This text is part of:
συμπεσεῖν, ‘to agree with, confirm’; cf. vi. 18 ad fin. λόγον: the story is an historic fact (cf. i. 21. 1), hence γενόμενον. Μεμνονίοισι: cf. ii. 106. 5 n. ἑτέρου πρήγματος εἵνεκα. There is no reason to doubt that Callias went to Susa to negotiate for a peace about 448 B. C. (Aristodemus, xiii. 2; F. H. G. v, p. 16; Diodorus, xii. 4; Demosthenes, de Fals. Leg. 273; Paus. i. 8. 2; Plut. Cim. 13). Nor is there any question that after the death of Cimon peace in fact existed between Athens and Persia, as is shown by the regular trade with Phoenicia (Thuc. ii. 69; viii. 35) and with other parts of the Persian Empire (Ps. Xen. Pol. Ath. ii. 7 ἢ ἐν Κύπρῳ ἢ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ἢ ἐν Λυδίᾳ), and by the fact that H., a subject of the Athenian empire, travelled freely in the East. Indeed, the Athenians at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war have hopes of help from the Persian king (Thuc. ii. 7), and repeatedly send envoys to him (Arist. Ach. 61 f.; Thuc. iv. 50). The question whether a formal peace was concluded is more doubtful. The earliest distinct mention of it is by Isocrates, Panegyricus, §§ 117-20, circ. 380 B. C., who repeats the terms in the Areopagiticus, § 80 (355 B. C.) and the Panathenaicus, § 59 (340 B. C.). It is mentioned also in the Menexenus (242 A) and twice by Demosthenes (pro Rhod. 29 and de Fals. Leg. 273), as well as by Lycurgus (in Leoc. 73). Its omission by Thucydides in his brief account of the period has been deemed by many fatal to its reality. But it should be noticed that the indignant rejection in 411 B. C. by the Athenians (who were prepared to give up Ionia) of the demand that the Persian should be allowed to sail where he would along his own coasts (Thuc. viii. 56), proves the existence of some convention excluding the Persian fleet from the Aegean. Further, it appears almost certain that a treaty was made with Darius II soon after his accession (circ. 423 B. C.), since not only does Andocides state that Epilycus, his own first cousin, made peace and eternal alliance with the king (Andoc. de Pace 29), but on a contemporary inscription, Heraclides of Clazomenae is thanked for his help in securing the success of the embassy to the king (C. I. A. (vol. iv.) ii. 5 c). It would be extraordinary that Thucydides should omit all mention of this, unless it was a mere renewal on the accession of another king of an older convention. It may therefore be argued that Thucydides indirectly confirms the fact of an understanding with Persia about 448 B. C. The fact which led Theopompus (fr. 168, F. H. G. i, p. 306) to question the existence of a peace, viz. that the inscription recording it was in Ionic letters, indicates at most that the record was not contemporary (though some Attic inscriptions even before 403 B. C. were written in Ionic letters (Hicks 36, 50, 73)); in any case it was accepted as genuine by Craterus, who gave a copy in his collection of Inscriptions. For the terms we are unfortunately dependent on the fourthcentury orators and late historians who are undoubtedly guilty of gross exaggerations. The limits fixed for ships of war, the Cyanean rocks (Dem. de Fals. Leg. 273; Aristodem. xiii. 2; Lycurg. in Leoc. 73; Diod. xii. 4. 5) and Phaselis (Isoc. Panegr. 118; Areopag. 80; Panath. 59; Diod. l. c.; Lycurg. l. c., supported by the fact that Phaselis was a member of the Delian league), are probably correct, though Demosthenes (l. c.) and Plutarch (Cim. 13) substitute for Phaselis the more conspicuous landmark of the Chelidonian isles. On the other hand, the stipulation that the king's armies should not come nearer the coast than one day's march for cavalry (Dem. Plut. l. c.) or three days for infantry (Diod. l. c.) ‘if ever made’ must often have been broken, and Isocrates' limit, the Halys, is a gross and foolish exaggeration. Finally, the notion that the peace secured autonomy for all Greek cities (Lycurg. l. c.; Diod. xii. 4, 5. 26. 2) is clearly a later invention designed to heighten the contrast with the peace of Antalcidas. It is contradicted by the abandonment of Cyprus to the Persian, and by contemporary evidence that the great king never formally relinquished his claims even to Ionia (Hdt. vi. 42 n.; Thuc. viii. 5). This is the reason why H. makes no mention of the peace here, covering it over with the vague phrase ἑτέρου πρήγματος εἵνεκα. In the fifth century it was discreditable to Athens to relinquish Cyprus and Egypt, to give up the crusade against Persia and turn her arms against other Hellenes (Thuc. iii. 9. 4), and to obtain from the great king only a grudging recognition of undeniable facts, but in the fourth century this same convention could be elevated by contrast with the base betrayal of Greece by Sparta at the peace of Antalcidas (387 B. C.) into a triumphant assertion of Greek liberties and Greek empire. On the peace of Callias cf. further E. Meyer, F. ii. 71-82; Busolt, iii. 346-58. ἐμμένει (sc. ἡ φιλία): cf. i. 74. 4; Thuc. ii. 2. The question gains point if it be remembered that Argos had been since 462 B. C. in alliance with Athens, the enemy of Persia (Thuc. i. 102). About 450, however (Thuc. v. 14, 28, 40), Argos made a thirty years' peace with Sparta, and apparently aimed at returning to her old position of neutrality.
The National Endowment for the Humanities provided support for entering this text.
Purchase a copy of this text (not necessarily the same edition) from Amazon.com
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.