E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

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We now return for the last time to the subject of propriety of style, on which in this chapter we have some concluding observations. Rhetorical propriety must shew itself in the due adaptation of style to matter; and consequently the three branches of Rhetoric must be treated each in its appropriate style. We therefore distinguish two kinds of speeches, and two styles appropriate to them; (1) ‘debate’, speaking in the actual strife or contest of the assembly and the law-court, ἀγω- νιστικὴ λέξις, and (2) γραφική, written compositions, which are confined to the third or epideictic branch: and the first is again subdivided into (a) public speaking, popular harangues addressed to the assembly, and (b) forensic. This is only true in theory: in practice speeches were often written by the orators, as Demosthenes and Isocrates, for the use of those who were incompetent or unwilling to write and plead for themselves.

Under the head of γραφικὴ λέξις are included all compositions which are intended to be read, and consequently the whole range of literature, with the exception of speeches which are intended to be delivered or acted, deliberative and forensic, public and private orations—such as those of Demosthenes. Thus the third branch of Rhetoric, the ἐπιδεικτική, is made to embrace all poetry, philosophy, history, and indeed any writing on any subject whatsoever. The distinction coincides with that of Hermogenes, περὶ ἰδεῶν τομ. β́. περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου (see Rhet. Gr. II. p. 401 seq. Spengel), who divides composition into λόγοι συμβουλευτικοί, δικανικοί, and πανηγυρικοί, the last including the works of Homer and Plato, the most distinguished of poets and prose writers.

The declamations delivered at the Olympian Games and other great public festivals or assemblies πανυγύρεις, whence the name πανηγυρικοὶ λόγοι—such as Isocrates' Panegyric¹ and Panathenaic orations, and Lysias' celebrated Ὀλυμπιακός, of which a short fragment is preserved, (Or. 33, Baiter et Sauppe, Or. Att. I 146)—were intermediate between the public or agonistic and the epideictic or graphic speeches, partaking of the character of both; being declaimed in public and sometimes with a political object (as Lysias' speech, and some of Isocrates'), but that object was subordinate, the main consideration being always the display. Isocrates is always anxious to impress his readers with the conviction that his speeches are not mere empty declamations, ἐπιδείξεις, but genuine πολιτικοὶ λόγοι—are indeed a branch of Philosophy, which with him is pretty nearly convertible with Rhetoric, see κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν §§ 1, 11, 21, and Mr Sandys' note on Paneg. § 10. [‘Isocrates means by “Philosophy” a combination of the accomplishments of the ῥήτωρ and the πολιτικός’. Thompson's Phaedrus, p. 172.]

Isocrates, writing from his point of view, ἀντίδ. §§ 46—50, contrasts himself and his own declamations, which he calls Ἑλληνικοὺς καὶ πολιτικοὺς καὶ πανηγυρικούς, with δικανικοὶ λόγοι, forensic pleading and pleaders, whom, probably in consequence of his own failure in that branch of Rhetoric, he attacks and vituperates upon intellectual, social, and moral grounds. Writing before the establishment of Aristotle's threefold division of the art, he evidently recognises only two branches, public or political speaking, in which national interests are concerned— and at the head of these he places his own πανηγυρικοὶ λόγοι, the true philosophy (§ 50)—and judicial or forensic, in which private interests between man and man are debated and decided. In respect of style, he of course gives the preference to his own kind of composition, §§ 46, 7.

On this adaptation of style to the different kinds of oratory, see Quint. VIII 3. 11—14. The opening observation, at all events, looks like a reference to this chapter, though Spalding in his note is silent on the subject.

Whately also, in his Rhet. c. IV ‘on Elocution’, (Encycl. Metrop. p. 299 b, 300 a, 301 b,) has some good observations, partly derived from Aristotle, upon the contrast of the agonistic and graphic styles. On the contrast of the two, see by all means Isocr. Phil. §§ 25, 26: all the main points of interest in public and forensic, or agonistic, speeches are there enumerated, and the comparatively lifeless speeches to be read, forcibly contrasted with them. [Comp. also Alcidamas, περὶ τῶν τοὺς γραπτοὺς λόγους γραφόντων, (against Isocrates).]

