Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865

[95] Cooper, on the following day, telegraphed, saying that General Johnston had not been heard from, and that, if the enemy had abandoned an immediate attack, and General Johnston had not yet moved, he (General Beauregard) had better withdraw his call on him, as the enemy was advised, at Washington, of the projected movement of Generals Johnston and Holmes, and might vary his plans in consequence.¹

How can this telegram be made to tally with the following passage, taken from Mr. Davis's book? ‘As soon as I became satisfied that Manassas was the objective point of the enemy's movement, I wrote to General Johnston, urging him to make preparations for a junction with General Beauregard,’ etc.² Was he no longer ‘satisfied,’ on the 19th of July, that Manassas was the enemy's objective point? If he was not—as we are inclined to believe is the case—the fact clearly shows how little he knew of the movements of the enemy, at that time; if he was, why was he bent upon reconsidering his action of July 17th, as shown by his telegram of that day, to General Johnston?

General Beauregard was too far-seeing, and had made too many fruitless attempts to force the concentration which was, at last, to be granted him, to be willing, of his own accord, to countermand the long-delayed order—contingent though it was—forwarded to General Johnston. He declined to act upon General Cooper's strange suggestion. Two days later he covered the Southern arms with glory, and won for himself the proud and immortal title of ‘Hero of Manassas.’