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[13]
As for enthymemes derived from examples,
they may be refuted in the same manner as probabilities. For if we have a single
fact that contradicts the opponent's example, the argument is refuted as not
being necessary, even though examples, more in number and of more common
occurrence, are otherwise1; but if the majority and greater frequency
of examples is on the side of the opponent, we must contend either that the
present example is not similar to those cited by him, or that the thing did not
take place in the same way, or that there is some difference.
1 On the other side, in the opponent's favor.
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