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‘It must not be forgotten (lost sight of) that a different kind of language is appropriate to each different kind (of Rhetoric). For the same style is not suitable to written composition (that which is intended to be read) and that which is used in debate (in the contests, the actual struggle, of real life; nor again in (the two divisions of the latter) public and forensic speaking. The orator must be acquainted with both: for the one (debate) implies the knowledge and power of clear expression in pure Greek, and the other freedom from the necessity (lit. the not being obliged to) of suppressing in silence (κατά, keeping down) anything that one may want to communicate to the rest of the world; which is the case with those who have no knowledge (or skill) of writing (i.e. composition)’. Comp. III 1. 7. Cicero, de Or. II 82. 337, gives a brief description of the ‘grand’ and dignified style appropriate to the exalted subjects of public speaking.

The meaning of this seems to be—the orator must be acquainted with the written as well as the debating style; the latter implies and requires only the correct use of one's native language, so that one may be able to make oneself clearly intelligible: this (debate alone) does not require the minute accuracy of studied composition, which can be examined at leisure and criticized; but since one who can only speak, and not write, is incapable of communicating his opinions to the rest of the world (τοῖς ἄλλοις, all others besides the members of the assembly or law-court that he is actually addressing), it is necessary for a statesman to acquire the power of writing well, and therefore to study in some degree the art of exact composition. Victorius, who renders τὸ μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι—τοῖς ἄλλοις of actual writing, that is of letters to absent friends, seems to narrow the meaning of ‘writing’ in such a way as to produce a somewhat ridiculous result. Surely any educated man, whether he be an orator and statesman or not, requires and possesses the knowledge of writing in that sense. On τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἑλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι, Thuc. II 60, 5—6 may serve as a commentary; Pericles, in his defence, describing his qualifications for a statesman, says οὐδενὸς οἴομαι ἥσσων εἶναι γνῶναί τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι ταῦτα...ὄ τε γὰρ γνοὺς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθη.

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‘The written style is the most exact’ (or finished: on ἀκρίβεια and its various senses, see Grant ad Eth. Nic. I 7. 18, and the references in Introd. ad h. l. p. 334, note 4), ‘that of debate lends itself most to acting’ (or delivery: is the ‘most capable of being acted’). Comp. III 1. 4. The reason of this as far as declamation is concerned, viz. why the graphic style admits of more ornament and artificial arrangement than the other, is thus stated by Cicero, Orat. LXI 208. After the invention of the period, &c., he says, nemo qui aliquo esset in numero scripsit orationem generis eius, quod esset ad delectationem comparatum remotumque a iudiciis forensique certamine, quin redigeret omnes fere in quadrum numerumque sententias. Nam quum is est auditor, qui non vereatur ne compositae orationis insidiis sua fides attemptatur, gratiam quoque habet oratori voluptati aurium servienti.

‘Of this (ἀγωνιστική) there are two kinds; one that (includes, conveys,) represents character, the other emotion (in the speech)’. That is, not that ἀγωνιστική is a genus, containing two species under it, moral and emotional: for this is not the fact, and also any speech may have both: but that these two elements belong specially, not exclusively, to the two debating branches of Rhetoric, of which they are very prominent ingredients: the reality of the interests at stake giving more room for the play of passion and the assumption of character than the cold unimpassioned, deliberate written compositions. The ethical part is of two kinds, the ἦθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι, I 2. 4, II 1. 4, and the characters ἤθη of the several ages and conditions, II 12. 17. The emotional is of course that which is partially described I 2. 5, and treated at length in II 2. 16. Of these ‘appeals to the feelings’, δείνωσις and ἔλεος, the earlier rhetorical treatises were full, I 1. 3, of which Thrasymachus' ἔλεοι (III 1. 7) described by Plato, Phaedr. 267 C, was a well-known specimen. Quint. III 8. 12, (In concionibus deliberatio) affectus, ut quae maxima, postulat, seq. Valet autem in consiliis auctoritas (this is principally due to ἦθος) plurimum, seq. See III 7. 1, 3, 6, where the two are described. The ἦθος is there confined to those of age, nation, station, &c. Compare with all this, Demetr. π. ἑρμηνείας § 193, ἐναγώνιος μὲν οὖν ἴσως μᾶλλον ἡ διαλελυμένη λέξις, αὕτη καὶ ὑποκριτικὴ καλεῖται: κινεῖ γὰρ ὑπόκρισιν ἡ λύσις. γραφικὴ δὲ λέξις ἡ εὐανάγνωστος. αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἡ συνηρτημένη καὶ οἷον ἠσφαλισμένη τοῖς συνδέσμοις. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ Μένανδρον ὑποκρίνονται λελυμένον ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις, Φιλήμονα δὲ ἀναγινώσκουσιν.

