E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

---

On the purport of this chapter, its principal divisions, and connexion with the general plan of the work, see Introd. p. 177.

---

ἢ ὑπαρχόντων] On this addition over and above the theory, see note on c. 3 § 4; and Introd. p. 120.

βουλεύονται δὲ...τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος] Eth. Nic. III 5, 1112 b 12, βουλευόμεθα δὲ οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. (This is because the means are within our own power to attain, the ends are not. βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν πρακτῶν, 1112 a 31, ὅσα γίνεται δἰ ἡμῶν...περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα, Ib. line 12, and this is afterwards repeated.) Οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλεύεται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους: ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τέλος τι, πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι, κ.τ.λ. Ib. b 34, οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

στοιχεῖα] i.e. τόπους, the ‘Elements’, the primary topics of the subject ‘good’. See Introd. p. 127, 8.

ἁπλῶς] See note on p. 30, c. 2 § 4. The sense in which ἁπλῶς is here intended is evidently that of good in general, as a general or abstract conception, opposed to καθ᾽ ἕκαστον special and particular goods. Schrader's rendering extra comparationem, if it means, as it seems to do, ‘absolute good’, ‘good in itself’, opposed to ‘relative’ or ‘human good’— that which cannot be compared with, i. e. has no relation to, any other kind of good, but exists in itself independently—is certainly wrong. ‘Absolute good’ can have no place in a rhetorical system or in the practice of the rhetorician; such a definition would be in direct violation of the principle so often laid down by Aristotle, that the rhetorical method must be in conformity with the materials of the art, of a popular and practical character, adapted to the understanding of an unlearned and unscientific audience. This is especially the case with definitions. See Introd. p. 12, 13. The general notion of good is first considered in §§ 1—3, and then this is applied and illustrated in particulars in the remainder of the chapter.

---

ἔστω δὴ ἀγαθόν κ.τ.λ.] The ‘popular’ character of these definitions is marked by the introductory ἔστω, ‘let it be taken for granted’; no demonstration is required, any current notion of good will serve our purpose. The same phraseology occurs again in a similar case, c. 7 § 2, ἔστω δὴ ὑπέρεχον κ.τ.λ.: c. 5 § 3, and 10 § 3.

First, ‘Good is anything that is in itself and for its own sake desirable (an object of choice), and that for whose sake we choose something else (which is the ulterior end of our preference for anything); and that which is the universal aim, either of everything or’ (as a qualification to exclude inanimate things) ‘everything that has sensation or reason, or (would be their aim) if they were to acquire the reasoning faculty’ (supposing they have it not yet, as infants and beasts). Comp. c. 7 § 21, ὃ λαβόντα τὰ πράγματα (anything) φρόνησιν ἔλοιτ᾽ ἂν ἕκαστον¹.

The first of these two definitions, which represents Good as desirable in and for itself, and as that to obtain which we choose something else, is in fact identical with the second which describes it as the ultimate end or aim of all action and desire, only differing from it in terms. Every thing that we choose or desire, and every act that we perform, is as the means to one universal end, the Good. This view of the nature of Good is laid down and illustrated in the first chapter of the Nic. Eth. πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ: διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο (it is a current, popular, definition of) τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ᾽ ἐφίεται—εἰ δή τι τέλος ἐστι τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δἰ αὑτὸ βουλόμεθα, τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο (the means to the universal end) καὶ μὴ πάντα δἰ ἕτερον αἱρούμεθα, (there is something, i. e. Good, which we desire only for itself,)...δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, and so on. Comp. c. 5. Similarly at the commencement of the Politics, we find that this is the end of states as well as individuals, because τοῦ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες. Comp. III 12, init. Metaph. B 2, 996 a 23—26, A 3, 983 a 31, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τἀγαθόν.

The same view of the nature of Good is to be found equally in Plato, from whom Aristotle may have derived it. See, for instance, Phileb. 53 E, seq. particularly 54 C, where good is proved to be the οὗ ἕνεκα, or universal end. Sympos. 205 A, where happiness, which consists in the possession of good, is similarly represented. Gorg. 499 E, τέλος εἶναι ἁπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκεν δεῖν πάντα τἆλλα πράττεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἄλλων. Euthyd. c. 8, 278 E, seq.

καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς κ.τ.λ.] ‘And all that reason in general, or universal reason, would assign to each of us, and all that the individual reason assigns to each of us, that is good to every human being’. That is, all that this supreme or universal reason or the particular reason of each individual, would assign as suitable to each; the former what is good for all alike, the latter what is good for each particular individual; since these sometimes differ: or, as Schrader interprets it, the universal reason that dictates general principles or rules of action, as contrasted with ὁ νοῦς ὁ περὶ ἕκαστον, mens quae de singularibus decernit, which decides in special and individual cases. The reason as an agent is here opposed to mere nature, or to a blind natural impulse; the choice of good is a reasonable choice, good is what reason universal or individual would necessarily choose. (νοῦς stands here in a general sense for the special faculty or part of it φρόνησις², the practical reason, the calculating discursive and moral part of the intellect, which directs us in our choice between good and evil. In Eth. Nic. VI, νοῦς in its proper sense, the intuitive and speculative reason, is distinguished from the διάνοια or discursive intellect, and its special virtue φρόνησις or practical wisdom).

‘Or that, by the presence of which anything (not only man in soul and body, but also things inanimate) is put in a healthy or proper condition (is made what it ought to be, what is best. for it to be) and made selfsufficing (independent of all external conditions), and self-sufficiency or independence in general’. On αὐτάρκεια see note on § 3 of Chapter V, p. 74, αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς. It is thus briefly defined Pol. IV (VII) 5, init. τὸ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηθενός.

‘Or any thing that is productive or preservative of (tends to produce or preserve) things of that sort, or that which is attended by such, or things that have a tendency to prevent and destroy the opposites of these’. These forms of good belong to a lower order, subordinate to τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ἀγαθά, as means to the end. Eth. Nic. I 4, 1096 b 10, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ᾽ ἓν εἶδος τὰ καθ̓ αὑτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον.

---

ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ διχῶς] ‘the term attending upon admits of two different senses, either simultaneous (attendance, accompaniment) or subsequent (consequence), as knowledge attends on learning subsequently, but life on health simultaneously³’. ἀκολουθεῖν and ἕπεσθαι are both used in logic to denote not merely something that follows, a ‘consequence’ in the ordinary acceptation of the words, but also an invariable or necessary attendant or concomitant in five different senses: (1) a preceding concomitant, or antecedent, Top. Γ 2, 117 a 11, καὶ γὰρ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἕπεται, as learning is always preceded by ignorance; Categ. c. 12, πρότερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται τετραχῶς...δεύτερον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, οἷον τὸ ἓν τῶν δύο πρότερον: δυοῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἀκολουθεῖ εὐθὺς τὸ ἓν εἶναι, κ.τ.λ. (2) a simultaneous concomitant, ἅμα: as health and life, Rhet. I 6, 3; 7, 5. (3) a subsequent concomitant, or ‘consequent’, ὕστερον, as learning is followed by knowledge, Rhet. ll. cc. (4) δυνάμει, a virtual concomitant, by implication, as sacrilege necessarily implies, includes potentially or virtually the notion of theft or fraud, by the rule omne maius continet in se minus; and (5) reciprocal contradictories regarded as consequents, Top. B 8, 113 b 25, ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἀκολούθησις, or ἀντικατηγορουμένως, where two terms or propositions are ‘convertible’, ἀντιστρέφει: such are ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον, and τὸ μὴ ζῷον οὐκ ἄνθρωπος: τὸ μὴ ἡδὺ οὐ καλὸν, and τὸ καλὸν ἡδύ. It seems from this as if the primary sense of ἀκολουθεῖν were to attend or wait upon, and that that of ‘following’ is a special and secondary signification under the general notion of accompaniment. Hence ἀκόλουθος becomes pedissequus, a constant attendant, footman, or ‘follower’. The ‘simultaneous’ kind of accompaniment appears also in this word sometimes even in the ordinary language, as when Plato writes, Menex. 249 D, ἀκολούθει μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ, Lach. 187 D, μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκολουθῶν: and similarly Demosthenes and the Orators; and Xenophon joins it with σύν. Diog. Laert. VII § 125, τὰς δ᾽ ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις, καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, of the Stoics. Plutarch, de Repugn. Stoic. c. 27, p. 1045 E, attributes the same doctrine in the same words to Chrysippus.

καὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ τριχῶς] This triple division of productive causes or conditions is thus explained by Majoragius. ‘Point tres species rerum conficientium quae ita distingui possunt. Quae conficiunt, aut sunt a natura, h. e. intrinsecus, aut extrinsecus adhibentur. A natura sunt, ut temperies humorum, et bona corporis constitutio, conficiens est bonae valetudinis. Quae extrinsecus adhibentur aut sunt tanquam instrumenta, aut sunt actiones; instrumenta, ut cibaria:...actiones, ut exercitatio corporis, et deambulatio, quae frequenter bonam valetudinem efficit.’ This account, though correct in the main, requires a little further explanation and modification. The ground of the distinction of the first of the three classes, of which the illustration is τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, the healthy state of body, active, actual health, as produced by ὑγιεία, health in itself, we learn from two passages of the Nic. Eth. First, VI 13, 1144 a 4, ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μὲν (αὗται αἱ ἀρεταὶ) οὐχ ὡς ἰατρικὴ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν: μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα. Here ὑγίεια itself represents the formal cause of health, which is internal and essential (μέρος, ἔχεσθαι), and developes, quickens, and stimulates the bodily functions into healthy activity, gives health an active reality (ἐνεργεῖ), and is therefore contrasted with the efficient, and external cause, the physician, who, as the Paraphrast on the parallel passage, X 4, says, συντηρεῖ καὶ φυλάττει, καὶ ὅπως παραμείνῃ ζητεῖ. The second passage, X 4, 1174 b 25, is again an illustration: οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τόπον ἥ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἴτιά ἐστι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν: on which the Paraphrast's (Andronicus Rhodius) commentary is, ἡ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴ ποιεῖ μὴ οὖσα (i. e. ἐνέργεια, not ‘non-existent’) τὴν τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν ἐνέργειαν, ὁ δὲ συντηρεῖ κ.τ.λ. as before. The second and third divisions represent two kinds of extraneous causes or conditions, distinguished from this formal, intrinsic cause. These are first, necessary conditions, as of health, represented by food; and secondly, probable conditions, as exercise, which, as Aristotle adds, only produces health ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.

---

We now proceed to the application or illustration of the general principles laid down in the three first sections, which continues to the end of the chapter; τούτων δὲ κειμένων κ.τ.λ. Application of the two topics of ‘consequents’, ἅμα and ὕστερον ἀκολουθεῖν: the receipt of all good things is an instance of the latter, because it is followed by the possession of good things; and the loss or riddance of evil things, which is accompanied simultaneously by the relief from what is bad, exemplifies the former. This latter conclusion rests upon the principle, here understood, but stated in § 18, ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ᾽ ἀγαθόν. Comp. also Top. Γ 2, 117 b 2, on λήψεις and ἀποβολαί.

---

ᾧ γὰρ ὑπερέχει κ.τ.λ.] ‘for the amount of the excess of the greater over the less, the same is the measure of the gain of the one (good) and the loss of the other (evil)’. γίνεται, ‘becomes’, i. e. ‘amounts to’. The excess of the greater over the lesser good, and the excess of the greater over the lesser evil, is the measure of the gain in the one case, and the loss in the other; the loss of the evil being a gain, by the same rule as before, ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ᾽ ἀγαθόν.

---

ποιητικαὶ...καὶ πρακτικαί] virtues, besides being ‘productive of good’, like many other things, have also this special peculiarity, that they are effective of good by action. The distinction is, that whereas ποιεῖν tends to some ἔργον or substantial enduring result, as a picture, or statue, or other work of art, the end of πραττειν is action itself, and there is no further result. See the commencement of the Nic. Eth., and what is there said about these two τέλη. Ethics and Rhetoric are πρακτικαὶ τέχναι, the arts of the painter and statuary ποιητικαί. Compare Introd. pp. 16—19. By the distinction here taken we find brought into view the specially ‘practical’ character of the virtues, which, like the art that describes them, end in action: though besides this, some of the virtues, at any rate, produce lasting effect, and leave results beyond the mere performance of the act, some positive benefit (as an ἔργον) to an individual or the community. But the words here distinguished are elsewhere employed indifferently to express generally the power of producing an effect or result, as appears in the comparison of 5 §§ 3, 16; 6 § 2. Of the two, ποιητικός is most frequently used in the expression of this conception, as may be seen in the following sections.

All moral virtues must necessarily be each a form of good: for they produce a good moral habit, or condition, or constitution in those that possess them, and are besides productive (and effective) of good in their actions and the results of these.

‘Each of them, its substance or true nature’ (the first Category, τί ἐστί, οὐσία, substance what the thing is, really and essentially), ‘and qualities’ (the third Category), ‘must be treated separately, χωρίς, apart’. This is done in c. 9. The contents of the chapter to which reference is here made shew that ἀρεταί are here confined to the ἠθικαί or moral virtues, the ‘virtues’ par excellence, and do not include physical, or any other, ‘excellences’.

---

καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι] What is here taken for granted, as universally admitted, that pleasure is good (though not necessarily the good) is in both the treatises on pleasure, in the 6th and 10th books of the Nicomachean Ethics, carefully investigated and discussed, and the opinions held upon the question by preceding philosophers, as Eudoxus and Plato, examined, Bk. VII, c. 12, seq. and X, c. 2. Aristotle's conclusion (in Bk. X) is that though pleasure may be regarded as good it is not the good, i.e. the supreme good, good in itself, because there are some pleasures which are not proper objects of choice and therefore not good. Eudemus (if the seventh book be his), seems rather to be inclined to the contrary view; it is said at any rate, c. 14, init., ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι, and three lines further, ἄριστον τ᾽ οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονήν τινα εἶναι. And at the beginning of c. 13, in answer to Plato's objection in the Philebus, we find, ὅτι δ᾽ οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. This difference of view between the master and pupil (on the supposition that eudemus is the author of Bk. VII) is in fact in exact conformity with the difference of their respective definitions of pleasure; Aristotle defining it as the perfecting (τελείωσις) of the ἐνέργεια, but not our ἐνέργεια itself, and therefore not ‘the supreme good’; whilst Eudemus goes further and describes it as an ‘unimpeded energy’, ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια: and in fact this variation may be regarded as one of the principal arguments for the difference of authorship of the two treatises on pleasure in the Nic. Eth. The principle upon which the fact is here assumed in the Rhetoric, is stated in both treatises of the Ethics; the universal recognition, namely, of the principle that pleasure is desirable. See VII 14 init. and X 2, 1172 b 35, οἱ δ᾽ ἐνιστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ̓ ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν λέγωσιν: ὃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ̓ εἶναι φαμέν.

