H. II. Introd. XXIII. ‘And this topic and the kind of enthymeme is the whole of the earlier art of Theodorus’. Comp. supra § 14 of Callippus, and § 21, of Callippus and Pamphilus. ἡ πρότερον Θ. τέχνη] i. e. ἡ πρότερον οὖσα, γεγραμμένη, πεποιημένη: as οἱ πρῶτον, ‘the earliest writers’, III 1. 9. Theodorus’ work must have passed through two editions, of which the second, from what is said here, seems to have been larger and more complete. This one is the ‘first’ or ‘earlier’ edition; the one before the second. If this contained nothing but the illustration of the topic of ‘mistakes’, it must have been extremely insufficient as an ‘art of rhetoric’. We must ascribe either to his second and enlarged ‘Art’ or to speeches and rhetorical exercitations all that Aristotle says of him, together with Tisias and Thrasymachus, de Soph. El. c. 34, 183 b 32, as well as the καινὰ λέγειν, Rhet. III 11. 6, and his divisions of the speech, III 13. 5; as also the notices of him in Plato's Phaedrus, Quintilian, Cicero Brut. XII 48, &c., Dionysius, &c. (which may be found in Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX. III 284 foll.22). Of Theodorus of Byzantium—to be distinguished from another Theodorus, a rhetorician of Gadara, Quint. II 15. 21—see further in Speng. Art. Script. p. 98 seq.; Westermann, Gesch. der Beredtsamkeit, § 30. 16, p. 40, § 68. 7, p. 140. Sauppe, Fragm. Or. Att. VIII, Or. Att. III 164, simply refers to Spengel's Artium Scriptores, and to his own tract in Zimmerm. diurn. lit. antiq. 1835, p. 406. [Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit, I p. 253.]
Top. XXVIII. The argument, ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος, significant names: “which draws an inference from the signification of a name.” Brandis. A dialectical topic akin to, but by no means identical with, this, (the one is confined to surnames, the other extends to all words in general,) occurs in Top. B 6, 112 a 32, to consider the derivation and signification of names with a view to applying them as suits the immediate purpose: which coincides more nearly with Cicero's topic, quum ex vi nominis argumentum elicitur, quam Graeci ἐτυμολογίαν vocant Top. VIII. 35 seq., than with the rhetorical form of it as it appears here; though both of the others may be regarded as including this special rhetorical application. But in the rhetorical treatise, the de Inv. II 9. 28, we have the same use of names (i. e. surnames) suggested as by Ari stotle: Nam et de nomine nonnumquam aliquid suspicionis nascitur... ut si dicamus idcirco aliquem Caldum vocari, quod temerario et repentino consilio sit. Quintilian, V 10. 30, 31, thinks that an argument can seldom be drawn from a surname, except in the case of such significant names as are assigned for a reason, as Sapiens (Cato and Laelius), Magnus (Pompey), and Plenus (?): or where the name is not significant, but suggests a crime—as the name Cornelius, in the case of Lentulus, was suggestive of conspiracy (for a reason there given). The use of the name recommended by Aristotle's topic (which he does not mention) is pronounced, in the case of Euripides—who represents Eteocles as attacking the name of his brother Polynices, πολὺ νεῖκος, ut argumentum morum— as insipid and tasteless, frigidum. It is however ‘a frequent material for jokes; especially in the hands of Cicero, who freely employs it, as in the case of Verres’. The passage of Euripides referred to, is Phoen. 