‘And this is why actors also (as well as debaters) hunt after (διώκουσι) plays of this kind (that is, plays of which the subjects give scope for the exhibitions of passion and character), and the poets after persons (whether actors to represent the πάθη, or characters in the dramas to be represented with them) of the same kind. At the same time, the poets that can be read (that write to be read as well as acted or rhapsodised) become pocket-companions, or favourites’.

βαστάζεσθαι is said of anything that is carried about in the hand or arms, fondled, cherished, fondly and familiarly treated, like a baby or pet lapdog; and hence when applied to a book naturally means one that people are fond of, and carry about with them in their pockets. There are several instances in Sophocles—see Ellendt's Lex.—that illustrate this sense of βαστάζεσθαι, as Philoct. 655 of the favourite bow and 657, (Neopt.) ἔστιν ὥστε...καὶ βαστάσαι με (be allowed to nurse it), προσκύσαι θ᾽ ὥσπερ θεόν; Aesch. Agam. 34, εὐφιλῆ χέρα ἄνακτος τῇδε βαστάσαι (to press and caress) χέρι (Blomfield's Glos. ad loc.). Quint. VIII 3. 12, of any striking sentiment or expression, intuendum (to be narrowly looked into) et paene pertractandum.

‘Chaeremon for instance who is as exact (highly finished) as a professional speech-writer (such as Isocrates), and Licymnius amongst the dithyrambic poets’. On Chaeremon, see note II 23. 29, ult. [The ἀκρίβεια of Chaeremon may be illustrated by his partiality for minute details, such as enumerating the flowers of a garland, e.g. Athenaeus XV p. 679 F, κίσσῳ τε ναρκίσσῳ τε τριέλικας κύκλῳ στεφάνων ἑλικτῶν.] On λογογράφος, see II 11. 7; Shilleto on Dem. de F. L. § 274. Licymnius is mentioned above, III 2. 13, where reference is made to Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX. Vol. III pp. 255—7, for an account of what is known of him; and again III 13. 5.

‘And upon comparison the (speeches, λόγοι) of the writers when delivered in actual contests have a narrow, confined, contracted (i.e. poor, mean, paltry) appearance, whilst those of the orators (meaning particularly the public speakers, in the assembly), which by their skilful delivery succeed or pass muster’ (none of this is expressed but ‘well delivered’²), ‘when taken in the hands (to read) look like the work of mere bunglers or novices’. στενός is the Latin tenuis, and the English slight and slender, in a contemptuous and depreciatory sense. In its primary sense of narrow it stands in opposition, in respect of style, to the wider range, and the broader, larger, freer, bolder, tone required by the loftier and more comprehensive subjects, and also by the larger audiences, of public speakers; the high finish and minute artifices of structure, as well as the subtler and finer shades of intonation and expression, are lost in a crowd and in the open air. So Whately, Rhet. ch. IV (Encycl. Metrop. p. 301 a), describes the agonistic style, as “a style somewhat more blunt (than the graphic) and homely, more simple and, apparently, unstudied in its structure, and at the same time more daringly energetic.” στενοί then represents the comparative narrowness or confined character of the graphic style, with its studied artificial graces, careful composition, and other such ‘paltrinesses’, ‘things mean and trifling’—a sense in which it occurs in a parallel passage of Pl. Gorg. 497 C, where σμικρὰ καὶ στενά are contemptuously applied by Callicles to Socrates' dialectics. This is actually said of Isocrates, in the passage of Dionysius, de Isocr. Iud. c. 13, by Hieronymus, the philosopher of Rhodes; ἀναγνῶναι μὲν ἄν τινα δυνηθῆναι τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ (Isocr.) καλῶς, δημηγορῆσαι δὲ τήν τε φωνὴν καὶ τὸν τόνον ἐπάραντα, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ κατασκευῇ μετὰ τῆς ἁρμοττούσης ὑποκρίσεως εἰπεῖν, οὐ παντελῶς.