τῶν δὲ καλῶν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα τὰ δέ κ.τ.λ.] This division of καλόν brings into view the physical and moral aspects of it united in the term beauty and right. καλόν as ἡδύ, an object of pleasure, is the physical beauty that pleases in nature and art; in καθ᾽ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν we are referred to the moral side of it, that which is ‘fair’ and right, which is an end in itself, in itself desirable, and to be sought on its own account and with no ulterior object. It is defined in this latter sense, c. 9, 3, ὃ ἂν δἰ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ὂν ἐπαινετὸν ᾖ, (its being the object of ‘praise’ confers upon it its moral character) ἢ ὃ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἡδὺ ᾖ, ὅτι ἀγαθόν. Comp. II 13, 9, τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἁπλῶς. Eth. Eudem. VII 15, 3, 1248 b 18, τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν πάντων τέλη ἐστιν, ἃ αὐτὰ αὑτῶν ἕνεκά ἐστιν αἱρετά. τούτων δὲ καλά, ὅσα δἰ αὑτὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐπαινετά ἐστιν. On the καλόν as a moral end, the ultimate object and motive of human action, to which all action should be directed and all lower interests sacrificed, see the fine passage of Eth. Nic. IX 8, 1169 a 6, seq., particularly 20—27.

---

ὡς δὲ καθ᾽ ἓν εἰπεῖν] ‘to describe good things singly’, in detail, by an enumeration of particular kinds of good.

εὐδαιμονία] happiness, the universal τέλος, aim and end of life and action. See especially Eth. Nic. I 5, where happiness is defined by its three principal characteristics; it must be τέλειον, αὔταρκες, τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος. These same characteristics appear in the definition here given in the Rhetoric: τέλειον corresponds to τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν, its perfection or completeness being chiefly shewn in its desirability for its own sake. Eth. N. I 5, 1097 b 31, τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δἰ ἕτερον, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δἰ ἄλλο αἱρετὸν τῶν καὶ καθ̓ αὑτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ̓ αἱρετῶν, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ̓ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δἰ ἄλλο. τοιοῦτον δ̓ ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ̓ εἶναι δοκεῖ: ταύτην γὰρ αἱρούμεθα ἀεὶ δἰ αὑτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δἰ ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἱρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δἰ αὐτὰ...αἱρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. τὴν δ̓ εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ̓ ὅλως δἰ ἄλλο: note on c. 5 § I, p. 72. On αὐτάρκεια, the second characteristic of happiness, see c. 5 § 3, and note there, p. 74. The sentences of Eth. Nic. I 5, following those already quoted, are upon this same subject. The concluding summary of the contents of the chapter is, τέλειον δή τι φαίνεται καὶ αὔταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος, which gives the third of the conditions in the Rhetoric. A precisely similar description of happiness is found in Eth. Nic. X, cc. 6 and 7.

---

The list of virtues here given is very incomplete, and a mere extract or sample of that given in the Nic. Eth. II 7, which is itself anything but a complete or satisfactory enumeration of them. A longer list is to be found in c. 9 § 5, which includes the two intellectual virtues, σοφία and φρόνησις, but still omits several of those which are distinguished in the table of the Ethics. All the virtues here mentioned are analyzed in detail in Eth. N. III, IV, V, justice being treated separately at great length in the fifth book.

ἕξις, the genus of the definition of virtue, is an acquired, developed, confirmed habit or state, physical, mental or moral—the last of the three, of course, when applied to virtue. It is properly opposed to διάθεσις, as a settled and permanent state, opposed to a temporary and changeable disposition. It is developed out of the πάθη by the operation of ἔθος, habit or association, till it has acquired a fixed tendency and direction and a confirmed character, which shews itself in the constant exercise of similar ἐνεργεῖαι, and is now no longer liable to change and the opposite tendency to vice. On the growth of virtue, and the formation of the ἕξις, see Eth. Nic. II 1—5, particularly 4 and 5. Also Sir A. Grant, Ess. on Ethics, I p. 120 seq. (1st Ed.) [=p. 164, 3rd Ed.] Trendel. on de Anima p. 311, and 366. Kategorienlehre, p. 95.

---

ὑγίεια...ἄριστον δοκεῖ εἶναι] This is one of many opinions. So the ‘Delian inscription’, quoted by Aristotle, Eth. N. I 9, and Eudemus, Eth. Eud. I 1, 1, with a slight variation; also in Theogn. Eleg. 255 (Bergk), κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λῷστον δ᾽ ὑγιαίνειν | ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχ᾽ οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν, for which Bergk gives in the second line, πρῆγμα δὲ τερπνότατον τοῦ τις ἔραιτο τυλεῖν. Soph. Creus. Fragm. ap. Stob. CIII 15 (Dind. Fr. Soph. 326), κάλλιστόν ἐστι τοὔνδικον πεφυκέναι: λῷστον δὲ τὸ ζῇν ἄνοσον: ἥδιστον δ᾽ ὅτῳ πάρεστι λῆψις ὧν ἐρᾷ καθ̓ ἡμέραν. Ariphron, Dithyr. I (ap. Bergk, Fragm. Lyric. Gr. p. 841 [p. 984 Ed. 2]), ὑγίεια, πρεσβίστα μακάρων, μετὰ σεῦ ναίοιμι τὸ λειπόμενον βιοτᾶς...σέθεν δὲ χωρὶς οὔτις εὐδαίμων ἔφυ. See also a fragment of Licymnius, Fr. 4, in Bergk, u. s., p. 840 [p. 986 Ed. 2] (a dithyrambic poet and rhetorician, mentioned by Aristotle, Rhet. III 12, 2; 13, 5, and quoted, as Bergk supposes, in III 14, 5); Plut. de virt. mor. c. 10, quoting from some poet, ἥ τε τοῦ σώματος ὑγίεια—δοκεῖ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν: οὔτε γὰρ πλούτου χάριν ἢ τεκέων, οὔτε τᾶς ἰσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώποις βασιληΐδος ἀρχᾶς—τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν μὴ παρόντος. de fraterno amore, c. 2, ἧς χωρὶς οὔτε πλούτου, φασίν, οὔτε τᾶς ἰσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώποις βασιληΐδος ἀρχᾶς εἶναί τινα χάριν καὶ ὄνησιν. (ap. Bergk not.)

---

πλοῦτος, ἀρετὴ κτήσεως] The ἔργον, special office or function, that which it was intended by its nature to do, determines the ἀρετή or special excellence of anything. If wealth is the object of acquisition, and acquisition fulfils its proper function, its destination, the law of its being, in the accumulation of wealth; then the ἀρετή or special excellence of the art of acquiring is manifested in the attainment of that object, or the wealth amassed. Wealth as a ‘good’ seems here to be regarded as an end; if so, this is in contradiction to the more scientific doctrine laid down in the Politics I 8, according to which wealth is only an instrument, see note on p. 79 (c. 5, 7), and note 1 on the same page. However, as some good things are only instrumental and means to an end, we are not obliged to suppose that Aristotle regards wealth here otherwise than as one of those mediate ends, subordinate and subservient to some other and higher end. On the relation of ἔργον and ἀρετή, see notes on c. 2, 12, and 5, 4, and the reff. in the former.

---

καθ᾽ αὑτὸν αἱρετὸς ὁ φίλος] This is an application of the general principle in § 2, that good in general is in itself desirable, to the special case of friendship. That a good friend, or the friendship of the good, is desirable in itself is made to appear in the course of a long and subtle argument in Eth. N. IX 9, of which the conclusion is (at the end of the chapter) δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων. The words most in point here are, εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ το<*> εἰναι αἱρετόν εστι καθ̓ αὑτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὂν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστιν, καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν αἱρετῶν ἂν εἴη.

---

τιμή, δόξα] The distinction between these two is stated in note on c. 5, 4, p. 76. These are not only ‘pleasant’ and therefore good in them selves, but also productive of various advantages which accrue to them from the respect of others, and so ‘good’ in this secondary or subordinate sense likewise.

καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ.] ‘and they are accompanied for the most part by the actual possession of the things’ (natural gifts, qualities, accomplishments, acquirements, military distinction, rank and fortune, and such like) ‘which the honours paid them (these supposed possessors) imply’, ἐφ᾽ οἷς τιμῶνται, on the basis of which, on account of, for which, they receive the honour paid, or ‘on which the honours paid them rest, are grounded, or based’. ἐφ᾽ οἷς τ. might possibly be rendered ‘for which they (the honour and reputation) are valued’; on which their value depends, or, by which it is measured; but the other interpretation seems more direct and natural.

