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[546] [five weeks after the fight] that the number may be increased to 1,600. That is certainly a very lean exhibit of prisoners as the fruit of so decisive a victory; but the fleetness of our soldiers is to be taken into the account. He guesses that our losses will amount to 4,500 in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and adds:
The ordnance and supplies captured include some 281 field-pieces of the best character of arms,2 with over 100 rounds of ammunition for each gun, 37 caissons, 6 forges, 4 battery-wagons, 64 artillery horses, completely equipped, 500,000 rounds of smallarms ammunition, 4,500 sets of accouterments, over 500 muskets, some 9 regimental and garrison flags, with a large number of pistols, knapsacks, swords, canteens, blankets, a large store of axes and intrenching tools, wagons, ambulances, horses, camp and garrison equipage, hospital stores, and some subsistence.

At 7 A. M., of Monday, the 22d, the last of our stragglers and wounded left Centerville, which a Rebel cavalry force was about to enter. But there was no pursuit, and no loss on our part after the battle, but of what our men threw away. Beauregard explains his failure to pursue, after our discomfiture, as follows:

An army which had fought like ours on that day, against uncommon odds, under a July sun, most of the time without water and without food, except a hastily snatched meal at dawn, was not in condition for the toil of an eager, effective pursuit of an enemy immediately after the battle.

On the following day, an unusually heavy and unintermitting fall of rain intervened to obstruct our advance, with reasonable prospect of fruitful results. Added to this, the want of a cavalry force of sufficient numbers made an efficient pursuit a military impossibility.

The forces actually engaged in this celebrated battle, so decisive in its results and so important in its consequences, were probably not far from 25,000 on either side;3 while the combatants actually on the battle-field, or so near it as to be practically at the disposal of the respective commanders,

1 Our reports admit a loss of 17 guns; other accounts make it 22. Beauregard, writing on the 26th of August, should have been able to state the exact number. His statement of the number of muskets taken at “over 500,” including all those dropped by our dead and wounded, proves that tho stories told by excited correspondents and other fugitives, of our men throwing away everything that could impede their flight, were gross exaggerations.

2 Gen. Heintzelman, in his official report of the battle, giving an account of his retreat by the circuitous road on which he had advanced, says:

Having every reason to fear a vigorous pursuit from the enemy's fresh troops, I was desirous of forming a strong rear-guard; but neither the efforts of the officers of the regular army, nor the coolness of the regular troops with me, could induce them to form a single company. We relied entirely for our protection on one section of artillery and a few companies of cavalry. Most of the road was favorable for infantry, but unfavorable for cavalry and artillery. About dusk, as we approached the Warrenton turnpike, we heard a firing of rifled cannon on our right, and learned that the enemy had established a battery enfilading the road. Capt. Arnold, with his section of artillery, attempted to run the gauntlet and reach the bridge over Cub Run, about two miles from Centerville, but found it obstructed with broken vehicles, and was compelled to abandon his pieces, as they were under the fire of these rifled cannon. The cavalry turned to the left, and, after passing through a strip of woods and some fields, struck a road which led them to some camps occupied by our troops in the morning, through which we gained the turnpike. At about 8 P. M., we reached the camps we had occupied in the morning. Had a brigade from the reserve advanced a short distance beyond Centerville, nearly one-third of the artillery lost might have been saved, as it was abandoned at or near this crossing.

These were the only guns lost by us, save those abandoned for want of horses, on the immediate field of conflict.

3 Pollard, in his “Southern History,” says:

Our effective force of all arms ready for action on the field, on the eventful morning, was less than 30,000 men.

This was before the arrival of that portion of Johnston's army led to the field by Kirby Smith, and afterward commanded by Elzey, or the brigade of Early — to say nothing of the reenforcements that were received during the day from the direction of Richmond.

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