ἰδιωτικοί] such as have only the capacity (-κός) of unprofessional persons, or laymen in art, &c. as opposed to clerks, when all science and learning were in the hands of the clergy. ἰδιώτης is opposed to δημιουργός, a practitioner of any art, science, profession, or pursuit: and especially to philosophy and its professors, as in the adage, ἰδιώτης ἐν φιλοσόφοις, φιλόσοφος ἐν ἰδιώταις.

Spengel follows MS A^{c} (or A) in reading ἢ τῶν λεχθέντων for εὖ λεχθέντες. But I confess that I do not see who could be intended by τῶν λεχθέντων besides the orators. Certainly not the preceding ἀναγνωστικοί.

ἰδιωτικοὶ ἐν ταῖς χερσίν] This must have been the case with Cicero's rival, Hortensius. Quintilian [XI 3. 8], after telling us that Hortensius was, during his lifetime, first thought to be chief of all orators, secondly Cicero's rival, and thirdly second to him alone, adds, ut appareat placuisse aliquid eo dicente quod legentes non invenimus (the same may be said of many sermons). Isocrates' Phil. §§ 25, 26, an excellent commentary on this, is unfortunately too long to quote.

‘The reason is that their appropriate place is in an actual contest or debate’ (with ἁρμόττει supply, if you please, ταῦτα as the nomin.—it means at all events the subject of the immediately preceding clause): ‘and this also is why things (speeches) intended to be acted or delivered (lit. proper to be, or capable of being, -κός), when the delivery is withdrawn don't produce their own proper effect (or perform their special function, ἔργον), and so appear silly: for instance asyndeta, and the reiteration of the same word in the written, graphic style’—with which the agonistic divested of its acting or delivery is now (surreptitiously) associated—‘are rightly disapproved; whereas in debating the orators do employ them, because they are proper for acting’. Aquila c. 30 (ap. Gaisford, Not. Var.), Ideoque et Aristoteli et iteratio ipsa verborum ac nominum et repetitio frequentior, et omnis huius modi motus actioni magis et certamini quam stilo videtur convenire.

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What follows is a note, a passing observation suggested by the subject, but not immediately connected with it. ‘In this repetition of the same thing, some change must be made in the mode of expression of each member of it’: (the repetition should be made in different words, to avoid monotony. See on the interpretation of this, and the figure μεταβολή, to which μεταβάλλειν points, a full explanation, Introd. p. 326, and note 1:) ‘which paves the way as it were for the delivery’ (on προοδοποιεῖ, see note on I 1. 2). ‘“This is he that stole from you, this is he that cheated you, this is he that last of all attempted to betray you”’. (From an unknown rhetorician; most probably not the author's own.) ‘And again, as another instance, what Philemon the actor (not to be confounded with the Comic poet) used to do in Anaxandrides' Old men's madness, where (lit. when, ὅτε) he says (uses the words in playing his part) “Rhadamanthys and Palamedes,” and also, in the prologue of the Devotees, the word ἐγώ: for if such things (phrases, sentences, or words) as these be not (varied) in the delivery, they become like “the man that carries the beam,” in the proverb (τήν）’, i.e. stiff and awkward, like one that has ‘swallowed a poker’, as our proverb has it.

