Horace Greeley, The American Conflict: A History of the Great Rebellion in the United States of America, 1860-65: its Causes, Incidents, and Results: Intended to exhibit especially its moral and political phases with the drift and progress of American opinion respecting human slavery from 1776 to the close of the War for the Union. Volume I.

1 Our reports admit a loss of 17 guns; other accounts make it 22. Beauregard, writing on the 26th of August, should have been able to state the exact number. His statement of the number of muskets taken at “over 500,” including all those dropped by our dead and wounded, proves that tho stories told by excited correspondents and other fugitives, of our men throwing away everything that could impede their flight, were gross exaggerations.

2 Gen. Heintzelman, in his official report of the battle, giving an account of his retreat by the circuitous road on which he had advanced, says:

Having every reason to fear a vigorous pursuit from the enemy's fresh troops, I was desirous of forming a strong rear-guard; but neither the efforts of the officers of the regular army, nor the coolness of the regular troops with me, could induce them to form a single company. We relied entirely for our protection on one section of artillery and a few companies of cavalry. Most of the road was favorable for infantry, but unfavorable for cavalry and artillery. About dusk, as we approached the Warrenton turnpike, we heard a firing of rifled cannon on our right, and learned that the enemy had established a battery enfilading the road. Capt. Arnold, with his section of artillery, attempted to run the gauntlet and reach the bridge over Cub Run, about two miles from Centerville, but found it obstructed with broken vehicles, and was compelled to abandon his pieces, as they were under the fire of these rifled cannon. The cavalry turned to the left, and, after passing through a strip of woods and some fields, struck a road which led them to some camps occupied by our troops in the morning, through which we gained the turnpike. At about 8 P. M., we reached the camps we had occupied in the morning. Had a brigade from the reserve advanced a short distance beyond Centerville, nearly one-third of the artillery lost might have been saved, as it was abandoned at or near this crossing.

These were the only guns lost by us, save those abandoned for want of horses, on the immediate field of conflict.

3 Pollard, in his “Southern History,” says:

Our effective force of all arms ready for action on the field, on the eventful morning, was less than 30,000 men.

This was before the arrival of that portion of Johnston's army led to the field by Kirby Smith, and afterward commanded by Elzey, or the brigade of Early — to say nothing of the reenforcements that were received during the day from the direction of Richmond.