[3]
It would seem that envy also is similarly opposed to pity, as being
akin to or identical with indignation, although it is really different; envy
also is indeed a disturbing pain and directed against good fortune, but not that
of one who does not deserve it, but of one who is our equal and
like. Now, all who feel envy and indignation must have this in
common, that they are disturbed, not because they think that any harm will
happen to themselves, but on account of their neighbor; for it will cease to be
indignation and envy, but will be fear, if the pain and disturbance arise from
the idea that harm may come to themselves from another's good fortune.
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Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, translated by J. H. Freese. Aristotle. Cambridge and London. Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd. 1926.
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