Anaxandrides, quoted before, III 10.7. The first citation from his comedy, the γεροντομανία, has the rest of the verse supplied in Athen. XIV 614 C, καί τοι πολύ γε πονοῦμεν. τὸν ἀσύμβολον εὗρε γελοῖα λέγειν Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Παλαμήδης. On the passage of Aristotle, which he quotes, Meineke, Fr. Comic. Gr. III 166, has the following remark: “Philemon autem quid fecerit in recitandis verbis P. καὶ Π., non satis apparet.” I don't suppose the repetition to have been confined to these words; all that Aristotle means to say seems to be, when Philemon had come to that point, thereabouts, the repetition took place. “Num forte eadem verba in pluribus deinceps versibus recitabantur et alio atque alio vocis flexu et sono ab histrione recitabantur? (This follows Victorius' interpretation of μεταβάλλειν.) Ita sane videtur, neque alia alterius loci fuerit ratio, in quo identidem repetebatur pronomen ἐγώ.” At all events, these were two notorious and well-remembered points made by Philemon in this varied repetition in acting the character which he sustained in these two comedies. There is, or was, a similar tradition (which I heard from Dr Butler, the late Bp of Lichfield, and Master of Shrewsbury School) of the effect produced by Garrick's rendering of Pray you undo this button:—thank you, sir,—of Lear, choking in his agony, at the point of death [V. III. 309].

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‘And of asyndeta the same may be said, “I came, I met, I implored”’. I have translated this upon the supposition that there is no intention of distinguishing here the aorist and imperfect: ‘for (here again) delivery (i.e. intonation) must come into play, and it must not be spoken as if it were all one, with the same character and accent’. Of ἀσύνδετον or λύσις, the disconnected style, in which σύνδεσμοι ‘connecting particles’ are absent, comp. Demetrius, π. ἑρμηνείας § 194, ὅτι δὲ ὑποκριτικὸν ἡ λύσις παράδειγμα ἐγκείσθω τόδε, ἐδεξάμην, ἔτικτον, ἐκτρέφω, φίλε (Menander, Fr. Inc. 230, Meineke, u.s. IV 284). οὕτως γὰρ λελυμένον ἀναγκάσει καὶ τὸν μὴ θέλοντα ὑποκρίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν λύσιν: εἰ δὲ συνδήσας εἴποις, ἐδεξάμην καὶ ἔτικτον καὶ ἐκτρέφω, πολλὴν ἀπάθειαν τοῖς συνδέσμοις ἐμβαλεῖς. Of asyndeton two examples are given from Demosthenes by Hermogenes π. μεθόδου δεινότητος, § 11, Rhet. Gr. II 435, Spengel.

A good example of asyndeton, illustrating the rapidity and vivacity which it imparts to style, is supplied by Victorius from Demosth. c. Androt. § 68, ὁμοῦ μετοίκους, Ἀθηναίους, δέων, ἀπάγων, βοῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος. Add Cicero's abiit, excessit, evasit, erupit.

The vivacity imparted to style by asyndeton and the opposite (the employment of connecting particles) is admirably explained and illustrated by Campbell, Phil. of Rhet. Bk. III sect. 2, near the end (2nd ed. Vol. II pp. 287—293.)

‘Further asyndeta have a certain special property; that (by their aid) many things seem to be said in the same time’ (as one thing would be, if they had been employed); ‘because the connecting particle (or connexion) converts several things into one, (Harris, Hermes, II 2, p. 240,) and therefore if it be withdrawn (extracted), plainly the contrary will take place; one will become many. Accordingly (the asyndeton) exaggerates (or amplifies: or multiplies, increases the number)³: “I came, I conversed, I supplicated”: (the hearer or reader) seems to overlook or survey a number of things that he (the speaker) said’. (I have followed Bekker, Ed. 3, πολλὰ δοκεῖ ὑπεριδεῖν ὅσα εἶπεν. Spengel has, πολλὰ δοκεῖ, ὑπερεῖδεν ὅσα εἶπον, which does not agree with MS A^{c}, and is also obscure. Bekker, Ed. 1, has πολλά: δοκεῖ δὲ ὑπεριδεῖν ὅσα εἶπον, ὅσα φημί).

