E.C. Marchant, Commentary on Thucydides Book 1

2. ἡμῶν depends on ὅ.

4. παύσαισθε—reach the end. If we begin in a hurry, we shall not be properly prepared, and the war will be prolonged.

5. καὶ ἅμα—the meaning is ‘we have always been free and famous, so our βραδύτης has served us well.’ This leads naturally to the reflexion that the so-called βραδύτης is really σωφροσύνη.

7. δύναται ... εἶναι—when δύναται = ‘means’ we do not find εἶναι: δύναται μάλιστα εἶναι = literally ‘can be on the whole,’ i.e. ‘may be called.’ τοῦτ᾽ is emphatic, ‘it is just this that.’ ἔμφρων too is emphatic; hence its position; and the etymological jingle σω-φροσ-ύνη ἔμ-φρων is equivalent to ‘true prudence.’ For σωφροσύνη cf. c. 68. 1, to which this is a retort.

10. τῶν ... ἐξοτρυνόντων depends as objective gen. on ἡδονῇ. There must be here a side ref. to the increasing influence of oratory in the Athenian ecclesia—ἔπαινος, ἡδονή (produced by rhetoric), κατηγορία all show it. The whole of this paragraph is an independent criticism of Athens as well as an answer to the contrast drawn by the Corinthians.

[2] ξὺν ἐπαίνῳ —ξύν of the means is very rare (cf. 84.3 and c. 141 ξὺν φόβῳ), but occurs sometimes in Xen., as well as in poetry.

11. ἐπὶ τὰ δεινά—cf. c. 70. 2.

13. ξὺν κατηγορίᾳ—like the Corinthian speech.

14. ἀνεπείσθημεν—for the aorist cf. c. 70. 7.

[3] 15. τὸ μέν—i.e. πολεμικοί. The meaning is ‘we are brave because we have a keen sense of honour, and we have a keen sense of honour because we are moderate’ But Thuc. proceeds in the opposite direction, and says, ‘The chief element in moderation (σωφροσύνη substituted for τὸ εὔκοσμον) is honour, and the main ingredient in the sense of honour (αἰσχύνη = αἰδώς) is bravery.’ Cf. 3.83 τὸ εὔηθες, οὗ τὸ γενναῖον πλεῖστον μετέχει.

17. ἀμαθέστερον. παιδευόμενοι—causal partic., ‘not so highly as to despise the laws’; see c. 68. 1, but a different turn is given to ἀμαθία here in the retort.

18. καὶ ξὺν χ.—sc. παιδευόμενοι, which is again to be supphed to the following infinitives.

20. τὰ ἀχρεῖα—thinking on public policy for one's self, for instance, and putting before the assembly what you have thought of.

22. ἀνομοίως—not so well as the fine criticism would lead one to expect.

ἐπεξιέναι—sc. αὐτοῖς, i.e. τοῖς πολεμίοις (Stahl).

23. παραπλησίους—as good as ours.

24. τὰς προσπιπτούσας ... διαιρετάς—the chances that befall cannot be determined by argument. The general sense is ‘just as we do not despise the intelligence of our enemy, so we know that we cannot see into the future—how war will go —but must depend on our εὐψυχία and σωφροσύνη in preparing.’ διαιρεῖν is properly to make a gap in.

[4] 26. παρασκευαζόμεθα—see crit. note: αἰεί favours the indic., καὶ ... δεῖ the subjunc. But an exhortation here would come in very awkwardly before c. 85, where the peroration begins; and Steup, reading παρασκευαζώμεθα, thinks this whole section (84.4) properly follows c. 85.1.

4. ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις—in the most rigorous discipline; cf. ξὺν χαλεπότητι παιδευόμενοι above. (The rendering of Bonitz, ‘trained (only) in what is indispensable,’ as distinct from the useless wisdom of the Athenians seems to take us far beyond anything that Archidamus has said on the small extent of Spartan education, and a limitation—only—does not fit in well with the context.)