636—7; Eteocles terminates the altercation with his brother with the two lines, ἔξιθ᾽ ἐκ χώρας: ἀληθῶς δ̓ ὄνομα Πολυνείκῃ πατὴρ ἔθετο σοι θείᾳ προνοίᾳ νεικέων ἐπώνυμον. With this use of significant names all readers of the Greek Tragic poets are familiar. It is not to be regarded in them as a mere play on words, but they read in the significant name the character or destiny of its bearer: and thus employed they have a true tragic interest. It is singular therefore that Elmsley, who had certainly studied the Greek dramatists with care and attention, should, on Bacch. 508, after citing a number of examples, end his note with this almost incredible observation, “Haec non modo ψυχρά sunt” (is the epithet borrowed from Quintilian?), “verum etiam tragicos malos fuisse grammaticos. Quid enim commune habent Ἀπόλλων et ἀπολλύναι praeter soni similitudinem?” And this is all that is suggested by Ajax's pathetic exclamation, αἶ αἶ τίς ἄν ποτ᾽ ᾤετ̓ κ.τ.λ. Soph. Aj. 430, and the rest! Elmsley has omitted Aesch. S. c. T. 658, ἐπωνύμῳ δὲ κάρτα Πολυνείκη λέγω, from his list; and Eur. Antiope, Fr. 1 (Dind., Wagner), and Fragm. 2, Ibid. Agath. Fragm. Thyest. 1 ap. Wagn. Fr. Tr. Gr. III 74. Add from other sources, Dante Div. Com. Purg. XIII. 109, Savia non fui, avvegna che Sapia fossi chiamata. Shaksp. Rich. II., Act II. Sc. 1 73, Gaunt. O how that name befits my composition! Old Gaunt indeed; and gaunt in being old, &c. The king asks, Can sick men play so nicely with their names? No, is the reply, misery makes sport to mock itself, &c.: which is not a bad answer to Elmsley's objection. This tracing of the character or destiny in the name is particularly common in the Hebrew of the Old Test., as the well-known instance of Genesis xxvii. 36, ‘Is not he rightly named Jacob? for he hath supplanted me these two times.’ The practice, which seems to be a suggestion of nature itself, is thus shewn to have prevailed in various times, nations and languages. The line of Soph. is from his Tyro, Fragm. 1 (Fr. Soph. 563), Dind. Sidero, Tyronis noverca: Fragm. IX, Wagn. Fragm. Trag. Gr. II 413, “Egregie Brunck. versum huc rettulit, quo haud dubie Sideronis crudelitas in Tyronem exagitatur.” On the Tragedy and its contents, Wagner u. s. p. 410. Victorius and Gaisford cite Eustath. ad Il. A p. 158, et ad Il. Γ 379=287. 35, καὶ εἰσὶν ἀληθῶς φερώνυμα τὸ σίντιες οἱ παρ᾽ Ὁμήρῳ...ὡς... κατὰ τὴν παροιμιαζομένην Σιδηρὼ θρασεῖαν ἐκείνην γυναῖκα, φοροῖεν τὸ οἰκεῖον ὄνομα. In the second passage the latter part of this is repeated. καὶ ὡς ἐν τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐπαίνοις] “Fortasse intelligit iis nominibus vocari eos tunc solitos quae vim et potestatem eorum declararent.” Victorius. It may perhaps refer to the ‘significant names’ derived from their attributes or occupations, by which deities are designated, and which as special distinctions would naturally occur in the hymns addressed to them. These may sometimes be substituted for their proper names, and may furnish arguments of praise. The Conon and Thrasybulus here mentioned are doubtless, as may be inferred from the absence of any special designation, the Conon, the victor of Cnidus (394 B. C.), and the Thrasybulus, the expeller of the Thirty and restorer of the demus in 403: though there are several others bearing both of these names in Sauppe's Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att. III. pp. 63, 4, 81, 2. Thrasybulus is named by Demosth., de Cor. § 219, as one of the most distinguished orators among his predecessors, together with Callistratus, Aristophon, and Cephalus; the two first of these we have had mentioned in the Rhetoric. In de F. L. § 320, he is called τοῦ δημοτικοῦ (the popular Thrasybulus, the people's friend, καὶ τοῦ ἀπὸ Φυλῆς καταγαγόντος τὸν δῆμον. Conon and he were contemporaries. Conon died soon after 392 B. C., Clinton, F. H. sub anno 388. 