‘And this is Homer's intention also in writing Nireus at the commencement of three lines running’. Il. II 671. On this Demetrius, π. ἑρμηνείας §§ 61, 62, τὸν δὲ Νιρέα, αὐτόν τε ὄντα μικρὸν καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτοῦ μικρότερα—all this is raised to magnitude and importance by ἐπαναφορά, repetition, and διάλυσις, asyndeton. He then quotes the three lines; and, § 62, continues, καὶ σχεδὸν ἅπαξ τοῦ Νιρέως ὀνομασθέντος ἐν τῷ δράματι (dramatic poetry) μεμνήμεθα οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως καὶ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως, καίτοι κατ᾽ ἔπος ἕκαστον καλουμένων σχεδόν κ.τ.λ. concluding with an ingenious simile; ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἑστιάσεσι τὰ ὀλίγα διαταχθέντα πως (a few meats by a certain disposition or arrangement) πολλὰ φαίνεται, οὕτω κἀν τοῖς λόγοις. Comp. also Hermogenes, περὶ ἐπαναληψέως, de repetitione, π. μεθόδου δεινότητος, § 9 (Rhet. Gr. II 433, Spengel), who gives this example of Nireus, with others from Homer, Xenophon, and Demosthenes. Illustrations of this emphatic repetition, and especially of that of the pronoun αὐτός, occur in a fragm. of Aeschyl, Fragm. Inc. 266, quoted at length in Plat. Rep. II 383 B, the most forcible of them all: κἀγὼ (Thetis) τὸ Φοίβου θεῖον ἀψευδὲς στόμα ἤλπιζον εἶναι, μαντικῇ βρύον τέχνῃ. ὁ δ̓ αὐτὸς ὑμνῶν, αὐτὸς ἐν θοίνῃ παρών, <*>ὐτὸς τάδ̓ εἰπών, αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ κτανὼν τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἐμόν. After this it will be unnecessary to quote inferior specimens; such as Xen. Anab. III 2. 4, Aesch. Eumen. 765, with Paley's note, and Blomfield's note on 745, in Linwood's ed. p. 188, where several references are given.

‘For a person (or thing) of which many things are said must necessarily be often mentioned; and therefore (this is a fallacy) they think it follows (καί, that it is also true) that if the name is often repeated, there must be a great deal to say about its owner: so that by this fallacy (the poet) magnifies (Nireus) by mentioning him only once (i.e. in one place), and makes him famous though he nowhere afterwards speaks of him again’. This is the fallacy of illicit conversion of antecedent and consequent, de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 1, ὁ δὲ παρεπόμενον ἔλεγχος διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἀντιστρέφειν τὴν ἀκολούθησιν κ.τ.λ. and Rhet. I 7. 5. Analogous to this is the fallacy exposed in III 7. 4.

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It seems as if in the following section Aristotle had, probably unconsciously misled by the ambiguous term, used ἀκριβής and its πτώ- σεις in two distinct senses: exactness and high finish in style and reasoning. The general subject and connexion of the chapter will oblige us to refer the first clause, with its comparison of public speaking to a rough sketch in black and white, without details, and producing no effect on close inspection, to the style of the speech—which indeed is the subject of the whole book as well as this chapter—though it may possibly include also minute details of reasoning. The same thing may be said of ἡ δίκη ἀκριβέστερον: in this the style and the argument may be minuter, exacter and more detailed in proportion to the diminished size of the audience, and the increased probability of their paying attention to such things (see note ad loc.). But when we come to the third degree, the single judge, it seems to be false and absurd to say that exactness and high finish of style is more suited to speeches addressed to him: no man would endeavour to attract or impose upon an arbitrator by such artifices. The exactness in this case seems therefore to be confined to exactness of reasoning and minute detail, as of evidence and the like. A single judge—as in our own courts—would always be more patient, more inclined to listen to, and more influenced by, exact reasoning and circumstantial evidence than either of the two preceding: the mob of the assembly would not hear them, nor follow them, nor listen to them at all: the large body of dicasts would be more ready to do so: but most of all the single judge. The last clause of the section brings us back to the point from which it started, viz. differences of style, and seems to apply this exclusively to what has been said of ἀκρίβεια in forensic pleading.

‘Now the style of public-speaking is exactly like scene-painting; for the greater the crowd, the more distant the point of view, and consequently’ (in these crowded assemblies; held too in the open air—which should be added in respect of the style required, though this does not distinguish it from forensic rhetoric,) ‘all exactness, minute and delicate touches, and high finish in general appear to be superfluous and for the worse (deviating from the true standard of public speaking) in both’. Compare with this Whately's remarks, partly borrowed from Ar., Rhet. c. IV (Encycl. Metrop. p. 299), on the “bolder, as well as less accurate, kind of language allowable and advisable in speaking to a considerable number”: he quotes Ar.'s comparison of scene-painting, and then proceeds “to account for these phenomena”—which Ar. has omitted to do. His explanation is derived from the various sympathies which are especially awakened in a great crowd.

