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[14]
But since few of the propositions of the
rhetorical syllogism are necessary, for most of the things which we judge and
examine can be other than they are, human actions, which are the subject of our
deliberation and examination, being all of such a character and, generally
speaking, none of them necessary; since, further, facts which only generally
happen or are merely possible can only be demonstrated by other facts of the
same kind, and necessary facts by necessary propositions （and that this
is so is clear from the Analytics1）, it is evident that the materials
from which enthymemes are derived will be sometimes necessary, but for the most
part only generally true; and these materials being probabilities and signs, it
follows that these two elements must correspond to these two kinds of
propositions, each to each.2
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, translated by J. H. Freese. Aristotle. Cambridge and London. Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd. 1926.
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