3, Thrasybulus, “perhaps in the beginning of B.C. 389.” Ib. sub anno 390. His name, according to Conon, fitly represented the rashness of his counsels and character. Grote, H. G. IX 509 [chap. LXXV.], in describing the character of Thrasybulus, omits to notice this. In like manner the name of Thrasymachus, the rhetorician, is significant of the hardihood and pugnacity which were combined in his character. The sketch given of him in the first book of Plato's Republic is in exact correspondence with this. “Always true to your name,” rash and combative, said Herodicus to him, doubtless provoked by some rudeness of the Sophist in the course of a dialectical disputation. There were two Herodicuses, both physicians; see note on I 5. 10. Doubtless this again is the better known of the two, Herodicus of Selymbria in Thrace; of whose medical practice Plato gives an account, Rep. III 406 A seq. In a similar dispute with Polus, another Sophist and Rhetorician, (whose character, in perfect agreement with this, is likewise sketched by Plato in his Gorgias, where he is said to be νέος καὶ ὀξύς23,) Herodicus again reminds him of the significance of his name, “Colt by name and colt by nature24.” And lastly this inveterate punster applies the same process to ‘Dracon the legislator’, declaring ‘that his laws were not those of a man, but of a dragon; so cruel were they’. Aristotle, Pol. II 12 sub finem, says of Draco's laws, that they had nothing peculiar, but ἡ χαλεπότης, διὰ τὸ τῆς ζημίας μέγεθος. Nearly every offence was made punishable with death. Hence Demades said of them that they “were written not in ink, but in blood.” Plut. Sol. 17. Tzetzes, Chil. 5, line 342 sqq. ap. Sauppe, Fragm. Demad. 17, Orat. Att. III 316; Grote, H. G. III 202 [chap. X.], whence our Draconian legislation. The verse that follows is from Eur.'s Troades 990, where Hecuba is answering Helen, who had been arguing the invincible power of Love. “All follies are to mortals Aphrodite” (are attributed by men to this passion, ‘take the form of Aphrodite’ in their fancy), ‘and rightly does the goddess' name begin the word ἀφροσύνη.’ Ἀφροδίτη and Ἀφροσύνη have the first half of the word in common. Πενθεύς, κ.τ.λ.] ‘Pentheus that bearest the name of thy future fortune’. Comp. Bacch. 367 and 508, and Theocr. Id. XXVI. 26, ἐξ ὄρεος πένθημα καὶ οὐ Πενθῆα φέρουσαι. Probably from Chaeremon's Dionysus, quoted three times in Athenaeus (Elms. ad Eur. Bacch. 508), and also probably, like the Bacchae, on the story of Pentheus. Chaeremon's fondness for flowers and the vegetable creation in general, noticed by Athen. XIII. 608 D, appears throughout the fragments preserved. See infra III 12. 2 where he is spoken of as ἀκριβής, ὥσπερ λογογράφος, on which see note in Introd. ad loc. p. 325. On Chaeremon see Müller Hist. Gr. Lit. XXVI 6, and the Art. in Smith's Dict. Biogr. s. v. He is a poet whose plays are more suited for reading than acting, ἀναγνωστικός, Rhet. III u. s. He is quoted again by Ar. Probl. III 16. In Poet. I 12, his Centaur is spoken of as a μικτὴ ῥαψῳδία, on the import of which see the two writers above referred to; and in Poet. 24. 11, this blending of heterogeneous elements is again alluded to. See also Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 517 seq. Chaeremon is one of those who have been erroneously included amongst the Comic poets. Wagner, Fr. Trag. Gr. III 127—147. Clint. F. H. Vol. II. Introd. p. xxxii.
