James Adam, The Republic of Plato

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595A - 597E On a retrospect of our city, says Socrates, we can now see even more clearly than before that we did right in excluding imitative Poetry. What is Imitation? Examine it in the light of the Ideas, and you will find that it is the production of images or appearances which are third in order from Reality and Truth. There are, for example, three beds: (1) that which is in Nature, made, as we may say, by God: (2) that which the carpenter manufactures: (3) that which is the product of the painter's art. The first is, and must be, one: for there cannot be two Ideas of bed. We have thus two makers in connexion with the notion of bed: (1) a Nature-maker (φυτουργός), who is God; (2) a manufacturer (δημιουργός), viz. the carpenter. There is also (3) an imitator, i.e. the painter. Imitation is therefore concerned with a product third in sequence from Nature, and the tragic poet, among other imitators, is third from Royalty and Truth.

ff. Book X falls into two divisions, the first (595 A—608 B) dealing with Poetry, the second (608 C—621 D) with Immortality and the rewards of Justice both here and hereafter. The second half of the Book forms a welcome supplement to Plato's treatment of the main thesis of the Republic (see on 608 C); but the first division is of the nature of an episode, and might have been omitted without injury to the artistic unity of the dialogue (cf. Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. d. pl. Pol. p. 623). It is in no sense, as supposed by Schleiermacher (Einleitung p. 55) and apparently also by Hirzel (der Dialog I p. 237 note), a fulfilment of the promise held out in III 392 C; nor ought we to construe ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω ἔτι τούτων III 394 D as a hint that the subject of Poetry is to be resumed: see note ad loc. Why then is the episode introduced at all? The chorizontists (such as Siebeck Unters. zur Phil. d. Griech. pp. 142 ff., Pfleiderer zur Lösung etc. p. 34 and Brandt zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehre d. Seelenteilen p. 27), relying partly on the tone of the exordium, partly on ἀπολελογήσθω 607 B, assert that Plato is replying to certain comic poets (Pfleiderer), or to Antisthenes (Brandt), who had presumably fallen foul of Plato's treatment of Poetry in Books II and III. Cf. also Zeller^{4} II p. 556 note 2. But apart altogether from the question whether the Republic was issued en bloc or piecemeal, there is no actual evidence to support the presumption on which this theory rests (cf. 598 D, 607 B notes). The Platonic dialogue, like actual conversation, is at liberty to recall, modify, and expand the results of a discussion apparently finished (cf. Hirzel l.c. pp. 228—230, 236); and we have already had an incidental recurrence to the subject of Poetry in VIII 568 A—D. Granted that Plato wished to justify his exclusion of the Muses by metaphysical and psychological as well as moral and paedagogic arguments, the beginning of Book X is his best, and indeed, as Hirmer shews (l.c. p. 625), his only opportunity: see on 595 B. He may well have wished to do so: for his dethronement of the great educator of Greece (606 E) would be sure to arouse wide-spread hostility, and Plato almost seems to feel that it needs further justification even to himself (595 B note). Cf. Hirmer l.c. pp. 624—628 and see also on 598 D, 607 B.

The student will find an excellent and exhaustive account of Plato's theory of Aesthetics in Walter Gesch. d. Aesthetik im Altertum (1893) pp. 168—476. His attitude towards Poetry and Poets is very fully discussed by Reber Platon u. die Poesie (1864). Heine de rat. quae Platoni cum poet. Gr. intercedit, etc. (1880), and more recently by Finsler Platon u. die Arist. Poetik (1900) and Stählin Die Stellung d. Poesie in d. plat. Phil. (1901). Following on the path marked out by Belger in his dissertation de Arist. etiam in arte poetica Platonis discip. (1872), Finsler has succeeded in shewing that Aristotle's debt to Plato in his Theory of Poetry is far greater than is commonly supposed: and although the treatment of Poetry in Book X of the Republic must be confessed to be inadequate and unjust, Plato himself, as Walter and Stählin have recognised, furnishes us elsewhere with the materials for constructing a truer and more generous theory. See also on 598 E. It may be added that a study of the Poetics of Aristotle side by side with 595 A— 608 B will enable the student to understand both Plato and Aristotle better than if he confines himself to either alone. See also Butcher Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art^{2}, pp. 115 ff.

ἐνθυμηθεὶς περὶ ποιήσεως. II 377 B—III 403 C.

τὸ μηδαμῇ -- μιμητική. See III 394 B —398 B. Plato speaks as if he had tabooed all mimetic poetry, but it is clear from III 396 E compared with 397 D, 398 B and 401 B—402 C that he did not condemn poetic and artistic imitation as such, but would have admitted it where the model imitated was good. See also on 595 C, 607 A, 608 A infra.

