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Such are the motives and incentives that stimulate men to injustice and wrong, which have been found to be so many varieties of pleasure: we next proceed to examine and classify, for the use of the forensic practitioner, the dispositions and characters of wrong-doers and of their intended victims, those who are most likely to be exposed to wrong. First of all, the ‘possibility’ of effecting it must always be taken into account by any one who contemplates the perpetration of a wrong: and not only the general possibility, as whether so and so is possible to a human being (physical or absolute possibility), but a special possibility to themselves, καὶ ἑαυτοῖς δυνατόν; in other words, the moral possibility, when the act is done in such a way or under such circumstances as shall render it worth their while; such that the prejudice or injury sustained by the action or its consequences shall not outweigh the prospective benefit; an act done in spite of these considerations may be regarded as morally ‘impossible’. εἴτε ἂν (οἴωνται) λαθεῖν πράξαντες] ‘whether, that is, the intended wrongdoers think the crime will never be detected at all; or be detected, but remain unpunished; or if it be punished, that the loss or injury so sustained will be less than the gain resulting from it to themselves’.
ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον] The subject of ‘general probability and improbability’ shall be considered hereafter, that is, in II 19, where the δυνατόν and ἀδύνατον (one of the four κοινοὶ τόποι) are analysed. This is expressed by the κοινὰ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντων τῶν λόγων of the parenthesis: ‘because they are common to all kinds of speeches’, (viz. the three kinds of Rhetoric, which is here taken as the basis of their κοινότης, elsewhere it is their opposition to the εἴδη, see Introd. on τόποι, p. 128), ‘therefore they shall be considered hereafter’, viz. with the rest in II 19. We now proceed to the subject of the special or moral probability, which affects would-be wrongdoers themselves (αὐτοὶ δ᾽ οἴονται δυνατοὶ εἶναι...), and under the circumstances of any particular case. The first class of persons that rely on this kind of possibility, in the sense of a possible exemption from punishment if they do wrong, are able speakers and men of action—the one capable of defending themselves against attack with their tongues by plausible argument, the other of carrying through the business or transaction in the best and completest way, so as to secure all possible advantage; and men already practised in many forensic contests—and so with acquired experience of the resources available for defence against an accuser in a court of justice; and men with many friends, having an extensive or influential connexion, or well befriended,—these will be well helped; and the wealthy—who can buy off an accuser or antagonist, and corrupt the judges.
The possibility of doing wrong with impunity is greatest when the parties themselves answer to any of the foregoing descriptions; and if not, (in the next degree), when they have friends, or servants and followers, or associates of these kinds; for these circumstances and capacities make it possible for them (διά, the cause, the power is due to these) to do the things (this applies specially to the πρακτικοί), and to escape either detection or punishment.
Again, the possibility is increased, the attempt becomes easier, if they are friends either of the objects of the wrong, those whom they propose to injure, or of the judges who would have to try the case if brought before them: for friends are off their guard (lit. unguarded), and thereby particularly exposed to injury and wrong, and moreover are inclined to come to terms or to be reconciled without ‘prosecuting’ the case, or bringing it before a court of justice; and judges are ready to oblige their friends, and either let them off altogether, or inflict a very slight penalty (so fair and upright were the Athenian dicasts). οἱ...φίλοι ἀφύλακτοι κ.τ.λ.] This sounds very atrocious, and certainly has a highly immoral appearance on the face of it. But we are to recollect that the author told us in his apology for Rhetoric in the preface that such suggestions are to be regarded only as exemplifications of the theory of the art, which argues each side of every question indifferently without regard to moral considerations: but in practice, though the rhetorician as such can employ immoral arguments, no honest rhetorician would have recourse to them. Rhetoric does not profess to teach virtue; that must be learned aliunde. This is Aristotle's view of the matter: the Sophists, who, as we are expressly told, identified the study of Rhetoric with a general, political education, had no such excuse or justification for the immoralities of their Rhetoric, which they inculcated without alloy. προσκαταλλάττονται] ‘καὶ πρὸς, et praeterea. pessime vulgo προσκαταλλάττονται’. Gaisford. Bekker and Spengel retain the vulgate, to which there is no possible objection. καταλλάττεσθαι alone, it is true, conveys all that is necessary to the sense, the reconciliation namely; but πρός is very often added to a verb, simple or compound, to express ‘direction’ to an object, as προσεντείνειν πληγάς, Dem. c. Mid. 528. 25; προσευθύνειν, Ar. Pol. VII (VI) 8, 1322 b 9; and particularly with verbs that imply conciliation or reconciliation, as προσχωρεῖν Thuc. I 103, IV 71, ‘to come over to a side’, προσάγεσθαι, ‘to bring over to one, to conciliate’. Isocr. Nicocl. § 22, θεραπείας προσαγάγεσθαι. Thuc. III 43, ἀπάτῃ προσάγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος, III 48, μήτε οἴκτῳ μήτ᾽ ἐπιεικείᾳ, οἷς οὐδὲ ἐγὼ ἐῶ προσάγεσθαι (to be won over). προσίεσθαι et similia. So here the compound verb καταλλάττεσθαι denotes the mutual settlement of the disputed points, and the additional πρός the conciliation, being won over, which attends it.
Persons likely to escape detection are those whose personal and moral or mental character is opposite (this is the ‘opposition’ of ‘contrariety’, the extremes under the same genus, as black and white in colour, bitter and sweet in taste, hot and cold in touch or feeling, and such like) to that which the charge necessarily implies; as when a man of feeble bodily frame is charged with ‘assault and battery’, or a poor and ugly man with adultery. The ἀσθενής charged with αἰκία was a stock example of the τόπος of τὸ εἰκός in the early rhetorical treatises. This τόπος was the staple of Corax's τέχνη, Rhet. II 24. 11; and the case of the ‘weak man’ is quoted by Aristotle as one of the examples there used. The application of the argument of ‘probability’ to the treatment of it, shewing how Rhetoric τἀναντία συλλογίζεται, is there illustrated. It appears again in Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37). 6, and Pl. Phaedrus 273 B, as an extract from Tisias' τέχνη, where the τόπος of τὸ εἰκός is represented as somewhat differently treated. Victorius cites Quint. V 10. 26, speaking of the same mode of inference; the probability namely of the conformity of a man's actions to his bodily condition and ordinary character. These are ‘personal’ topics of argument, argumenta a persona, § 23, inferences from personal conditions, qualities, habits, employed to determine the probability of a certain action, as proceeding from him: one of these is, habitus corporis: ducitur enim frequenter in argumentum species libidinis, robur petulantiae; his contraria in diversum—the two cases given by Aristotle. ὁ πένης καὶ ὁ αἰσχρός, the definite article marking the genus, the member of a certain class. See note on I 7. 13 εἰ μὴ ἦν ὁ πράξων, p. 130. In this and the next topic there is a change from persons to things, which are resumed as the objects of analysis in § 32. καὶ τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερῷ] ‘And things, i. e. acts, that are excessively conspicuous, open to observation and under people's eyes’. τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς, ‘things in sight’, qui sautent aux yeux. Polit. VII (VI) 4, 1319 b 18, ὀλίγον μὲν γὰρ πονηρὸν παρορᾶται, πολὺ δὲ γινόμενον ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς μᾶλλόν ἐστιν. Such glaring acts are not guarded against (ἀφύλακτα here occurs in a different sense to ἀφύλακτοι φίλοι in § 4: that is ‘unguarded’, from φυλάττεσθαι, the direct passive; this is ‘not guarded against’, the passive of (the middle) φυλάττεσθαί τι ‘to guard oneself against anything’, comp. §§ 6 and 21), no precautions are taken to prevent them, ‘because no one would suppose that any one was likely to attempt them’. Supply to complete the sense τιν᾽ ἂν ποιῆσαι αὐτά, or ἐπιχειρῆσαι αὐτοῖς. This is a return to the original topic of ἃ δύνανται πράττειν ‘possible actions’. τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερῷ are therefore acts which are likely ‘to be carried into effect’—not, ‘to escape detection’, λαθητικά from the preceding clause, which is in some sort parenthetical.