The rule here tacitly referred to, as warranting the inference that, when honour is conferred, those so honoured are generally worthy of it, is that a generally received opinion, or popularly current maxim, or the expression of these in the ordinary language, may be for the most part depended on as true⁴. With τὸ ὑπάρχειν, τοῖς κεκτημένοις, or something similar, must be supplied.

---

εὐφυΐα] is a happy natural constitution of mind or body or both; εὐφυὴς τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, Plat. Rep. III 409 E. In de Soph. El. c. 1, 165 a 5, we have εὐφυέστατος applied to ‘a topic’, in the sense (apparently) of ‘naturally best adapted to a certain purpose’. And in the spurious addition to the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 38 (Bekk. 39), 19, εὐφυΐα τόπων occurs to denote the ‘natural advantages of situation’, opportunitas locorum. The word is however applied here, as it usually is, to the mental faculties, and signifies cleverness, quickness of intellect, intellectual dexterity, differing very little from ἀρχίνοια. And so, infr. § 29 and II 15 3. Similarly de Anima B 9, 2, 421 a 25, οἱ μὲν γὰρ σκληρόσαρκοι ἀφυεῖς τὴν διάνοιαν, οἱ δὲ μαλακόσαρκοι εὐφυεῖς. Top. Γ 2, 118 a 22, φιλοπονεῖν ἀρνούμεθα ἵν᾽ εὐφυεῖς εἶναι δοκῶμεν, ‘we deny that we are industrious in order to gain the reputation of cleverness’. In Top. Θ 14, 163 b 13, ἡ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν εὐφυΐα is defined, for dialectical purposes, τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς ἑλέσθαι τἀληθὲς καὶ φυγεῖν τὸ ψεῦδος: ὅπερ οἱ πεφυκότες εὖ δύνανται ποιεῖν. In Eth. Nic. III 7, 1114 b 9, it is used similarly to denote sagacity in aiming rightly at the true end, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθίνη ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα. Rhet. III 2, 10 init. In Poet. 22, 17 it stands for readiness in poetical invention. ἀφυής, the opposite, is ‘dull’ and ‘stupid’, Plat. Phaed. 96 C. In the Platonic ὅροι, p. 413 D, it is defined, ταχος μαθήσεως: γέννησις φύσεως ἀγαθή: ἀρετὴ ἐν φύσει.

μνῆμαι] Victorius, Vater and Vahlen (in Trans. of Vienna Acad. Oct. 1861, p. 105) object to the plural of this word, on the ground either that abstract nouns do not admit of the plural formation, or (as Vahlen) that as it is the faculty of memory that is here in question the plural is inadmissible. As to the former, such is no doubt the rule, but the exceptions are abundant. Parallel to this is ἀναμνήσεις, ‘acts of recollection’, de Memor. 2, 6 and 10. We have already noticed προσκυνήσεις and ἐκστάσεις as examples in c. 5, 9; three more occur together in c. 11, 4, ῥαθυμίαι, ἀπονίαι, ἀμέλειαι. Eth. N. I 13, 1102 b 4, ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις, II 1, 1103 b 19, τὰς ὀργάς, 2, 1104 a 27, γενέσεις, αὐξήσεις, φθοραί, b 25 τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἠρεμίας. Pol. II 5, 1264 a 35, εἱλωτείας τε καὶ πενεστείας καὶ δουλείας. The plural expresses the several acts or moments of these abstract conceptions when carried into operation, or particular cases or instances of the manifestation of them. Μνῆμαι therefore means here, any ordinary examples of retentive memory. It occurs itself, Metaph. A 1, 980 b 29, and Anal. Post. II 19, 100 a 5. [Also, in Eth. N. IX 4, 1166 a 25; X 2, 1173 b 19, Index Aristotelicus. S.]

εὐμάθεια] which is equivalent to εὐφυΐα πρὸς μάθησιν, is a particular kind of natural sagacity and readiness directed to learning. εὐφυΐα ψυχῆς πρὸς τάχος μαθήσεως. Ὅροι Platon. 413 D.

ἀγχίνοια] ‘ready wit’, ‘quickness of apprehension’, is mentioned as a kind of εὐστοχία and distinguished from εὐβουλία (right judgment), but not defined, Eth. Nic. VI 9. The defin. of ὅροι Platon. is εὐφυΐα ψυχῆς, καθ̓ ἣν ὁ ἔχων στο<*>χαστικός ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ τοῦ δεόντος: ὀξύτης νοῦ, which agrees very well with the preceding. It is therefore an intellectual (not moral) ‘presence of mind’, the faculty of seeing the point at once, or ‘ready wit’. In Anal. Post. I 34, init. it is thus defined, εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόνῳ (intuitive, immediate) τοῦ μέσου (the middle term of the syllogism, which expresses the cause), οἷον εἴ τις ἰδὼν ὅτι ἡ σελήνη τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀεὶ ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον, ταχὺ ἐνόησε διὰ τί τοῦτο, ὅτι διὰ τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου: ἢ διαλεγόμενον πλουσίῳ ἔγνω διότι δανείζεται: ἢ διότι φίλοι, ὅτι ἐχθροὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, which expresses in a logical form precisely the same characteristic of the faculty, rapidity of apprehension, ταχὺ ἐνόησε.

εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἄλλο κ.τ.λ.] This seems to refer exclusively to the last mentioned of the three, τὸ ζῇν, to which alone it is strictly appropriate. Sciences and arts are avowedly ‘productive of good’, and rest their claims upon that alone.

---

καὶ τὸ δίκαιον κ.τ.λ.] The argument is, justice is κοινῇ συμφέρον, it promotes the public interest, it is advantageous or expedient to society, whose interest it is that the laws should be duly observed and the rights of its citizens maintained, and evildoers punished, and all this is the effect of τὸ δίκαιον: but that which is useful or expedient is good, § 1, because it is the means to an end, that end being happiness, the ultimate and universal aim.

---

So far the good things treated of are universally acknowledged to be such, and we may therefore take it for granted that they are so. We now come to cases of doubtful good things, which are or may be disputed, and which therefore require argument for their support. συλλογισμός here stands for the rhetorical enthymeme, or rather, perhaps, for any kind of regular inference or ratiocination in general. See note on c. 2, 11, and c. 4, 5.

σχεδόν] ‘pretty nearly’, ‘about’. Used in qualification of a too general expression, just like ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν. The author means to say that he has given a tolerably complete list, or exact account of them; he does not profess perfect accuracy.