σκιαγραφία is a painting in outline and chiaroscuro, or light and shade, without colour, and intended to produce its effect only at a distance—herein lies the analogy to public speaking—consequently rough and unfinished, because from the distance all niceties and refinements in style and finish would be entirely thrown away (περίεργα). This point is well brought out in a parallel passage of Plat. Theaet. 208 E, νῦν δῆτα, ὦ Θ., παντάπασί γε ἔγωγε ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, ξυνίημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν: ἕως ἀφεστήκη πόρρωθεν ἐφαίνετό μοί τι λέγεσθαι (Heindorf, note ad loc.): “as long as he was at a distance he seemed to understand the meaning of what was said; on a nearer approach all the apparent clearness vanished, and it became confused and indistinct.” In Phaedo, 69 B, σκιαγραφία is a mere rough sketch or outline; a daub, without any distinct features (see Wyttenbach ad loc.). Parmen. 165 C, οἷον ἐσκιαγραφημένα, ἀποστάντι μὲν ἓν πάντα φαινόμενα,... προσελθόντι δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα. Rep. X 602 D. Ib. II 365 C, where it has the same sense as in the Phaedo. Ast ad loc. Comm. p. 410. And in several other passages of Plato. As the point of comparison here is solely the difference between the near and distant effects, I have translated it ‘scene-painting’ (as also Whately) which represents this better to us: the proper and literal meaning of the word is “the outline of a shadow”, the supposed origin of painting. See further in Mr Wornum's art. on ‘painting’, in Dict. Ant. p. 680 b. With πορρωτέρω ἡ θέα, comp. de Soph. El. 1 164 b 27, where the ‘appearance’ as opposed to the ‘reality’, is compared to this distant view, φαίνεται δὲ δἰ ἀπειρίαν: οἱ γὰρ ἄπειροι ὥσπερ ἂν ἀπέχοντες πόρρωθεν θεωροῦσιν.

ἡ δὲ δίκη ἀκριβέστερον] ‘Whereas justice (forensic pleading) admits of more exactness and finish’. The audience is less numerous, and nearer, literally and metaphorically, to the speaker; they are nearer to him locally, so they can hear better what he says, and also nearer to him in respect of the knowledge of persons and circumstances, which permits him to enter into more minute detail. Also they are not personally interested in the dispute, and can afford to bestow more attention upon minutiae of style, action, intonation, and such like, and being comparatively unoccupied are more likely to notice and criticize such things. All these are reasons why ἡ δίκη is ἀκριβέστερον in various senses. See Quint. III 8.62 seq. After speaking of the declamatory style, he continues, Alia veris consiliis ratio est; ideoque Theophrastus quam maxime remotum ab omni affectatione in deliberativo genere voluit esse sermonem: secutus in hoc auctoritatem praeceptoris sui; quanquam dissentire ab eo non timide solet. Namque Aristoteles idoneam maxime ad scribendum demonstrativam, proximamque ab ea iudicialem putavit et seq.

‘And still further (in respect of the reduction of the number of hearers, and the consequent admissibility of accuracy and finish in the speech) that (subaudi δίκη, the pleading) before a single judge: for he is least of all subject to (liable to be imposed on by) rhetorical artifices (appeals to the feelings and the like): for he takes a more comprehensive view of what belongs to the subject and what is foreign to it (this seems to define the kind of ἀκρίβεια that is here intended) and the contest is absent (there is no room for partisanship and prejudice) and his judgment clear or pure (i.e. free and unbiassed; sincerum, pure of all alloy, such as the preceding). And this is why the same orators don't succeed (become popular, distinguish themselves) in all these (at once): but where action or delivery is most required, there is least of exact finish to be found’. [With ὁ ἀγὼν ἄπεστιν comp. Cic. ad Att. I 16. 8 remoto illo studio contentionis quem ἀγῶνα vos appellatis.]