And acts again which are of such a magnitude (τηλικαῦτα) and of such a kind as no one (else) would ever think of doing (supply ποιήσειε); for these too (like the preceding) are not guarded against, (viz. novel and audacious attempts and enterprises which people are unprepared for, and which therefore take them by surprise): for it is only against customary offences, just like sicknesses, that people are on their guard; against diseases hitherto unknown, (which no one has ever yet had), no one ever takes precautions. ἀῤῥώστημα, ἀῤῥωστία, ἀῤῥωστεῖν properly denote ‘want of strength’, bodily weakness, and hence any infirmity, such as sickness. Hence Thucydides applies it, III 15, to want of strength of will, or of inclination, ἀῤῥωστία τοῦ στρατεύειν; and VII 47, to weakness of mind; the mental prostration or despondency which prevailed amongst the Athenian troops before Syracuse: and again in VIII 83, to Tissaphernes' weakness of will or inclination, as shewn in his ‘remissness’ or ‘disinclination’ to supply pay to the crews of the Peloponnesian vessels; which Arnold well expresses by ‘he was sick of it’. In Plat. Rep. II 359 B it represents nothing more than the defect or weakness of a faculty. In Xenophon the three words usually denote some form of disease or sickness: Demosth. Ol. II p. 24. 5, ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἡμῶν, ἕως μὲν ἂν ἐῤῥωμένος ᾖ τις, οὐδὲν ἐπαισθάνεται τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα σαθρῶν, ἐπὰν δὲ ἀῤῥώστημά τι συμβῇ, πάντα κινεῖται, κἂν ῥῆγμα κἂν στρέμμα κἂν ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπάρχοντων σαθρὸν ᾖ, any disease or other imperfection and unsoundness of body, including fractures, sprains, &c.
καὶ οἷς μηδεὶς ἐχθρὸς ἢ πολλοί] is a return to the original construction of § 3. Supply οἴονται δύνασθαι πράττειν κ.τ.λ. or simply οἴονται δύνασθαι ἀδικεῖν. And also those (are disposed to do wrong, or think they can do it undetected or with impunity) who have no enemy at all or a great many: the former think they will escape undetected because there is no one (no enemy) to take precautions against them (and their attempts); the latter pass undiscovered, because they are not likely (ἄν) to be suspected of assailing people when they are on their guard against them (as enemies), διὰ τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν ἂν ἐπιχειρῆσαι ‘because they would not be thought (lit. seem) likely to assail’, ‘because no one would think them likely to assail’; and also, if they are suspected or detected (so Victorius), (and brought before a court of justice), they have a defence ready that they never would have made, were not at all likely to make, such an attempt; that is, that their guilt is highly improbable; Corax's topic of τὸ εἰκός again.
And those again who have any means of concealment (either of themselves, or of the goods they have stolen,) or any ‘mode’ (of changing it, so that it shall not be recognised, Victorius, or more generally, ‘any contrivance or device’) or any place (of refuge for themselves, or for stowing away the stolen property) or are of an inventive disposition, or habit of mind’, (suggestive of τρόποι in the second sense, and μηχαναί). Victorius confines the whole of this topic to the one crime of robbery, de furibus ac latronibus; and interprets κρύψις qui possunt quae sustulerint nullo negotio occulere; τρόπος quibus modus viaque facilis est illa immutandi. Quod aut figuram aut colorem variare possint; aut artificio denique suo aliquo modo facere ne ipsa agnoscantur. I should prefer giving it the wider sense of contrivances, devices of all kinds, tricks, artifices, any ‘ways’ or ‘modes’ of getting out of a scrape, and escaping the consequences of a criminal act. In Plat. Phileb. 16 A, it has a nearly similar sense, εἴ τις τρόπος ἔστιν καὶ μηχανή. Lastly, confining διάθεσις to the same subject, he translates it vendere, as we say to dispose of a thing; adding, διάθεσιν enim hic alienationem valere arbitror, and quoting, in support of the interpretation, Plut. Solon, p. 91 E, τῶν δὲ γενομένων διάθεσιν πρὸς ξένους ἐλαίου μόνον ἔδωκεν: ἄλλα δὲ ἐξάγειν ἐκώλυσεν. Demosth. Olynth. II, p. 22, οὔθ᾽ ὅς᾿ ἂν πορίσωσιν οὕτως ὅπως ἂν δύνωνται ταῦτ̓ ἔχοντες διάθεσθαι. Isocr. Paneg. § 42, τὰ μὲν ὅπου χρὴ διάθεσθαι τὰ δ᾽ ὁπόθεν εἰσαγάγεσθαι, (the word in this sense implies ‘distribution’, and so, ‘disposing or setting out for sale.’ Similarly ib. § 9, τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὖ διάθεσθαι ‘to set out, or forth, in words’; and several of the best authors use it of ‘disposing of’ a variety of different things, property, one's own person, a daughter, goods for sale). It seems to me preferable to extend the meaning, as in the other cases, beyond the mere ‘disposal’ of stolen goods, to any disposition or habit of mind, which is at all events the usual meaning of διάθεσις. And there is this further reason for rejecting Victorius' limitation of the topic, that if it is adopted no difference whatsoever is left between κρύψις and τόπος here and afterwards in §§ 33, 34. καὶ οἷς, ἐὰν γένηται ζημία κ.τ.λ.] And those who, if they don't escape detection, have the means of getting rid of (lit. pushing off) the trial altogether, or postponing it, or of bribing the judges. And those who, if a penalty be actually imposed have the means of getting rid of the payment of it, or postponing it for a long time, or who from poverty have nothing to lose: (in the last clause the relative οἷς, which is convertible with εἴ τις, must be supposed to take that form when joined with ἕξει).