---

ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ᾽ ἀγαθόν] If, for instance, you can shew that vice and folly are bad, you may infer at once that their opposites, virtue and wisdom, are good. This is not universally true; Aristotle himself places it amongst the topics which are ‘open to question’. So Bacon, Cuius contrarium malum bonum; cuius bonum malum. Non tenet (this does not hold) is the ‘redargutio’, in iis rebus quarum vis in temperamento et mensura sita est. Dum vitant stulti vitia in contraria currunt. Pref. to Colours of Good and Evil. Bacon's Works, ed. Ellis and Spedding, Vol. VII p. 67. According to Aristotle, Eth. N. II 8, there is double opposition in the case of virtue and vice, αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ μέση ταῖς ἄκραις. When virtue, the mean disposition, is opposed to either of the extremes or vices, the rule holds; when the extremes or vices are considered as opposed to one another, it fails. Categ. c. 11, 13 b 36, ἐναντίον δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγαθῷ μὲν κακόν: τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον τῇ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἐπαγωγῇ, οἷον ὑγιείᾳ νόσος καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ δειλία, ὁμοίως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. κακῷ δὲ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον, ὁτὲ δὲ κακόν: τῇ γὰρ ἐνδείᾳ κακῷ ὄντι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἐναντίον κακὸν ὄν: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἐναντία ἑκατέρῳ, οὖσα ἀγαθόν. ἐπ̓ ὀλίγων δ̓ ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἴδοι τις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἀεὶ τῷ κακῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον ἐστίν. 14 a 19, ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει εἶναι, ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ἢ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι...ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ κακὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν γένει, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένη τινῶν ὄντα. Cic. Topic. XI 47, deinceps locus est qui a contrario dicitur. Contrariorum autem genera sunt plura: unum eorum quae in eodem genere plurimum differunt (Aristotle's ἐναντία, in his ordinary usage of the term. Good and bad however are different genera, not extremes of the same genus), ut sapientia et stultitia. Eodem autem genere dicuntur quibus propositis occurrunt tamquam e regione quaedam contraria, ut celeritati tarditas, non debilitas: ex quibus argumenta talia existunt: si stultitiam fugimus sapientiam sequamur: et bonitatem si malitiam. The dialectical topics of τὰ ἐναντία, in which this is not included, are analysed in Topic. B cc. 7, 8. To this head may also be referred the topic of στέρησις, privatio, criticised by Bacon, Colours of Good and Evil, No. 6, cuius privatio bona, malum: cuius privatio mala, bonum. στέρησις and ἕξις, one of the forms of contraricty or opposition, Met. I 4, 1055 a 33, πρώτη δὲ ἐναντίωσις ἕξις καὶ στέρησίς ἐστιν. And Top. B 8, 114 a 7 (though in a different application), ὁμοίως δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν στερήσεων καὶ ἕξεων σκεπτέον. Στέρησις contrasted with ἕξις is one of the four (Categ. 10, 11 b 17) or five (Metaph. Δ 10, 1018 a 20) kinds of opposition, ἀντικεῖσθαι. Comp. supr. § 4, in which this is implied.

---

Victorius quotes in illustration, Cic. pro Muren. c. 39, Si L. Catilina cum suo consilio nefariorum hominum quos secum eduxit hac de re posset iudicare, condemnaret L. Murenam: si interficere posset, occideret....Idemne igitur delecti amplissimis ex ordinibus honestissimi atque sapientissimi viri iudicabant quod ille importunissimus gladiator hostis reipublicae iudicaret?

οὗ ἐναντίον] The gen. immediately following the ordinary construction ᾧ ἐναντίον, is remarkable. The genitive after the adjective is accounted for by the comparison implied in it, just as it follows ἕτερος, ἄλλος, διάφορος, διαφέρειν, διαφερόντως, ἀλλοῖος, ἀλλότριος. See for examples Matth. Gr. Gr. 366, on ἐναντίος, Obs. 2.

---

ἦ κεν γηθήσαι Πρίαμος] Il. A 255, ‘Huc confugit fallacissimus homo Sinon apud Virgilium (Aen. II 104) et ab hoc loco praesidium petivit, cum salutem suam callide procurans, quam abiecisse videri volebat, inquit, Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridae.’ Victorius.

ἔστι δ᾽ οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.] This last rule is liable to exceptions, as in the case where the same thing, the same course of action or policy, happens to be for the interest of two adversaries: a common misfortune has often this effect of ‘bringing’ enemies ‘together’, or uniting them, as when the Athenians were forced into alliance with the Thebans by their common dread and hatred of Philip. συνάγει γὰρ τοὺς ἐχθίστους ὁ κοινὸς φόβος, Polit. VIII (V), sub init. ‘Misery acquaints a man with strange bedfellows’, says Trinculo in the Tempest (Act II Sc. 2), which illustrates the proverb. However, the ordinary rule is, that it is common interests that produce sympathy, συνέχει τὸ κοινόν, Eth. Nic. 14, ult.; and the example of Athens and Thebes is only an apparent exception, because in the given case the common danger had altered their original relations and engendered common interests and common sympathies and antipathies.

---

οὗ μή ἐστιν ὑπερβολή] ‘that which does not admit of excess’, health, life, virtue, and all that lies in a mean state, happiness, are all ends in themselves, and desirable in and for themselves. Pleasure by this rule, which does admit of being carried to excess, is properly speaking no ‘good’.

ὃ ἂν ᾖ μεῖζον ἢ δεῖ, κακόν] by the rule, μηδὲν ἄγαν.

---

πολλὰ πεπόνηται ἢ δεδαπάνηται] ‘much labour or expense has been incurred’.

ἤδη] note on c. 1, 7, p. 13 ‘already’, for that reason alone, and without looking any farther. The time, trouble, and expense which we have spent in the pursuit of an object shews already, without any further consideration, or without our knowing whether it is really good or not, that it seems at any rate good to us: it consequently becomes an end to us, and all ends are good. ἀγαθόν, οὗ ἐφίεται πάντα, 6, 2.

τὸ τέλος ἀγαθόν] because ‘every art, science, action, and purpose has some good in view at which it aims, and which is therefore its end in every case’. Eth. Nic. init.

The two quotations from Homer are taken from Il. B 176, and 298. Vater observes that the half line quoted of the first does not convey the intention of the quotation; the ‘boast to Priam’ is not in point. The lines applicable are these: λίποιτε Ἀργείην Ἑλένην, ἧς εἵνεκα πολλοὶ Ἀχαιῶν ἐν Τροίῃ ἀπόλοντο φίλης ἀπὸ πατρίδος αἴης. The second line, αἰσχρόν τοι δηρόν τε μένειν κενεόν τε νέεσθαι, became proverbial; whence Cic. de Offic. III 2, 6 (of the result of his son's studies at Athens), ad quos cum tamquam ad mercaturam bonarum artium sis profectus, inanem redire turpissimum est.

---

καὶ ἡ παροιμία δέ] This δέ, introduced after καί—always (except in Epic poetry, Il. Ψ 80, καὶ δέ σοι αὐτῷ μοῖρα, Odys. π́ 418) with a word or more intervening—is inserted as something additional to the preceding, which it enforces or emphasizes, and has in these, as in all other cases, a reference to μέν expressed or implied. A first implies a second, and a second a first. Of μέν implied in δέ, see some instances in Herm., note on Soph. Phil. 86, and the reverse case, δέ in μέν, Don. New Crat. § 154, where the origin and derivation of the two particles is made out. The δέ here may be readily explained as in correlation to a suppressed μέν after ταῦτα, ‘these first, and secondly the proverb’; or ‘these on the one hand, on the other the proverb’. It may be rendered ‘too’, ‘also’, or from the emphasis that it conveys, ‘in fact’, or any thing similar. This special usage, like the other senses of δέ, is derived from the primary meaning of μέν and δέ, ‘one’ and ‘two’; and so, as conjunctions, in the sense of ‘firstly’ and ‘secondly’. See Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 769, 2, where a few examples are cited. Others are given in Paley's note on Prom. Vinct. 994 (from Aeschylus): in Arnold's note on Thucyd. II 36, 6 (from Thucydides, Herodotus, and Xenophon): Plat. Rep. IX 573 B (ed. Tur.), καὶ μανίας δέ. It is found in all Greek writers, but is more common in Aristotle than elsewhere: Rhet. I 7. 18, 19, 20; 9. 29, 30; II 3. 12; 11. 11, καὶ ἀρχὴ δέ: Eth. N. V 5, 1130 b 21, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δέ: Polit. VI (IV), 13, 1297 b 10, καὶ εἰώθασι δέ: and again V 16, καὶ ἡ πρώτη δὲ πολιτεία, de Anim. A 4, linit. καὶ ἄλλη δέ: c. 5, 411 a 7, καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δέ, B 3, 415 a 6, καὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν δέ, et passim. [‘Maxime in Ethicorum libro quarto octavo nono decimo.’ Eucken, de Arist. dicendi ratione I p. 32. S.] The same meaning is much more frequently expressed by these particles in the inverted order, δὲ καί.

