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[32]
and that it would be ridiculous that he should be unwilling to take an oath in
cases where he demands that the dicasts should take one.
Now, since we have shown how we must deal with each case individually, it is
clear how we must deal with them when taken two and two; for instance, if we
wish to take the oath but not to tender it, to tender it but not to take it, to
accept and tender it, or to do neither the one nor the other.
For such cases, and similarly the arguments, must be a combination of those already mentioned. And if we have already taken an oath which contradicts the present one, we may argue that it is not perjury; for whereas wrongdoing is voluntary, and perjury is wrongdoing, what is done in error or under compulsion is involuntary.
For such cases, and similarly the arguments, must be a combination of those already mentioned. And if we have already taken an oath which contradicts the present one, we may argue that it is not perjury; for whereas wrongdoing is voluntary, and perjury is wrongdoing, what is done in error or under compulsion is involuntary.
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