Another class of cases in which men are disposed to do wrong, and think wrong deeds possible, is where the profit likely to accrue is evident, or certain (patent to all, free from all doubt or obscurity), or great, or immediate; and the penalties to which they are liable small, or obscure and uncertain (not such as to attract attention, and so deter from the intended wrong; quae obscurae admodum et caecae sunt ut perspici nequeant: Victorius), or remote. Or again, where no possible punishment is equal to the prospective benefit; as is supposed (δοκεῖ) to be the case with absolute sovereignty or tyranny. On τυραννίς, and the distinction between it and μοναρχία, see note on I 8. 4 and 5, p. 155.
‘And cases in which the offence, and the profit or result of it, is a substantial, solid gain, and the penalty mere disgrace’.—λήμματα refers perhaps to pecuniary gain (lucrum). ‘And the reverse; where the (legal) crime tends to any kind of praise (is directed to, as its meed or reward; i. e. where what is a crime in one point of view, is likely to meet with praise in another), as, for instance, if the crime was accompanied by vengeance for father or mother, as it was in Zeno's case; whilst the penalties are all directed against a man's purse or person, as fine, imprisonment, banishment, or anything else of the same kind (not affecting his character or reputation): for both circumstances and both dispositions may be motives to wrong acts, only not in the same persons and the same characters’. Men of different characters are influenced by different motives in the commission of crime. Some care more for honour and glory and reputation than for their money and personal ease and comfort, and these, like Zeno, will be ready to commit what may be construed as a crime and render them liable to punishment, provided it be attended with something which leads to praise: the others, who value their personal wellbeing more than their good name, will be induced rather to do wrong acts which lead to substantial gain, and affect only their reputation. The one are virtuous, though they err; the others, sordid, mean, and vicious. Of Zeno's case, here referred to, nothing is known, and we are reduced to conjecture. Of the two best known of this name, Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic sect, whose death is placed in B. C. 263 (Clint. Fast. Hell.), would, if alive, have been too young when Aristotle wrote the Rhetoric to have attracted public attention: it is just possible that the other, Zeno the logician, of Elea, Parmenides' follower, may be the person here meant. Of this Zeno we learn from Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, and Diodorus (see the reff. in Brandis' Art. in Smith's Dict. Biogr.) that he joined in an attempt to rid his native country of her tyrant: and if the attempt was successful (of which we are not informed) and the tyrant slain, Zeno may possibly have mixed personal considerations with his public and patriotic motives, just as Harmodius and Aristogeiton did, as Aristotle tells us in the Politics (VIII (V) 10), in their attack upon the Athenian tyrant. Only it seems unlikely that if this were the true explanation of the allusion that Aristotle would have spoken of tyrannicide as an ἀδίκημα, a ‘wrong’, either legal or moral: and besides this, the act itself, as well as the attendant circumstance, would have been regarded as praiseworthy. πλήν] ‘only’, an exception or reservation; see note on I 1. 14, p. 26.
‘And those who have often in previous attempts escaped either detection or punishment. And, on the other hand, those who have often failed in their attempts’ (the opposite to the last); ‘because there is a class of people who in such matters as these, as well as in actual fighting, are inclined (have a disposition) to renew the fight’. οἷοι for οἷον is due to Victorius in addendis. Victorius quotes in illustration of this pugnacious character, Problem XVIII 2, de Sophistis, καὶ γὰρ νικῶντες διὰ τὸ χαίρειν προάγονται μᾶλλον ἐρίζειν: καὶ ἡττώμενοι ὡς ἀναμαχούμενοι.
καὶ οἷς] is no doubt masc., as it is through the whole series of these topics, and in accordance with οἱ γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς τοιοῦτοι that follows. Otherwise it would be more naturally and conveniently translated in this and the following section as neuter, ‘in all cases where’.... ‘And all those who have the pleasure (consequent on their action) immediately, and the pain comes afterwards; or the profit at once and the penalty later: because this suits the character of the ἀκρατεῖς who are devoid of self-control, and this vice extends (beyond mere pleasure) to every object of man's aims and aspirations’, to profit as well as pleasure. And therefore wherever there is immediate pleasure or profit, and only subsequent pain or loss, the ἀκρατεῖς whose character is to be tempted by present pleasure and profit, though at the expense of future pain and loss, are naturally in all such cases prone to wrong-doing. What is here said of ἀκρατής and ἀκρασία is confirmed by Eth. Nic. VII 2, ult. ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους, though, as the λέγονται shews, this is only a popular way of speaking (and therefore suited to Rhetoric): and in VII 6, 1147 b 31, seq. we are told that these are not ἁπλῶς ἀκρατεῖς, ἀκρασία proper being περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, limited to the same class of objects as ἀκολασία; and ὁ τῶν τε ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων, πείνης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους καὶ πάντων τῶν περὶ ἁφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν, παρὰ τὴν τροαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀκρατὴς λέγεται.
‘And also the opposite characters to these are equally prone to wrong-doing in cases where the pain or loss is for the moment (ἤδη), and the pleasure and profit later and more lasting: for this is the character of the ἐγκρατεῖς, those that have acquired the habit of self-control, and of the wiser sort (men of more practical wisdom, φρόνησις), who pursue them in this order’.
‘And those whose actions may possibly be thought to be due to chance, or to necessity, or to nature, or to habit, and who in general may be thought to have been guilty of error rather than of crime’. There is a variation here in the classification of these impelling causes of action from that laid down in c. 10. 7, 8, which is singular even in a rhetorical treatise, considering that they stand so near together. In the former there are three (of the seven) which are independent of ourselves and our own will, (1) τύχη, and ἀνάγκη subdivided into (2) βία and (3) φύσις. ἔθος in the other list is classed with the voluntary sources of action, where we are ourselves the causes of them. Here ἔθος is referred to the other class, doubtless because habit when confirmed becomes a ‘second nature’, and action from habit is so far involuntary. Rhet. I 11.3, and de Memoria, c. 2, φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος. ἁμαρτεῖν and ἀδικεῖν] refers to the well-known threefold gradation of wrong or criminality, (1) ἀτύχημα, accidental injury, (2) ἁμάρτημα, a mistake or error arising from ignorance of the circumstances of the case (Eth. N. III 2), and (3) ἀδικία, in which the προαίρεσις, the deliberate purpose, enters and constitutes an intentional wrong or crime, malice prepense. In Eth. Nic. V 10, a fourth degree is added, ἀδίκημα, distinguished from ἀδικία in this, that though the act is voluntary and intentional at the moment, the intention is not preconceived and deliberate, the malice is not prepense; it is without προαίρεσις, deliberate purpose; as an injury or death inflicted in a sudden fit of passion.