The chapter concludes with two observations on enthymemes in general. First, ‘Enthymemes of refutation are more popular and applauded than those of demonstration, because the former is a conclusion of opposites’ (the def. of ἔλεγχος; see Introd. p. 262, note 1) ‘in a small space (or narrow compass), and things are always made clearer to the listener by being placed side by side (close together, so as to admit of immediate comparison)’. This is repeated in nearly the same words, III 17. 13. ‘But of all syllogisms destructive or constructive, such are most applauded as those of which the results are at once (at the very begining, of the argument) foreseen: not because they are superficial (ἐπιπολῆς, I 15. 22, note ad loc., II 16 1)—for they (the hearers ‘are pleased themselves also with themselves at the same time’) are pleased (not only with the speaker and his enthymeme, but) with themselves also (ἅμα) for their sagacity in anticipating the conclusion: (and therefore they don't think it superficial)—and those which they are only just so far behind—which they can so nearly keep pace with—as to understand them (step by step) as they are delivered’. ἅμα εἰρημένων] On this genitive, see note on II 8 11. [For the sense, compare III 10. 4.]
1 If I am not mistaken ὅμοιαι πτώσεις is a misnomer. If πτώσεις are the various inflexions—declensions in an extended sense—of a root-word, the term must be confined to the changes of the terminations: in these appears, not similarity, but difference: the similarity lies, not in the terminations, but in the idea or root common to all the varieties: ‘similar’ therefore, though it may very well be predicated of the σύστοιχα, is not properly applied to πτώσεις.
2 The relation of ποιεῖν and πάσχειν, agent and patient, action and passion, is well illustrated in the argument between Polus and Socrates, Plat. Gorg. c. 32, 476 B, seq. It is there shewn by analogy—the usual Socratic and Platonic method—that the relation between the two prevails throughout its various applications, and therefore that crime and punishment follow the same law, and that justice or desert in the punishment of the criminal or patient implies the like justice in the infliction of it by the agent, and vice versa.
3 The unwarrantable identification, there supposed, p. 261, of the Theodectea with the Ῥητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον, has been sufficiently corrected in Introd. to Rhet. pp. 55—67, on the Theodectea; where more information will be found about the author and his works.
4 See on this and two other speeches of Iphicrates attributed to Lysias, Sauppe, ad Fragm. Lys. XVIII and LXV. Oratores Attici III 178 and 190; [also Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit, p. 335].
5 Ulysses may be supposed to have accused Teucer of the murder of his brother— comp. Aj. 1012 seq. and 1021, where such a suspicion is hinted at: If you, Ulysses, are shocked at such a crime, do you suppose that I, Teucer, could have been guilty of it? The same argument was employed by Euripides in his Telephus. Fragm. XII, Dindorf, ap. Arist. Acharn. 554. Wagner, II p. 364. Fr. Tel. 24. ταῦτ᾽ οἶδ̓ ὅτι ἂν ἔδρατε (ita Meineke), τὸν δὲ Τήλεφον οὐκ οἰόμεσθα; comp. Valck. Diatr. ad Fr. Eurip. p. 211, “Telephi verba cum Ulysse loquentis.” Ulysses had been making some charge against Telephus, who makes this reply: You would have done so and so: am I not as likely, or still more so, to have done the same? Plut. ἀποφθ. βασιλέων, Alex. II, p. 180 B, Δαρείον δίδοντος αὐτῷ μυρία τάλαντα καὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν νείμασθαι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπίσης, καὶ Παρμενίωνος εἰπόντος, ἔλαβον ἂν εἰ Ἀλέξανδρος ἤμην, κἀγώ, νὴ Δία, εἶπεν, εἰ Παρμενίων ἤμην.
6 This is the usual way of connecting the parts of the sentence; but I think Gaisford's explanation, quoted above, is certainly to be preferred.
7 [“In cod. abest καὶ post Τεύκρᾠ (p. 252), ‘ego addidi; post φανείη extat εἰ, ego καὶ scripsi: deinde τοῦτό τις, ego τοῦτ᾽ οὔτις; extremo autem loco ἀεὶ, Muretus aliique δεῖ.” Ussing, in Opuscula Philologica ad Madvigium, 1876, p. 1.]