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ἐπειδὴ -- εἴδη: viz. in Book IV and also throughout VIII and IX. The psychological theory of these books is laid under contribution in 602 C ff.: see note ad loc. It may seem strange that Plato makes no reference to the metaphysical doctrine of V—VII, since he derives his first argument (596 A— 601 B) from the theory of Ideas: but it was unnecessary for him to refer to it in this connexion, because the theory is itself expressly re-enunciated (εἷδος γάρ που κτλ. 596 A) before the argument begins.

ὡς -- εἰρῆσθαι: ‘between ourselves.’ Cf. IV 430 E note

αὐτά: viz. πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, tragedy and other forms of μιμητικὴ ποίησις: not (as Schleiermacher) “wie sich die Dinge in der Wirklichkeit verhalten.” A knowledge of the real character of dramatic Poetry is the only antidote against its evil influence. On τυγχάνει ὄντα see I 337 B note

καίτοι φιλία γε -- λέγειν. Plato speaks with real feeling: no one who had so much of the poet in himself could be insensible to Homer's charm, and nearly every dialogue of Plato bears evidence of the affectionate admiration in which he held the ‘first of tragic poets.’ See Heine de rat. quae Platoni cum poetis Graec. intercedit pp. 8—15. The ancients classed Plato and Homer together: δύο γὰρ αὗται ψυχαὶ λέγονται γενέσθαι παναρμόνιοι, says Olympiodorus (vit. Pl. 6): and Longinus remarks that of all Greek writers Plato was Ὁμηρικώτατος—ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὁμηρικοῦ κείνου νάματος εἰς αὑτὸν μυρίας ὅσας παρατροπὰς ἀποχετευσάμενος (περὶ ὕψους 13. 3). See also the admirable remarks on Plato's imitation of Homer in James Geddes's essay On the Composition and Manner of Writing of the Ancients pp. 180—200, and Proclus' much less sound and instructive article ὅτι διὰ πάσης τῆς ἑαυτοῦ συγγραφῆς Ὁμήρου ζηλωτής ἐστιν ὁ Πλάτων ταῖς τε λεκτικαῖς ἀρεταῖς καὶ ταῖς πραγματικαῖς in his in remp. Kroll I pp. 163—177. There is a touch of something like filial love and piety in what Plato says of Homer in this passage, and we may well believe that he did not part company with the friend of his childhood without pain. From the way in which Plato here speaks, it looks as if he feared that his heart might after all get the better of his head (cf. infra 605 C, D, 606 B, 607 C ff.), and consequently tried by new and deeper arguments to provide an ‘antidote’ (φάρμακον, or ἐπῳδή 608 A) for himself as well as others (so also Hirmer l.c. p. 626).

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τῶν καλῶν κτλ. καλῶν is of course ironical. For the sense cf. 598 D, 602 B, 607 A, Theaet. 152 E οἱ <*>κροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος and ib. 153 A, with Arist. Poet. 4. 1448^{b} 35 ff., 5. 1449^{b} 16 ff. It will be remembered that Aeschylus called his dramas τεμάχη τῶν Ὁμήρου μεγάλων δείπνων (Athen. VIII 347 E). Herwerden, quite without reason, so far as I can see, brackets τῶν τραγικῶν. It is unkind of Aristotle to purloin this sentiment in order to introduce his attack on Plato's theory of Ideas in Eth. Nic. I 4. 1096^{a} 11 ff., and Plato might well complain, in the words of Aeschylus, τάδ᾽ οὐχ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ τοῖς αὑτῶν πτεροῖς. To read ἁνήρ for ἀνήρ, as has been proposed, would make a general statement particular, and spoil the antithesis between ἀνήρ and ἀληθείας. The reference in ὃ λέγω is to ῥητέον in line 11 above: cf. VII 541 B.