‘And those that have the prospect of, anticipate, a merciful construction being put on their act by the judges’. On ἐπιείκεια, see I 13. 13, and Introd. on that passage, pp. 190—193. It is thus defined in Eth. Nic. V 14, 1137 b 12, δίκαιον μέν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμου δικαίου, a rectification, supply of the deficiencies, of the strict letter of the law, legal justice, ᾗ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου, Ib. V 27, ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐλαττωτικός, 1138. 1. Soph. Oed. Col. 1127 (Oedipus), ἐπεὶ τό γ᾽ εὐσεβεῖ μόνοις παῤ ὑμῖν εὗρον ἀνθρώπων ἐγὼ καὶ τοὐπιεικές, milde gesinnung, humanität, gegenüber starrem recht, Schneidewin ad loc. Soph. Fragm. Inc. 699 (709, Dind.) δαίμονα, ὃς οὔτε τἀπιεικὲς οὔτε τὴν χάριν οἶδεν, μόνην δ᾽ ἔστερξε τὴν ἁπλῶς δίκην. ‘Any deficiency which a man feels may incline him to commit wrong —for the purpose of supplying it. Such deficiency is of two kinds; either deficiency in what is necessary, as poverty, or in some excess, as wealth’. Rich men often feel a craving for something over and above their wealth, something superfluous, as power, honour, license. Thuc. III 45. 4 reads like a commentary on this topic, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν πενία ἀνάγκῃ τὴν τόλμαν παρέχουσα, ἡ δ̓ ἐξουσία ὕβρει τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ φρονήματι ‘great resources and the consequent license breed the grasping spirit (their natural progeny, τήν) by insolence and pride’. Comp. also Pol. II 7, quoted in § 17.
‘And those in excessively high and in excessively low repute, the one as altogether unlikely, the other as no more likely than before, to incur the imputation of crime’. The first rely upon their character, either for the success of their attempt, which will put their victims off their guard, or for impunity by escaping suspicion; the second, having no character to lose, are emboldened by this to make new attempts, by which they may gain and cannot lose, because they cannot be in a worse position in the eyes of the world than they are already.
‘Such are the dispositions which lead men to attempt wrong’. We now turn to the characters and dispositions, qualities and circumstances which most expose men to wrong; these are as follows:
‘First, people that have what we want, either in respect of necessity or excess (superfluity), or of sensual enjoyment, whether remote or near; for the acquisition of the one is speedy, the vengeance of the other tardy: as when we Greeks spoil the Carthaginians’. ‘We Greeks’ are pirates. Comp. Pol. II 7, 1267 a 2, οὐ μόνον δ᾽ οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τἀναγκαῖα ἀδικοῦσιν,...ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσι (this is the craving after superfluities out of mere wantonness of appetite)...οὐ τοίνυν διὰ ταύτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἂν ἐπιθυμοῖεν ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἄνευ λυπῶν ἡδοναῖς. τί οὖν ἄκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων; κ.τ.λ. The difference of the two last of these lies in this, that the one is the desire caused by the painful gap to supply the deficiency; the other is a desire of pleasures which have no such painful craving attendant upon them, such are the pleasures of taste, learning, knowledge, and, in general, intellectual pleasures. The cure recommended for this vicious desire is philosophy, which may be obtained from within and δἰ αὐτοῦ, without any extraneous aid. It seems therefore that this division does not exactly coincide with that of the Rhetoric, though there is a strong resemblance between them.
‘And those who are not inclined to caution or precaution, but are of a confiding temper; for they are all easy to take by surprise’ (λαθεῖν, lit. it is easy for the wrong-doer to escape their notice in attacking them). And the careless (indolent, easy-tempered); because the prosecution of an offence belongs to (the opposite character) the careful, anxious attentive. So Leech, in Punch, Aug. 2, 1862. Infuricate Captain. ‘You scoundrel, I'll have you up as sure as you are born’. Cabman. ‘What, summons me! Oh no, you won't, my Lord. You'll never take the trouble’. (Exit Cabman with 3s. 6d. over his fare.) And the sensitive, timid, retiring, shamefaced; because they are not ‘combative’, inclined to contest the point, to stand out, in the matter of gain. αἰσχυντηλός, II 6. 27, 12. 10, it is characteristic of young men: whereas Eth. Nic. IV 15, 1128 b 20, πρεσβύτερον οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυντηλός. Plat. Charm. 158 C, Legg. II 665 E, αἰσχυντηλῶς ᾁδοντες. Vict. cites Aristoph. Equit. 264, καὶ σκοπεῖς γε τῶν πολιτῶν ὅστις ἐστὶν ἀμνοκῶν, πλούσιος καὶ μὴ πονηρὸς καὶ τρέμων τὰ πράγματα.
‘And those who have been wronged by many and yet never prosecuted, or taken vengeance on, the aggressors, these being what the proverb calls Mysians' spoil’, that is, an easy prey. Μυσῶν λεία dicitur de possessione quae defensore caret et obnoxia est direptori cuivis, Dissen ad Dem. de Corona, § 72; of anything that may be plundered with impunity, Liddell and Scott, Lex.; von allem durchaus preisgegebenen, Rost u. Palm, L. Harpocration and Suidas, s. vv., both explain the origin of the proverb to be the defenceless state of Mysia during the absence of their king Telephus, the famous beggar-hero of Euripides, and Horace's type of a pauper. See also Stallbaum's note on Gorgias 521 B, who quotes Olympiodorus (on the passage of Plato), ἡ παροιμία αὕτη ἐκ τοῦ Τηλέφου ἐστὶν Εὐριπίδου, ἐκεῖ γάρ κ.τ.λ. Whatever may be the origin of this proverb, it certainly was not derived from Euripides' play: for Harpocration expressly says that it is to be found in Strattis (the Comic poet) and Simonides ἐν ἰάμβοις. This last is probably Simonides of Amorgos, a very early writer; but if it be the other Simonides, of Ceos, it is equally impossible that he could have derived it from Euripides, since he died when Euripides was a child. The above explanations seem to be founded upon the helpless condition of the Mysian people under some special circumstances which deprived them of their ordinary means of self-defence. I should rather suppose that the proverb implies an imputation upon their national character, because another proverbial expression, at least as common as this, represents the Mysians, as sharing with the Carians, the reputation of being the vilest and most contemptible of mankind; the property of such mean and cowardly wretches would naturally be an easy prey to any one who chose to take it. This imputation of cowardice or weakness is directly conveyed by Aristotle in the passage before us. This brings the two proverbs together as the expression of the same features of national character. This will furnish a sufficient explanation of Gorg. 521 B, εἰ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, and we need not have recourse with Stallbaum and Heindorf (ad loc. § 162) to the Μυσῶν λείαν to interpret it. This proverbial contempt for the Mysian character appears in Rhes. 251, Pl. Theaet. 209 (Schol. in Heindorf and Stallbaum), Magnes, (Com.) Fr. Poastriae (in Meineke's Fragm. Comic. Gr. II 11), Philemon, Sicel. fr. 3 (Meineke u. s. IV 25), Menand. Androg. VII (Schol. Gorg. u. s., and Mein. IV 86), and Menand. Fr. Inc. 481 (Mein. IV 327), all in the words Μυσῶν ὁ ἔσχατος, ‘the last and lowest—even of the Mysians’, worthlessness can go no further. Cic. pro Flacco, 27. 65, quid in Graeco sermone tam tritum et celebratum est, quam si quis despicatui ducitur, ut ‘Mysorum ultimus’ esse dicatur. Ib. 2. 3; 40. 100; Orat. VIII 27, quonam igitur modo audiretur Mysus aut Phryx Athenis, quum etiam Demosthenes, &c. ad Quint. Fratr. I 1. 6 hominis ne Graeci quidem, at Mysii aut Phrygii potius. (Erasm. Adag. Mysorum postremus, p. 354.) The other form of the proverb occurs in Dem. de Cor. p. 248, § 72, τὴν Μυσῶν λείαν καλουμένην, in Strattis, Medea, (fr. Harpocr.) Mein. II 776. (Erasm. Adag. Mysorum praeda, p. 1774.)
