The frame of
mind in which men feel emulation, what things and persons give rise to it, will
be clear from the following considerations. Let us assume that emulation is a
feeling of pain at the evident presence of highly valued goods, which are
possible for us to obtain, in the possession of those who naturally resemble
us—pain not due to the fact that another possesses them, but to the
fact that we ourselves do not. Emulation therefore is virtuous and
characteristic of virtuous men, whereas envy is base and characteristic of base
men; for the one, owing to emulation, fits himself to obtain such goods, while
the object of the other, owing to envy, is to prevent his neighbor possessing
them.
Necessarily, then, those
are emulous who hold that they have a claim to goods that they do not
possess;1 for no one claims what seems impossible.
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1 Something like “although they are within their grasp” is needed to complete the sense.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, translated by J. H. Freese. Aristotle. Cambridge and London. Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd. 1926.
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