μίμησιν κτλ. In III 392 C ff., μίμησις, in its application to Poetry, was regarded primarily as a form of style or λέζις, viz. the imitative or dramatic )( the narrative, and in this sense it included tragedy, comedy, and the strictly dramatic parts of epic and other poetry (394 C). But even in Book III μίμησις and its cognate notions have sometimes a wider application (e.g. 401 B—402 C). The following discussion tries to define the essential meaning of μίμησις in general by its relation to the Theory of Ideas. It should be noted that Poetry and Art were admitted to be μιμήσεις in Plato's day: cf. Laws 668 B τοῦτό γε πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ περὶ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὅτι πάντα τὰ περὶ αὐτήν ἐστι ποιήματα μίμησίς τε καὶ ἀπεικασία, with Xen. Mem. III 10. 1—8, Plato Crat. 424 D, 430 B (τὰ ζῳγραφήματα —μιμήματα—πραγμάτων τινῶν, 434 A, Soph. 266 D), Prot. 312 D, Critias 107 B et al. See also on III 392 C and cf. Stählin Poesie in d. plat. Phil. p. 25. On the contrast between Plato's view of Imitation in Book X and that of Aristotle in his Poetics, see Butcher Theory of Poetry^{2} etc. pp. 115—152. Walter has justly remarked (Gesch. d. Aesthetik im Altertum p. 442) that μίμησις, with its question-begging connotation, was in many ways an unfortunate word by which to describe the essence of Art, though in view of what Aristotle made of it, I should not go so far as to say that ‘Imitation is an unproductive principle, and dries up aesthetic life’ (ib.). If Poetry, and not Painting and Statuary, had determined the Greek view of Art, we should probably hear more of Creation (ποίησις), and less of Imitation, in ancient discussions on aesthetics; and it is difficult not to regret that Plato did not select a new and more fruitful point of view. See also on 598 A, B.

ἐπεὶ πολλὰ κτλ. is neither arrogant nor rude, if we realise the situation: see on VII 532 E f.

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ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας μεθόδου κτλ. As in V 476 A (see note ad loc.), so here, Plato does not try to prove the Ideal Theory, but treats Glauco as already a loyal Platonist. The account which Plato here gives of his Ideas has been widely canvassed from many different points of view. Bosanquet (Companion pp. 381 ff.) appears to me to err by interpreting it throughout only in terms of modern life and thought. Others refuse to regard it as serious, in view of the inherent difficulties, and because of Aristotle's remark διὸ δὴ οὐ κακῶς ὁ Πλάτων ἔφη ὅτι εἴδη ἔστιν ὁπόσα φύσει Met. Λ 4. 1070^{a} 18: cf. also A 991^{b} 3 ff. with Bonitz's note. Others, again, like Krohn (Pl. St. pp. 242 ff.), hold that the Ideal Theory in Bk X is inconsistent with the theory expounded in V—VII, where we do not hear of Ideas corresponding to concrete and artificial objects, but only of Ideas of qualities (such as Justice) and the like. In reply to the last school of critics, we may point out that Plato is not bound to give an exhaustive account of the Ideal theory whenever he has occasion to make use of it. On the previous occasion he confined himself to Ideas of the virtues etc., because they only were relevant to his immediate purpose (see on V 476 A and cf. Grimmelt de reip. Pl. comp. et unit. pp. 81 ff., Hirmer l.c. pp. 646 ff. and Dümmler zur Comp. d. Pl. St. p. 14), and it is exactly the same reason which makes him cite Ideas of concrete and artificial objects in Book X. The view that Plato should not be taken seriously is as old as Proclus, who (in Tim. 104 F) observes οὐ γὰρ κατά: τινας ἰδέας ὁ τεχνίτης ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ, εἰ καὶ δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν ὁ ἐν Πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖ μὲν τὰ εἰρημένα παραδείγματος εἴρηται χάριν καὶ οὐ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἰδεῶν, but, apart from other considerations, the recurrence of the same form of the theory in other dialogues (see on 596 B, C) justifies us in taking Plato here also at his word. The history of the controversy is ably reviewed by Dr Beckmann (Num Plato artefactorum ideas statuerit, Bonn 1889), with whom and with Zeller^{4} II pp. 666, 701 al. I agree in believing this passage to be an authoritative exposition of the Ideal theory on one of its many sides.

εἶδος γάρ που κτλ.: ‘for we are, as you know, in the habit of assuming a certain idea—always one idea—in connexion with each group of particulars to which we apply the same name’: lit. ‘an Idea, one each’ i.e. each being one. There cannot be two or more Ideas of Bed for example: cf. 597 C. Unnecessary trouble has been raised about the translation of this sentence by Krohn (Pl. St. p. 240), whose version “in Bezug auf jedes der vielen Dinge nehmen wir je. eine Einheit als εἶδός τι an” is both strained and inaccurate. For the statement itself cf. V 476 A, 479 A, B, E, 480 A, VI 493 E and VII 507 B note Plato might have written any of the foregoing passages without believing in Ideas of anything beyond qualities and attributes: but that he did believe in other Ideas also is evident not only from Book X, but also from Phil. 15 A, 16 C, D and many other places quoted by Zeller^{4} II p. 701 note 1.