καὶ οὓς μηδεπώποτε καὶ οὓς πολλάκις] sc. ἠδικήκασι. Both those who have never yet been injured and those who have been often injured (by the proposed wrong-doer) are proper objects of wrong: both of them are likely to be unprepared or taken off their guard (see on ἀφύλακτα, § 5, supra), the one because they feel secure and are careless from ignorance of all injurious treatment, and the others because they have already had so much of it that they think they must now be exempt from it for the future; that fortune or the Gods must be tired of persecuting them. οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐδέποτε, οἱ δ᾽ ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἔτι] sc. ἀδικούμενοι. The participle will suit both constructions. Soph. Oed. Col. 965, τάχ᾽ ἄν τι μηνίουσιν εἰς γένος πάλαι expressing ‘likelihood’, and convertible with οἱ τάχ᾽ ἄν: τι μηνίοιεν. (Hermann ad loc. 969.) Matth., Gr. Gr. § 599 C, quotes this passage as an illustration of ἄν with a participle signifying ‘mere possibility or probability, a conjecture or a modest indefiniteness’, distinguishing this from the general case which is exemplified in § 598 b. There is no ground for this distinction; the particle in both alike has its usual conditional signification; and the likelihood or probability and the rest is only one of the conditions under which the act is conceived. Here it expresses the opinion or expectation (ὡς) that they would be no longer likely to be exposed, or under such conditions or circumstances as would expose them, to wrong.
And those that have already been the subjects of hostile charges, suspicion, calumny (all included in διαβάλλειν, ‘to set one man at variance with, or against, another’), and such as are especially exposed or liable to it (easily calumniated, &c.); for such as these have neither the will (to prosecute) from fear of the judges (who are prejudiced against them), nor are they able to persuade (the judges, for the same reason, if they brought this case before a court of law): and to this class belong all that are hated and envied. φθονούμενοι] On the irregular passive, see Appendix B (at the end of this Book).
καὶ (ἀδικοῦσι τούτους) πρὸς οὓς ἔχουσι πρόφασιν] ‘and those again are liable to injury against whom there is (lit. others have) any available pretext’ (real or supposed for attacking, or doing them wrong) ‘of injury received or threatened by their ancestors or themselves or their friends against themselves or their forefathers, or those whom they care for, (are interested in); because, as the proverb has it, villany only wants a pretext’. For μελλησάντων Brandis' Anonymus (ap. Schneidewin's Philologus, IV, 1, p. 44) read μελετησάντων; no great improvement. μέλλειν, to be about to do, hence of something impending or threatening. Plat. Theaet. 148 E, of the intention; see Stallbaum's note; of a threatening attitude or posture, μέλλησις. Thuc. I 69, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινὰ ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, and IV 126, Brasidas (of the threatening demonstrations of the barbarians before the battle), οὗτοι δὲ τὴν μέλλησιν μὲν ἔχουσι τοῖς ἀπείροις φοβεράν. The proverb ‘any pretext will serve a knave’ is thus expressed by Menander, Thettale, Fr. 1. (Meineke IV 133), μικρά γε πρόφασίς ἐστι τοῦ πρᾶξαι κακῶς, ap. Stob. Flor. IV 40. To the same effect, Eurip. Iph. Aul. 1180, ἐπεὶ βραχείας προφάσεως ἐνδεῖ μόνον, ἐφ᾽ ᾗ ς᾿ ἐγὼ καὶ παῖδες αἱ λελειμμέναι δεξόμεθα δέξιν ἥν σε δέξασθαι χρεών. Victorius refers to a story of Agathocles tyrant of Sicily, in Plutarch, as an illustration of this topic. It is told (in the de sera numinis vindicta 557 B) of the Corcyreans, Ἀγαθοκλῆς δὲ ὁ Συρακοσίων τύραννος καὶ σὺν γέλωτι χλευάζων Κερκυραίους ἐρωτῶντας, διὰ τί πορθοίη τὴν νῆσον αὐτῶν, ὅτι, νὴ Δία, εἶπεν, οἱ πατέρες ὑμῶν ὑπεδέξαντο τὸν Ὀδυσσέα: and then of the people of Ithaca, καὶ τῶν Ἰθακησίων ὁμοίως ἐγκαλούντων ὅτι πρόβατα λαμβάνουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ στρατιῶται, ὁ δὲ ὑμέτερος, ἔφη, βασιλεὺς ἐλθὼν πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ τὸν ποιμένα προσεξετύφλῳσεν. And the last is repeated, Apophth. 176 F.