The proverb, τὸ ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν ὑδρίαν, ‘to drop⁵ or break the pitcher at the door’, after you have carried it home from the distant well with much toil and trouble, expresses the general conception of ‘lost labour’, ‘labour thrown away’. Erasmus, Adagia, p. 350, in foribus urceum, misinterprets the proverb as expressing something vile and contemptible, not worth the trouble of taking up.

Another more common corresponding proverb is πλύνειν πλίνθον, laterem lavare (Terent. Phorm. I 4, 9) ‘to try to make a red brick white by washing it’. Theocr. Id. XVI 62, ἢ ὕδατι νίζειν θολερὰν ἰοειδέϊ πλίνθον⁶, and answering to our ‘washing a blackamoor white’. Compare also Eur. Iph. Taur. 116, οὔτοι μακρὸν μὲν ἤλθομεν κώπῃ πόρον, ἐκ τερμάτων δὲ νόστον ἀροῦμεν πάλιν.

περιμάχητον φαινόμενον] ‘apparently, manifestly, conspicuously (with φαίνεσθαι in this sense, comp. II 2, 1, bis) an object of contention’.

τοῦτ᾽ ἀγαθὸν ἦν] ‘this is, as was said’, i. e. in § 2. This use of the imperfect, referring to a past transaction or statement referred to in present time, is so common both in Plato and Aristotle as to require no illustration.

οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ...φαίνονται] The acts and opinions of the great body of people, the most of those that you know or have heard of, are as convincing to the popular audience to which Rhetoric is addressed, as those of all mankind if they could be ascertained. The fact therefore that the possession of anything is much contested and coveted, implying that a great many people seek after it and care for it, is as sufficient a proof to them that it is a good, as if it could be shewn, as it ought by the rules, § 2, that it is the universal object of human aims: the sanction of ‘the many’ is as good as an universal admission.

---

τὸ ἐπαινετόν] The proper object of ἔπαινος is virtue, any kind of practical excellence; ἔστι δ᾽ ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς, Rhet. I 9, 33. On ἔπαινος as the test of virtue and the distinction of this from ἐγκώμιον and εὐδαιμονισμός, see Introd. Appendix B to Bk. I ch. 9, p. 212 seq. It is there said that ἔπαινος and ψόγος are the equivalents of Butler's ‘moral approbation and disapprobation’. This requires some qualification. When the ‘intellectual’ virtues are included as the objects of ἔπαινος, as they certainly are in the Eth. Eud. II 1. 18, the approbation loses its exclusively moral character. In Eth. Nic. I 12, Aristotle together with the moral virtues, justice, courage, ‘goodness’ in general, includes also as objects of praise all kinds of ἀρετή or excellence, such as strength and swiftness, which are manifested in action.

καὶ ὃ οἱ ἐχθροὶ καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ἐπαινοῦσιν] Victorius, in illustration of the former of these two topics, quotes Virg. Aen. XI 282, Stetimus tela aspera contra, Contulimusque manus; experto credite quantus In clypeum assurgat, quo turbine torqueat hastam. The prowess of Aeneas could not be more highly extolled than by the praises extorted from his enemy Diomede.

καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι] is rejected as a subsequent insertion by Muretus, F. A. Wolf, Bekker, Brandis, and Spengel, because it is passed over unnoticed in the explanatory commentary that follows, ὥσπερ γὰρ—πεπονθότες. Vater alone defends it. The explanation of it is easy, and it is perfectly consistent with the context and with good sense. If the vilest and meanest, the ‘worthless and contemptible’, φαῦλοι, who are least likely to be sensible of merit in others, being almost devoid of right moral instinct, find themselves compelled to praise some signal act of valour, disinterestedness, or virtue—we are engaged here upon actions—a fortiori it must meet with the approbation of better judges, and be emphatically good. If with this reasonable explanation we take into account Aristotle's hasty and careless habit, twice already noticed, of interrupting an explanation or an argument by the insertion of something bearing indirectly on the subject, but not immediately appropriate, I think we may without scruple retain the words objected to.

ὥσπερ γὰρ πάντες ἤδη ὁμολογοῦσιν] ‘for this is now as good as, equivalent to, an universal admission’. ἤδη, ‘by this time’, now that we have got as far as this, have reached, that is, the level of enemies, the extreme case of those who are interested in denying the merit—if they approve, all others must necessarily do so.

διὰ γὰρ τὸ φανερὸν...τὸ Ἴλιον] There is a difficulty here which has much occupied the commentators, arising from the want of connexion, as the present text stands, between the two rules laid down, ὥσπερ καὶ... ἐπαινοῦσιν, and the example (from Simonides) which is said, διό, to follow from them: the example, according to the present reading, is not an inference from either of them. The best way of meeting the difficulty seems to be to adopt, with Spengel, the reading of the best MS A^{c}. This omits the words οὓς οἱ φίλοι ψέγουσι καὶ ἀγαθοί, without which the sense is clear and consistent. ‘For it must be owing to its being evident that they are inclined to (would) admit it, just as’ (it is equally evident that, by the same rule, in the opposite case) ‘those who are praised by their enemies must be worthless’, (because if your enemy approves of your conduct towards him, which is assumed to be hostile, it shews that you can have done him no harm: and therefore that you have been wanting either in courage or patriotism or energy and skill). Of this the example of the Corinthians is now a real instance, and their suspicion of Simonides' intentions may be traced to the general rule. ‘And this was why the Corinthians conceived the suspicion that they had been insulted by Simonides, when he wrote, ‘Ilium has no fault to find with the Corinthians’ (which it ought to have had if they had done their duty). The Corinthians misinterpreted Simonides’ expressions; his intentions were innocent, but he failed to perceive the inference that might be derived from them. The line of Simonides is apparently misquoted by a lapse of memory. The Schol. Pind. Ol. XIII p. 78, who cites it, has μανίει (ι^) for μέμφεται; and this reading appears also in another reference to it in Plut. Vit. Dion. c. I sub init. (cf. Bergk and Gaisf.), ὁ Σιμωνίδης φησὶ τοῖς Κορινθίοις οὐ μηνίειν τὸ Ἴλιον ἐπιστρατεύσασι μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ὅτι κἀκείνοις οἱ περὶ Γλαῦκον ἐξ ἀρχῆς Κορίνθιοι γεγονότες συνεμάχουν προθύμως. Homer only says, Il. Z 152 seq., that Glaucus himself attributed his origin to Sisyphus of Ephyre or Corinth. If this be the true explanation of the reason why Ilium was ‘not wroth’, or ‘found no fault’, with the Corinthians, and Aristotle remembered it when he used the example, it seems that the instance is very ill chosen for the purpose of illustrating the rule. In this case nothing is imputed to the Corinthians except that the aid of Glaucus and his men of Corinthian race compensated the Trojans for their own hostility, and therefore that Troy had nothing to reproach them with, which could scarcely be construed by them as an insult: and the example only applies to the rule which it is supposed to exemplify in this sense; that the Trojans ought by the rule to have been represented as having directly censured the Corinthians, if Simonides had intended to pay them a compliment; by the mere omission of this they thought that he had insulted them.

---

Compare the corresponding topic of II 23, 12. On this kind of ‘authority’ see I 15, where it is exemplified under the head of ‘witnesses’, §§ 13 and 15. The φρόνιμος, the man of practical wisdom, skill and judgment, the ‘artist’ or expert in each pursuit, is the proper standard or measure to be appealed to in every disputed question. The general judgment of such well-qualified persons is the ὀρθὸς λόγός, which must be applied even to the determination of the due measure of virtue, which is a μεσότης...ὡρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν. Eth. N. II 6, init.

ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν] so Eth. X 5, ult., the standard of moral judgment is said to be ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός. IX 4, 1166 a 12, μέτρον ἑκάστῳ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος. III 6, 1113 a 32, διαφέρει πλεῖστον ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾷν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὤν.

προέκρινεν] ‘decided, distinguished by preference’.

Ἑλένην Θησεύς] The preference of Theseus, a man of consummate authority, παντελῆ τὴν ἀρετὴν κτησάμενον, for Helen, is actually introduced by Isocrates as one of the topics of his encomium of that much calumniated lady, Helen. §§ 18—22.

---

τὰ προαιρετά] ‘objects of deliberate and voluntary choice’. The προαίρεσις seems here intended in the more general sense in which προαιρεῖσθαι and προαίρεσις are employed in the ordinary language, and even sometimes in the Ethical treatise itself, as I 2, init. ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὀρέγεται. προαίρεσις is defined in Eth. Nic. III 5, ult. βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, ‘an impulsive faculty (implying, not directly expressing the free will) capable of deliberation, directed to things within our power’—no one deliberates about things beyond his power, οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον. And again in precise conformity with this, de Mot. Anim. c. 6, ἡ προαίρεσις κοινὸν διανοίας καὶ ὀρέξεως, ὥστε κινεῖ πρῶτον (is the ultimate mover, the origin of motion or action) τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητόν, (it is the object of the two faculties, and not the faculties themselves, which is the real origin of motion, according to the Aristotelian doctrine that the primary moving agent must be itself unmoved,) οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ διανοητὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος. Thus the προαίρεσις is composed of two separate elements or faculties, intellectual and impulsive, of which the latter alone is the agent of motion, or stimulates to action: the intellectual part deliberates prior to action, and decides whether the proposed object of the action is good or bad, right or wrong⁷. Though the προαίρεσις in its general and wider signification of ‘deliberate, voluntary purpose’ is capable of prompting to action of every kind, yet in its narrower and specially ethical usage it is moral action alone that it originates and determines, οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων, Eth. N. III 4, init. Comp. III 2, 1110 b 31, οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας. From the ethical point of view therefore the definition will be ‘a deliberate and voluntary moral purpose’. The principal passages on the subject of προαίρεσις are Eth. Nic. III cc. 4, 5, 6, where it is analysed and distinguished from ἐπιθυμία and θυμός, which are mere animal impulses, on the one hand, and from βούλησις, βούλευσις and δόξα, on the other: ib. VI 2; and de Anima III 9, 10, where it is treated in reference to its action as a motive principle.

τὰ εἰρημένα] all the objects of voluntary choice already mentioned which consist in, or are to be obtained by, action; such as health, pleasure, and especially the various moral virtues.

καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς κακά] This was an article of the received code of popular morality amongst the Greeks and Romans: comp. § 29, where one class of good things are ἃ ἀπεχθήσονται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. This is a duty, and a part of justice. In Rhet. I 9, 24, it is said to combine two kinds of virtue, τὸ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ καταλλάττεσθαι: τό τε γὰρ ἀνταποδιδόναι δίκαιον, καὶ ἀνδρείου τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι. II 5, 5. Rhet. ad Alex. I (2), 13. Xen. Memor. IV 2, 15, 16. Eur. Ion 1046, ὅταν δὲ πολεμίους δρᾶσαι κακῶς θέλῃ τις, οὐδεὶς ἐμποδὼν κεῖται νόμος. Med. 808, βαρεῖαν ἐχθροῖς καὶ φίλοισιν εὐμενῆ κ.τ.λ. Cic. de Off. I 7, Iustitiae primum munus est ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacessitus iniuria.

---

ταῦτα, sc. τὰ δυνατά.—τὰ γενόμενα ἂν καὶ τὰ ῥαδίως γιγνόμενα.] Two kinds of possibilities; ‘things which might’ (ἄν, under certain conditions, possibly difficult) ‘be brought to pass, and those which are easily attained’. The distinction is between ends or things hard and unlikely, and easy and likely, to be attained or obtained.

The same distinction of possibilities is found in Cic. de Inv. II 56, 169. (Victorius, who refers to it, quotes only the definition of facilis.) Atque in iis omnibus quae ante dicta sunt, quid fieri et quid facile fieri possit oportet considerare. Facile id dicimus, quod sine magno aut sine ullo labore, sumptu, molestia quam brevissimo tempore confici potest; posse autem fieri quod quamquam laboris, sumptus, molestiae, longinquitatis indiget, atque aut omnes aut plurimas aut maximas causas habet difficultatis, tamen, his susceptis difficultatibus, compleri atque ad exitum perduci potest: an excellent commentary on Aristotle's topic.

τὸ γὰρ χαλεπὸν κ.τ.λ.] ‘facility’ is defined by the absence of pain or laborious effort, or by the shortness of the time occupied in doing anything or getting anything done, because difficulty is defined by the opposites.

ὁρίζεται ἢ λύπῃ ἢ πλήθει χρόνου] A various reading in several of the earlier Editions is λύπη ἢ πλῆθος. In this case ὁρίζεται is the middle voice, as it usually is in the sense of ‘defining’. ὁρίζεσθαι however, as a passive, is found, though rarely, elsewhere, as Eth. Nic. III 10, 1115 b 23, ὁρίζεται ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει, ib. IX 8, 1168 b 5, πάνθ᾽ οἷς ὁ φίλος ὁρίζεται, Pol. VII (VI) 2, 1317 b 39, ὀλιγαρχία γένει καὶ πλουτῷ καὶ παιδείᾳ ὁρίζεται, Theophrast. Hist. Plant. I 1, 6, ἡ μὲν ἀνομοιότης ὁρίζεται σχήματι χρώματι κ.τ.λ. It is not to be included in the class of irregular passives formed from neuter verbs, the act of ὁρίζειν being transitive.

καὶ ἐὰν ὡς βούλονται] sc. γένηταί τι (or τὰ πράγματα) ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, ‘anything that turns out as they desire’; any result, either of their own acts, or of the course of events, such as they like; [Gaisford says, ‘nescio an in ὡς ἂν βούλωνται’ (a various reading) ‘lateant vestigia melioris scripturae, ὅσ᾽ ἂν βούλωνται.’ This is not so suitable to what follows.] ‘but what they do like is either no evil at all, or less than the good (ensuing): and this (the latter of the two preceding) will be the case, when (for instance) the penalty (which is attached to some illicit gain or advantage) is either unfelt (λανθάνῃ, escapes your notice, not the notice of others,) or trifling’. In both of these cases the profit, or good, is greater than the loss, or evil.

---

καὶ τὰ ἴδια] Things or qualities, special and peculiar, not shared by the rest of the world in general, such as personal gifts, graces, or accomplishments: anything that distinguishes a man from the mass. Of the three kinds of ἴδια distinguished in Top. A 5, 102 a 18—30 (ἴδιον proper, the fourth predicable, proprium), these are ἴδια ἁπλῶς; the second, are not absolutely and at all times ἴδια, but only at particular times, under particular circumstances of time, ποτέ; the third class, to which those here spoken of belong, are ‘relative’ ἴδια, ἴδια πρός τι, special and peculiar, i. e., in this case, to a few men as compared with the rest.

ἃ μηδεὶς (ἄλλος ἔχει）] This is only a particular case of the preceding: in that the advantage is shared by few, in this the possessor stands alone. Anything excessively rare or unique, as a coin, a tulip, a piece of china, a book, may acquire a special value from this circumstance. Comp. Magn. Mor. B 7, 1205 b 29, τὸ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν οὐκ ἀγαθόν. This feeling is characteristic of ambition, τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἐπὶ φιλοτιμοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ φιλοτιμίας οἰκεῖόν ἐστιν: ὁ γὰρ φιλοτιμός ἐστιν ὁ μόνος βουλόμενος ἔχειν καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν.