πολλαί πού εἰσι κλῖναι κτλ. Why does Plato select examples of artificial objects, when the Painter can equally well paint the features of Nature, as is virtually allowed in C? One reason is that otherwise he could not have constructed the descending scale θεός, κλινοποιός, ζῳγράφος 597 B ff. Had he selected e.g. mountains, it would be difficult to specify the middle term. Moreover in Soph. 266 B ff. we have a distinction drawn between θεία and ἀνθρωπίνη εἰδωλοποιική, the first producing likenesses of natural objects by natural agencies, the second likenesses of artificial objects by artificial means, and Painting is there also classed under the second head: τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἆῤ οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικῇ φήσομεν ποιεῖν, γραφικῇ δέ τιν̓ ἑτέραν, οἷον ὄναρ ἀνθρώπινον ἐγρηγορόσιν ἀπειργασμένην; (266 C). Inasmuch as σκευαστά are elsewhere credited with less reality than φυτευτά (see on VII 532 B, C notes), the choice of these examples is also specially appropriate to Plato's main object, that is to say, the depreciation of imitative art.

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ἀλλὰ ἰδέαι κτλ. For ideas of σκευαστά cf. especially Crat. 389 A—390 A, a passage which forms an admirable commentary on this. The anecdote about Plato and Diogenes in D. L. VI 53 (Πλάτωνος περὶ ἰδεῶν διαλεγομένου, καὶ ὀνομάζοντος τραπεζότητα καὶ κυαθότητα κτλ.) is pointless unless Plato believed in εἴδη τῶν σκευαστῶν.

οὐκοῦν -- κατὰ ταὐτά. Cf. Crat. 389 A ff. ποῖ βλέπων ὁ τέκτων τὴν κερκίδα ποιεῖ; ἆρ οὐ πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι ὃ πέφυκε κερκίζειν; Πάνυ γε. Τί δέ; ἂν καταγῇ αὐτῷ ἡ κερκὶς ποιοῦντι, πότερον πάλιν ποιήσει ἄλλην πρὸς τὴν κατεαγυῖαν βλέπων, ἢ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος, πρὸς ὅπερ καὶ ἣν κατέαξεν ἐποίει; Πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνο δικαιότατ̓ ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι κερκὶς καλέσαιμεν; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. The Idea is conceived as a παράδειγμα: cf. VI 500 E—501 C and see on V 476 D. Borrowing the ontology of the Philebus, we might say that the carpenter has an ἄπειρον of wood, into which he introduces πέρας after the model of the Idea of Bed or αἰτία, thereby manufacturing a μικτόν or material bed (Schmitt die Verschiedenheit d. Ideenlehre in Pl. Rep. u. Phil. p. 25 note 68). We are not entitled (in view of 597 B and the phraseology of the present passage) to take ἰδέαν merely as the plan or form of bed in the mind of the carpenter: the Ideas of σκευαστά must be credited with the same attributes—transcendence, self-existence, etc.—as appertain to those of abstract qualities and φυτευτά (see on V 476 A), although the difficulties which such a view involves are undeniably greater in the one case than in the other. If we put ourselves in Plato's position—and Socrates is here speaking as one Platonist to another (εἰώθαμεν λέγειν）—it becomes correct to say that the carpenter is looking at the Idea rather than at his own νόημα, for the νόημα is nought apart from its object, the νοητόν (cf. V 476 E note), i.e. the selfexistent Idea of Bed, without which all the νοήματα in the world would be powerless to generate a bed because it is the αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι κλίνη, and no mere νόημα, which is the true and essential cause of all material κλῖναι. See also on 597 B.

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καὶ τόνδε -- δημιουργόν: i.e. καὶ τόνδε τὸν δημιουργὸν τίνα καλεῖς, sc. as well as the δημιουργὸς ἑκατέρου τοῦ σκεύους. Baiter ought not to have printed Vermehren's pointless conjecture καὶ τόνδε τινὰ καλεῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν (Pl. Stud. p. 118): for Plato is leading up to 597 B ζῳγράφος δή, κλινοποιός, θεός, τρεῖς οὗτοι ἐπιστάται τρισὶν εἴδεσι κλινῶν, and he again calls the painter a δημιουργός in D and E: so also χειροτέχνης just below.

ὃς -- χειροτεχνῶν. Cf. Soph. 233 E— 234 C, where the same conception is worked out in almost exactly the same way.

τάχα here means ‘soon,’ and not ‘perhaps’: cf. with Schneider Crat. 410 E.