‘And friends as well as enemies; the former from the ease, the latter from the pleasure, of the undertaking and its success’. Theognis 1219, ἐχθρὸν μὲν χαλεπὸν καὶ δυσμενεῖ ἐξαπατῆσαι, Κύρνε: φίλον δὲ φίλῳ ῥᾴδιον ἐξαπατᾶν. Lysias, κατ᾽ Ἀνδοκίδου § 7, p. 103 ult. (of Andocides), ὃς τέχνην ταύτην ἔχει, τοὺς μὲν ἐχθροὺς μηδὲν ποιεῖν κακόν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους ὅτι ἂν δύνηται κακόν. Victorius. ‘And the friendless. And those who have no skill and practice in speaking or action (business)’; (the opposite of them, οἱ εἰπεῖν δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ πρακτικοί, are opposite also in disposition; they are of those that are inclined to do wrong, § 2); ‘for these either make no attempt at all to prosecute, or if they do make the attempt, soon come to an agreement, or if they do carry on the prosecution, produce no effect (bring it to no conclusion, make nothing of it)’. These are the ἀπράγμονες, the ordinary victims of the Cleons, and public informers, the συκοφάνται, and all other troublesome and mischievous people, who, like fever-fits or nightmares, τοὺς πατέρας τ᾽ ἦγχον νύκτωρ καὶ τοὺς πάππους ἀπέπνιγον, κατακλινόμενοί τ̓ ἐπὶ ταῖς κοίταις ἐπὶ τοῖσιν ἀπράγμοσιν ὑμῶν ἀντωμοσίας καὶ προσκλήσεις καὶ μαρτυρίας συνεκόλλων (Arist. Vesp. 1039), and, κἄν τιν᾽ αὐτῶν γνῷς (Cleon) ἀπράγμον᾽ ὄντα καὶ κεχηνότα καταγαγὼν ἐκ χεῤῥονήσου διαλαβὼν ἠγκύρισας... καὶ σκοπεῖς γε τῶν πολιτῶν ὅστις ἐστὶν ἀμνοκῶν, πλούσιος καὶ μὴ πονηρὸς καὶ τρέμων τὰ πράγματα, Equit. 261. On the impossibility of leading a quiet life at Athens, see Criton's case in Xen. Mem. II 9. 1, οἶδα δέ ποτε αὐτὸν καὶ Κρίτωνος ἀκούσαντα ὡς χαλεπὸν ὁ βίος Ἀθήνῃσιν εἴη ἀνδρὶ βουλομένῳ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. νῦν γὰρ, ἔφη, ἐμέ τινες εἰς δίκας ἄγουσιν, οὐχ ὅτι ἀδικοῦνται ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ̓ ὅτι νομίζουσιν ἥδιον ἄν με ἀργύριον τελέσαι ἢ πράγματα ἔχειν. It ends by Criton's taking one of these ‘sycophants’ into his own service, like a dog, as he describes him, to keep off these wolves from his flocks.
And those to whom it is unprofitable to waste their time in waiting for the trial or payment of the fine or penalty, such as strangers and farmers (who live in the country, and are so completely occupied in the cultivation of their land, that they cannot afford to waste time in attending the law-courts in the city); such as these are inclined to settle their differences on easy terms (διαλύεσθαι, to dissolve, break off, put an end to, and so make up, a quarrel), and readily leave off (drop) the prose cution. ‘Strangers’, who are merely passing through Athens, and incessantly occupied either with business or sight-seeing, have of course no time to spare in dancing attendance at the law-courts; and ‘farmers’, ‘cultivators of their own land’, just as little, for the reason already mentioned. These αὐτουργοί, ‘independent cultivators’, constitute the δῆμος γεωργικός, and are the best sort of democratical population, Pol. VII (VI) 4, init. βέλτιστος δῆμος ὁ γεωργικός ἐστιν, a statement often repeated. One of the reasons for this is, 1318 a 12, διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ πολλὴν οὐσίαν ἔχειν ἄσχολος, ὥστε μὴ πολλάκις ἐκκλησιάζειν, and the same would prevent them from waiting at the courts of law. This is confirmed by Eurip. Orest. 919, ὀλιγάκις ἄστυ κἀγορᾶς χραίνων κύκλον, αὐτουργός, οἵπερ καὶ μόνοι σώζουσι γῆν. To the same effect, Pol. VI (IV) 6, sub init., the γεωργοί, ἔχουσιν ἐργαζόμενοι ζῇν, οὐ δύνανται δὲ σχολάζειν. Comp. Eur. Suppl. 420, γαπόνος δ᾽ ἀνὴρ πένης ...ἔργων ὕπο οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο πρὸς τὰ κοίν̓ ἀποβλέπειν. The praises of agriculture and agriculturists are sung by Xenophon, Oecon. VI §§ 8, 9, 10, XV 9, and elsewhere. In Rhet. II 4. 9, the αὐτουργοί are distinguished from the γεωργικοί, the latter being confined to farmers and agricultural labourers, αὐτουργοί being extended to all that work with their own hands. See Thuc. I 141. 3, and Arnold's note. Thucydides does not observe Aristotle's distinction, the αὐτουργοί here are γεωργοί in the next chapter.
And those who have committed either many wrongs themselves, or wrongs of the same kind as they are now suffering: for it seems almost no injustice at all, when a man has the same wrong inflicted on him as he himself was in the habit of inflicting (upon others); an assault, for instance, committed on a man who is habitually guilty of wanton insolence or outrage. αἰκία and ὕβρις are thus legally distinguished. αἰκία is personal violence, a blow, or an assault, εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰκίζεσθαι πληγαῖς, Pol. VIII (V) 10, 1311 b 24, and is the subject of a δίκη or private action between citizen and citizen. ὕβρις is threefold, (1) δἰ αἰσχρουργίας, (2) διὰ πληγῶν (this is further defined μετὰ προπηλακισμοῦ, which distinguishes it from αἰκία), διὰ λόγων; that is, a violation of the feeling of personal dignity and sense of honour, humiliating, degrading, scornful, wanton, language or acts; the mental injury constituting a great part of the offence. This appears in Aristotle's definition of it, Rhet. II 2. 5, τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν ἐφ᾽ οἷς αἰσχύνη ἐστὶ τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τι γένηται αὐτῷ (not for any profit to himself) ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως ἡσθῇ (out of mere wantonness and pleasure in the insult itself). So that ὕβρις is a mixture of intentional insult and wantonness or ‘wanton insult’. To the same effect is the observation in I 13. 10, that it προσσημαίνει τὴν προαίρεσιν, ‘implies deliberate intention’. This then is the ground of the distinction between αἰκία and ὕβρις, and the reason for the latter being made the object of a γραφή, or public prosecution, the honour of the state being considered as compromised in the insult to one of its members. See further on this subject, Meier und Schömann Der Attische Process, p. 319 seq. Hippodamus, the legislator of Miletus, who drew the plans and laid out the Piraeus, and was the architect of Thurii on its foundation, and of Rhodes, divided crimes into three kinds, as we learn from Pol. II 8, 1267 b 38. περὶ: ὧν γὰρ αἱ δίκαι γίνονται, τρία ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμόν, ὕβριν, βλάβην, θάνατον, i. e. (1) crimes by which the feelings are wounded and the sense of personal dignity wantonly outraged, (2) those which involve loss or damage to person or property, and (3) murder and homicide.