With μάλιστα ὑποκρίσεως something must be supplied: whether we should understand δεῖ or the like; or simply ἐστί, ‘when it (the speech, or the thing in general,) belongs to, is concerned with, when it is a question of, delivery’. ‘And this where voice is required, and especially loud voice’ (to reach a larger assembly).

φωνή, voice in general, means the various qualities of voice, flexibility, sweetness, power, &c.; out of which a powerful voice is especially distinguished as the most important. It seems that Aeschines was very proud of his sonorous voice. Demosth. alludes to this, de F. L. § 388, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἄλλως ἐνταῦθ᾽ ἐπαρεῖ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ πεφωνασκηκὼς ἔσται. And § 389, καί τοι καὶ περὶ τῆς φωνῆς ἴσως εἰπεῖν ἀνάγκη: πάνυ γὰρ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ φρονεῖν αὐτὸν ἀκούω. And elsewhere.

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‘So now, as I was saying, the demonstrative, declamatory, branch of Rhetoric is the best adapted for writing; for its special function (the purpose which it was made to serve, its ἔργον⁴) is reading: and in the second degree the dicastic branch’ (and its pleadings). Comp. supra III 1.4 and 7. Cic. Orat. LXI 208 (already referred to). Quint. u. s. (III 8.63) referring to this place, Namque Ar. idoneam maxime ad scribendum demonstrativam, proximamque ab ea iudicialem putavit: videlicet quoniam prior illa tota esset ostentationis; haec secunda egeret artis, vel ad fallendum, si ita poposcisset utilitas; consilia fide prudentiaque constarent. It is very manifest, and had already been pointed out by Victorius and Spalding, ad loc. Arist. et Quint., that this is not Aristotle's meaning.

‘To make the further distinction, that the language must be sweet and magnificent is superfluous’—the author of this ‘distinction’ is Theodectes, in his ‘Art.’ Quint. IV 2.63, Theodectes...non magnificam modo vult esse, verum etiam iucundam expositionem—‘for why that more than continent (or perhaps discreet) and liberal, or any other virtue of character (the moral virtues, of which μεγαλοπρέπεια is one. Eth. Nic. II and IV)?’ For προσδιαιρεῖσθαι, Brandis' Anonymus, quoted in Schneidewin's Philologus [IV. i.] p. 45, has προσδιορίζεσθαι.

‘For plainly the sweetness will be produced by all that has been enumerated (purity, propriety, rhythm, vivacity, and the rest) if we have rightly defined what the excellence of the language consists in: for why (else, subaudi ἄλλου) must it be (as we have described it) clear, and not low (mean and common-place), but appropriate (ch. 2 § 2, μὴ ταπεινὴν ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην, σεμνοτέραν, § 3 ξένην)? For if it be verbose, it is not clear; nor if it be too concise (brief)’. Brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio. ἀδολεσχεῖν, said of idle chatter: here of verbosity, vain repetition, tautology. Comp. de Soph. El. c. 3, 165 b 15, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀδολεσχῆσαι τὸν προδιαλεγόμενον: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ πολλάκις ἀναγκάζεσθαι (by the opponent) ταὐτὸ λέγειν. Comp. supra c. 3. 3, τὸ ἀσαφὲς διὰ τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν, and II 21.3, where it is applied to unnecessary accumulation of steps of proof in reasoning, or drawing inferences.

‘But (on the contrary) it is quite plain (of itself, and without rule or precept) that the mean is the appropriate style’. Of this the preceding example is an illustration: clearness or perspicuity is the mean between the excess of garrulity, verbosity, and the defect overconciseness, in the amount of words. ‘Also the rules (ingredients) already stated will produce sweetness of language if they be well mixed, viz. the familiar (these are the ὀνόματα κύρια, the customary), and the foreign (γλῶτται, ἐξηλλαγμένα, ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον, c. 2 § 3, c. 3 § 3, sub init. ξενικὴν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν), and the rhythm, and the plausibility that arises out of (the due observation of) propriety’ (supra c. 7).

‘We have now finished our remarks upon style or language, of all (the three branches of Rhetoric) in common (cc. 2—11), and of each kind individually (c. 12): it now remains to speak of the order (division and arrangement) of the parts of the speech’.