περιττά] ‘things that are singular, preeminent, specially distinguished’ amongst their fellows or congeners, or among things of the same sort, ‘for by this they obtain greater credit’. περιττός is ‘odd⁸, singular, striking, remarkable’. From περί, ‘over and above’, ‘exceeding’, (Homer, περὶ δ᾽ ἄλλων φασὶ γενέσθαι, περὶ μὲν Δαναῶν,) the derivative περιττός passes into the metaphorical sense of surpassing, preeminent, standing out from the rest, out of the common way, extraordinary. This signification of the word will be found illustrated in the Lexicons. Add to these, as marked examples of some of its various significations, Eur. Hippol. 437, 445, 948. Ar. Pol. II 6, 1265 a 10, in the well-known passage on Plato's style, Ib. VIII (V) 10, 1312 a 27, πράξεως περιττῆς (extraordinary, signal) καὶ δἰ ἣν ὀνομαστοὶ γίγνονται καὶ γνώριμοι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ib. II 8 init. of Hippodamus of Miletus, that he became περιττότερος ‘rather odd, eccentric, extravagant’, in his dress and habits. Top. Z 4, 141 b 13, ἀκριβὴς καὶ περιττὴ διάνοια. Metaph. I 2, 1053 b 3, of Protagoras' dictum, (πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος), οὐθὲν δὴ λέγων περιττὸν φαίνεταί τι λέγειν, Rhet. II 15, 3, Probl. XXX 1 init. περιττοί (‘distinguished’ in any art or science) φαίνονται μελαγχολικοὶ ὄντες. (Waitz, on Top. Γ 2, 118 a 6, illustrates other senses of the word in Aristotle.) Of excellence of style, Dion. de Comp. Verb. c. 3, bis, sub init. et sub fin. From περί again, in the sense of ‘over and above, exceeding’, comes περιττός as applied to an ‘odd’ number; the supposition on which the name is based being, that the ἄρτιος ἀριθμός, or even number, was the primary number—2 was in fact considered as the first arithmetical number, I being the principle of unity—the odd number is an addition to or excess over the other, the next step in advance.

The three kinds of good just enumerated are all repeated in c. 9. 25, 26, under the head of καλόν. As ‘goods’ they are in fact all of them of the specially ‘questionable’ sort', ἀμφισβητήσιμα; supr. § 17.

τὰ ἁρμόττοντα] ‘suitable, appropriate’, specially applicable or belonging to them.

τὰ προσήκοντα κατὰ γένος καὶ δύναμιν] ‘things that naturally belong to them, or are due to them in respect of birth and power’.

ὧν ἐλλείπειν οἴονται] ἐλλείπειν with genitive, ‘to come short of, be deficient in’. ‘And anything men think wanting to them, as appropriate, or suitable to their condition’ (a second case of τὰ ἁρμόττοντα), ‘however trifling’, (they regard as a good, and eagerly pursue it): ‘for none the less for that (διὰ τὸ μικρὰ εἶναι) do they choose (deliberately purpose) to do it’; i. e. to do things, to act, so as to attain their end. So Victorius, who illustrates the topic by Hor. Sat. II 6, 8, O si angulus ille proximus accedat qui nunc denormat agellum. If this is right, as I suppose it is, προαιροῦνται πράττειν is carelessly written for ζητοῦσιν or ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, or ἐφίενται, or some verb that would imply the object of action, and not the mere action itself.

---

The things mentioned in this and the following section all of them designate what is considered good because men like to do it.

τὰ εὐκατέργαστα] ‘things easily effected, or easy achievements’, are considered as good, because they are possible, by the rule §§ 26, 27; they belong to the second class of things ‘possible’, such as are ‘easy’.

κατώρθωσαν] aor. ‘ever succeeded in’; or indicating the notion of ‘habit’ which the verb ὀρθοῦν and its compounds acquire. The secondary and metaphorical signification of safety and success, from the notion of going through a career, as a race, erect and in an upright position, without stumble or fall, is well illustrated by the following passages of Sophocles, Electr. 741, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους πάντας ἀσφαλεῖς δρόμους ὠρθοῦθ᾽ ὁ τλήμων ὀρθὸς ἐξ ὀρθῶν δίφρων. Oed. Col. 394, Ismene, νῦν γὰρ θεοί σ᾽ ὀρθοῦσι, προσθε δ̓ ὤλυσαν. Oed. γέροντα δ᾽ ὀρθοῦν φλαῦρον ὃς νέος πέσῃ.

ἃ χαριοῦνται τοῖς φίλοις] ‘anything by which one will oblige one's friends’. ἃ cognate accus. for ἃς χάριτας. In obliging a friend you may be said to oblige yourself, a true friend being ἕτερος αὐτός: Eth. N. IX 9, sub init. Ib. 1170 b 7. Ib. c. 4, 1166 a 31, προς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς ἑαυτόν, ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός.

ἃ ἀπεχθήσονται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς] ‘or by which one may shew one's hostility to (offend or annoy) one's enemy’. As before, ἃς ἀπεχθείας ἀπεχθ. τ. ἐχθροῖς. ἀπχεθάνεσθαι πρός τινα, or τινί, is ‘to make oneself odious or hostile to’, ‘to quarrel with’, or ‘to disoblige, offend, annoy’. Compare διαβάλλεσθαι πρός, in Plato, Thucydides, Demosthenes, Aristotle, to have a hostile feeling towards one, to be set against him, to quarrel with him (from διαβάλλειν, to set two people at variance, to engender animosity and ill feeling between them, and hence to give one an ill opinion of the other, and so, finally, to calumniate). Both of these, men think good and right, and proper objects of pursuit.

θαυμάζειν, ‘to look up to, respect, reverence, admire’. Valck. ad Hippol. 106. Ar. Rhet. II 6. 15, 16, 24. Aristoph. Nub. 180, 428, ἡμᾶς τιμῶν καὶ θαυμάζων. Ran. 1008, alibi. Isocr. Areop. ter &c.

εὐφυεῖς] ‘clever’, § 15, note on p. 105. Comp. c. II 28, Probl. XVIII 6, there quoted.

ἔμπειροι] those who have acquired skill by practice and experience, distinguished from the naturally clever and dexterous. Success, the attainment of one's object, in any practice or occupation for which any one has either a natural talent or an acquired aptitude, is regarded as a good, because it is more easily attained, § 27; ‘more easily’, either than by others who are not so skilful, or than in other pursuits and practices.

ἃ μηδεὶς φαῦλος] (οὐδείς, no definite particular person; μηδείς, no indefinite person, no man whatever); sub. πραξεῖεν ἄν. ‘Hinc ducto argumento, apud Euripidem quidam divitias non se movere dixit, quas etiam saepe improbissimi homines facillime consecuti sunt: Fragm. Aeol. 14 (5, Dind.) μὴ πλοῦτον εἴπῃς: οὐχὶ θαυμάζω θεὸν ὃν χὠ κάκιστος ῥᾳδίως ἐκτήσατο’. Victorius.

ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον] All objects of desire are supposed to be good, all αἱρετά, and ὧν ἐφίενται, § 2. The desire of a thing therefore implies not only that the satisfaction of it will give you pleasure, but also that you suppose it (φαίνεται) to be good.

---

καὶ μάλιστα ἕκαστοι (ἀγαθὰ ἡγοῦνται ταῦτα) πρὸς ἃ τοιοῦτοι] ‘to which they are so and so’, disposed in such and such a way. In the parallel passages of the Ethics this is expressed by φιλοτοιοῦτοι. Eth. N. I 9, 1099 a 8, ἑκάστῳ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ: τὸν αὑτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ̓ ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. Ib. III 13, 1118 b 22, τῶν φιλοτοιούτων λεγομένων. Ib. IV 10, 1125 b 15, πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιούτου λεγομένου.