And (in the way of retaliation) those who have either already done, or have intended, or are intending, or will certainly do, us mischief: because this retaliation or compensation carries with it (ἔχει) not only pleasure (sensual or intellectual, chiefly the latter in this case) but also (a sense of) right (the moral object of conduct), and so it seems bordering upon almost no wrong at all. ‘Retaliation’ or ‘compensation’ is right upon principles of justice, τὸ δίκαιον; of which the ‘reciprocal’ or ‘retaliatory’ is one of the three kinds, Eth. Nic. v c. 5, arising from the subdivision of the original two, διανεμητική, ‘distributive’, and διορθωτική, ‘corrective’; the latter having two divisions, (1) rectification of, or compensation for, frauds and crimes, διορθωτική proper, and (2) τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός (c. 8) the justice that regulates exchanges and commercial transactions. The difference between this topic and that of § 23, καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἔχουσι —κήδονται is, according to Victorius, that the motive or occasion of the wrong in either case is not the same. In the one the wrong-doer seeks a pretence or pretext for injuring his neighbour, in the other the occasion comes unsought; the wrong would not have been done had it not been provoked by previous injury.
καὶ οἷς χαριοῦνται] and those by whom, i. e. by whose injury, they will oblige either their friends, or those whom they admire and respect, or love, or their masters (any one who has power over them) or those by whose opinions or authority they direct their life and conduct. πρὸς οὓς ζῶσιν] in reference to whom they live, who are their guides and authorities in life and action: or, on whom they depend, to whom they look for support or subsistence; as a ‘dependant’ does. To which is opposed in I 9. 27, ἐλευθέρου τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῇν, ‘independence’, αὐτάρκεια, where you don't look to any one else but yourself. See the note there, p. 173. καὶ πρὸς οὕς] ‘those, in reference to whom’, that is in our relations (or dealings) with whom, it is possible (we may expect) to meet with indulgence or merciful consideration. On ἐπιείκεια, see Introd. p. 190—93. Victorius, followed by Vater, would connect this clause immediately with the preceding, πρὸς οὓς ζῶσιν αὐτοί, καὶ πρὸς οὕς κ.τ.λ. in order to avoid a supposed repetition of a former topic, § 14, καὶ οἷς ἂν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς τυχεῖν. Vater, who supplies this explanation, forgets that the two topics are differently applied; in § 14 the expectation of indulgent consideration is assigned as a motive of action in the agent; in this section it is a disposition in the patient which subjects him to wrong: though it is true that the feeling or tendency itself resides in both cases in the same person. Besides this, the union of these two seems to be an improper conjunction of two heterogeneous dispositions, a sort of moral ζεῦγμα; taking a man for the guide of your life or depending upon him, and relying upon his merciful consideration, are not closely enough connected to warrant their being classed together. I have therefore retained Bekker's punctuation, which makes them separate topics.
And if we have had cause of complaint against any one, or a previous difference with him, (we do to him) as Callippus did in the affair of Dion; for things of that kind (a wrong deed done under such circumstances) appear to us (personally and at that time, not always or in general,) to border upon, bear a close resemblance to, acts altogether innocent. προδιακεχωρηκότες] διαχωρεῖν is used here as the neuter of διαχωρίζειν, to separate. In this sense it is almost a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον. No authority for this use of the word is given by Stephens or any other Lexicon earlier than Arrian. It represents morally and metaphorically a ‘split’, or ‘separation’, ‘parting asunder’ of intercourse and interests between two friends. ἐποίει] The imperfect here seems unmeaning, as the act is only one. Spengel, in his Edition, 1867, has adopted without remark ἐποίησε from MSS Q, Y^{b}, Z^{b}. Κάλλιππος...τὰ περὶ Δίωνα] Plutarch. Vit. Dion. I 982, de Sera Numinis Vindicta c. 16. The story is thus told by Victorius. Callippus was an Athenian, friend and companion of Dion during his stay at Athens, and the partner of his expedition to Sicily for the liberation of his native country. By his conduct and services he had ingratiated himself with Dion's mercenaries, whom he incited to murder their general, and thereby made himself master of Syracuse. Before this, he had spread calumnious reports about Dion and excited the citizens against him. Dion being informed of this took no precautions for his own safety; partly in scorn of the attempt, and partly because he was unwilling to preserve his own power and life at the expense of the destruction of his friends: the scheme accordingly took effect, and Dion was shortly after put to death. Aristotle says upon this that Callippus justified the act by arguing that as Dion had now knowledge of his designs, and his own life was in danger, this anticipation of the other, was a mere measure of precaution or retaliation, and no crime at all. This suspicion of Callippus is the ground of his complaint and the occasion of the previous difference, or sundering of their apparent friendship. [Arnold Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, III 2. p. 159, 160.]
καὶ τοὺς ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων μέλλοντας (ἀδικεῖσθαι), ἂν μὴ αὐτοὶ (ἀδικῶσιν αὐτούς）] Another motive in the aggressor to commit a wrong, another circumstance which renders its intended object especially liable to it, arises, when the victim is in such a position that the wrong will be done by somebody else (ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων) if we don't do it ourselves, or take the initiative—this seems to us a justification of the act of aggression which in other circumstances would be a gross wrong—and the necessity of immediate action allows no time for deliberation. That this is a sort of justification of such an act appears in the conduct attributed to Ænesidemus towards Gelo: the latter (tyrant of Syracuse) had anticipated him (the tyrant of Leontini) in reducing and enslaving some state that was neighbour of both: Aenesidemus sends a present to Gelo of eggs, cakes, and sweetmeats, the ordinary prize of the game of κότταβος, as a prize, in acknowledgment of his superior foresight, quickness and dexterity, shewn in his ‘anticipation’ of himself, ὅτι ἔφθασεν, admitting at the same time that he had had an eye to it himself. This shows that Aenesidemus thought it ‘hardly a crime’, ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, a justifiable act; and also illustrates the extreme liability to aggression and wrong involved in the position of this ‘neighbouring state’, which would have been wronged in any case by some one else, ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων μέλλοντας, at any rate, even if Gelo (who here represents the αὐτοί, the man who takes the initiative) had not done it himself. As Casaubon has observed, there is some object understood after ἀνδραποδισαμένῳ. The simple τινάς or τινὰ πόλιν, will answer the purpose. Nothing more is known about the circumstances of the case. The person here called Αἰνεσίδημος, in Herod. Αἰνησίδημος, and in Pindar Αἰνησίδαμος, is mentioned twice in Herodotus, VII 154 as the son of one Patäicus, and a member of the body-guard of Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, and in c. 165, as the father of Thero, sovereign (μούναρχος) of Agrigentum, to whom Pindar's second Olympian Ode is dedicated. In Pindar his name occurs three times, but only as the father of Thero, Ol. II 46, III 9, and of him and Xenocrates, Isthm. II 41. To reconcile Herodotus' statement about him with that of Aristotle here, we may perhaps suppose that Aenesidemus had made himself master of Agrigentum, on the throne of which he was succeeded by his son Thero, before the period to which this story belongs. Aristotle's narrative certainly represents him as a sovereign prince, and not as a mere mercenary in another's service. Victorius, followed by Schrader, calls him ‘tyrant of Leontini’, but gives no authority. κοττάβια] On the game of κότταβος, the modes of playing it, and its varieties, see Becker, Charicles, on the Greek Games, Excursus III to Sc. VI, p. 349. Our information upon the subject is principally derived from Athen. XI 58, p. 479 C—E, and XV 1, 665 seq., and Pollux VI 109. We learn from Athenaeus, on the authority of Dicaearchus (479 D) that it was a Sicilian invention and most fashionable in that country, (cf. XV 666 B), ἡ τῶν κοττάβων εὕρεσις Σικελική ἐστι παιδιά, ταύτην πρώτων εὑρόντων Σικελῶν. Further we are told that the winner at the game received a prize, 667 D, ὅτι δὲ ἆθλον προὔκειτο τῷ εὖ προεμ̀ένῳ τὸν κότταβον προείρηκε μὲν καὶ ὁ Ἀντιφάνης: ᾠὰ γάρ ἐστι καὶ πεμμάτια καὶ τραγήματα. Similarly from Hegesander, 479 D, τοσαύτη δὲ ἐγένετο σπουδὴ περὶ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα ὥστε εἰς τὰ συμπόσια παρεισφέρειν ἆθλα κοττάβια καλούμενα. From Gaisford's observation that the form κοττάβεια occurs in at least three verses, in Ath. XV 666 E, 667 F, it seems that both this and κοττάβιον were in use. Gaisford unnecessarily infers from it that there was only one, and that κοττάβειον.