8 Peparethus, one of a small group of islands (Sciathus, Icus, Halonnesus, Scyrus; Strab. Thessal. IX 5) off the coast of Magnesia, πρόκεινται τῶν Μαγνήτων, Strabo u. s. (νῆσος μία τῶν Κυκλάδων, Steph. Byz. s. v., una ex Cycladibus, Buhle. οὐκ ἄποθεν Εὐβοίας, Suidas), N. E. of Euboea: famous for its wine, Soph. Phil. 548, εὔβοτρυν Πεπάρηθον, Aristoph. Thesmoph. Sec. Fr. 1 (ap. Athen. I 29, A [Aristoph. fragm. 301. Dind. ed. 5]) Meineke, Fragm. Com. II 1076. Comp. Herm. Fragm. Phorm. 2 12 (ap. eund. II 410).
9 The name Ismenias appears to have been traditional in Boeotia from the very earliest times. Ἰσμηνίης ὁ Βοιώτιος is mentioned in the biography of Homer ascribed to Herodotus, §§ 2, 3, as one of the original settlers of the new colony of Cuma in Aeolia, and carrying with him Homer's mother Critheïs.
10 On the force of this argument from universal consent, see Cic. Tusc. Disp. I cc. 12, 13, 14, 15: especially 13, 30 (of the belief in God), and 15, 35, omnium consensus naturae vox est, seq. With which compare the maxim, Vox populi vox Dei.
11 δίκην δοῦναι is here, as in Thuc. I 28, δίκας ἤθελον δοῦναι, ‘to submit to trial or adjudication’: comp. Aesch. c. Ctes. § 124, and the phrase δίκην δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, denoting a general legal settlement of differences. The usual meaning is ‘to pay the penalty or give satisfaction’.
12 I have expressed my opinion upon some points of Plato's character, in contrast with that of Aristotle, in Introd. to transl. of Gorgias p. xxvii, and note; to which I venture here to refer.
13 This argument may possibly be suitable to a sophist and declaimer, but the use of it in a court of justice would certainly be exposed to the ‘danger’ against which Quintilian warns those who employ the topic in general.
14 Gaisford, Not. Var., cites this as from Victorius. It is not found in my copy, Florence, 1548.
15 βλαισός...bandy-legged, opposed to ῥαιβός. ῥαιβός, crooked, bent, esp. of bandy legs. Liddell and Scott's Lex. sub vv.
16 Compare the whole passage §§ 124—126, in illustration of praevaricatio.
17 “Von der gleichheit der folgen auf gleichheit des ihnen zu grunde liegenden schliessende.” Brandis [Philologus IV i.].
18 Bekker and Spengel both retain οὐχ ἵνα κτάνωσι!
19 The writer of the Article Androcles, in Smith's Biogr. Dict., has no doubt upon this point. He says on this passage, “Ar. has preserved a sentence from one of Androcles' speeches, in which he used an incorrect figure!”.
20 Je n'en vois pas la nécessité.
21 At Milan, says Manzoni, Introd. to the ‘Storia della colonna infame,’ in 1830, the judges condemned to the most horrible tortures some persons who were accused of having helped to spread the plague, and in addition to other severe penalties, decretaron di piu, che in quello spazio (where the house of one of the condemned had stood) s' innalzasse una colonna, la quale dovesse chiamarsi infame, con un' iscrizione che tramandasse ai posteri la notizia dell' attentato et della pena. E in ciò non s' ingannarono: quel giudizio fu veramente memorabile.
22 In referring to this paper I take the opportunity of withdrawing all that I have said in p. 286, ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου τέχνη, and the illustration from Carcinus. It is sufficiently corrected in the note on this section.
23 [p. 463 E.] A very brief summary of the leading points of Polus' character as he appears in the Gorgias, is given amongst the ‘dramatis personae’ of the Introd. to transl. of Gorg. p. lxxvii.
24 This most ingenious rendering was given by Dr Thompson, then Greek Professor, in a lecture delivered Feb. 6, 1854. [Introd. to ed. of Gorg. p. v.]
Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Edward Meredith Cope. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1877.
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