And those to whom the wrong can be readily compensated, or more than compensated by just acts, because such wrongs admit of an easy cure;—an instance of this is the saying of Jason of Pherae, that we are bound to commit some wrongs in order that we may have the opportunity of doing justice on a larger scale. The saying itself is to be found in somewhat different words in Plutarch, πολ. παραγγέλμ. 817 F (Buhle), it was always applied, ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἐβιάζετο καὶ παρηνώχλει τινὰς ἀεὶ λεγομένην, to his various acts of oppression and annoyance, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀδικεῖν τὰ μικρὰ τοὺς βουλομένους τὰ μέγαλα δικαιοπραγεῖν. This is in fact Robin Hood's plea, that he robbed the rich to give to the poor. This topic may be further illustrated by Bassanio's appeal to the judge, Merchant of Venice, Act IV. Sc. 1, line 209, And I beseech you, Wrest once the law to your authority: To do a great right do a little wrong, And curb this cruel devil of his will.
Victorius observes that we here enter upon a new division of the chapter. The analysis has been hitherto confined to persons prone to wrong and liable to wrong: it is now applied to certain classes of things or circumstances which increase the liability to wrong. These are kinds of ἀδικήματα. It is in fact a transition to the subject of the next chapter. Such are offences of very common occurrence; men are tempted to commit such because they think they shall meet with indulgence: people have become so familiar with the offence by constant association (συνηθείᾳ) that it has lost its repulsive character; and also they may argue that if ‘all or many’ are guilty of it, it must be a human infirmity, and being a natural defect is hardly to be called a vice.
Crimes and the products of them that are easy to conceal, especially in the case of stealing, which is here most prominent in the author's thoughts. Such are things that are soon consumed, as eatables, or things that can be easily changed (in their appearance, without losing their value; so that they shall not be recognized, and the theft escape detection), in respect of their shape (as plate and coin by melting), or colour (cloth or silk by dyeing), or mixture (as liquids of all kinds). Victorius refers to Cic. de Fin. V 25. 74, of the Stoics, Atque ut reliqui fures earum rerum quas ceperunt signa commutant, sic illi ut sententiis nostris (sc. Academicorum) pro suis uterentur nomina tanquam rerum notas mutaverunt. There is about the same amount of resemblance in this topic to that of § 8, as we found in § 28 (q. v.) to that of § 14; the circumstance is nearly the same, the application different.
Or things that are easy to make away with, put out of sight (effacer, cause to disappear) in many different ways; such are things portable, which can be hid away in holes and corners (lit. small places).
And things (stolen goods), like others, of which the thief has already a good many in his possession, either exactly like (with no difference at all between them) or nearly like (bearing a general resemblance, and so not easy to distinguish). The first is the case of coins or medals, and in general, things that are made in sets, one exactly like another. ἀδιάφορος, which in the sense here assigned to it seems to be a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον, is not to be confounded either with the logical signification of it—Anal. Post. II 13, 97 b 31, ἐν τοῖς καθόλου ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις, Top. A 7, ἀδιάφορα τὸ εἶδος, ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος; this is ‘without specific difference’, ‘an individual’—or with the meaning it bears in the Stoic philosophy, things ‘indifferent’, without any moral differences, neither good nor bad; from which our sense of the word is derived. ‘And things which the injured party is ashamed to reveal: as any outrage committed upon the women of one's own family, or one's self or one's children’. Victorius quotes Lysias, c. Simon. § 3, μάλιστα δ᾽ ἀγανακτῶ, ὦ βουλή, ὅτι περὶ τοιούτων πραγμάτων εἰπεῖν ἀναγκασθήσομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐγὼ αἰσχυνόμενος, εἰ μέλλοιεν πολλοί μοι συνείσεσθαι, ἠνεσχόμην ἀδικούμενος. καὶ ὅσα φιλοδικεῖν] ὅσα cognate accusative for ὅσας δίκας; or perhaps the local accus., ‘the cases in which (as the seat of them) the litigious spirit is shewn’, Appendix B, note 1, at the end of this Book. ‘And all cases in which prosecution would seem to indicate a litigious spirit in the prosecutor’; that is, where the offence is trifling, or, again, in the case of acts that deserve indulgence—some of which are mentioned in c. 13. 16, 17. Victorius refers to Lysias, κατὰ Θεομνήστου A § 2, ἐγὼ δ᾽ , εἰ μὲν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ με ἀπεκτονέναι ἠτιᾷτο, συγγνώμην ἂν εἶχον αὐτῷ τῶν εἰρημένων: οὐδ̓ εἴ τι ἄλλο τῶν ἀποῤῥήτων ἤκουσα, οὐκ ἂν ἐπεξῆλθον αὐτῷ, ἀνελεύθερον γὰρ καὶ λίαν φιλόδικον εἶναι νομίζω κακηγορίας δικάζεσθαι. The chapter concludes with a summary enumeration of its contents. ‘So now of the characters and dispositions that incline men to crime, the several kinds of those crimes, the characters that invite crime, and the motives that incite to crime, we have given a tolerably complete (σχεδόν) account’, or analysis.
Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Edward Meredith Cope. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1877.
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