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[3]
For it makes a great difference with regard to
producing conviction—especially in demonstrative, and, next to this,
in forensic oratory—that the speaker should show himself to be
possessed of certain qualities and that his hearers should think that he is
disposed in a certain way towards them; and further, that they themselves should
be disposed in a certain way towards him.1
1 The instructions given for enthymematic or logical proof should suffice; but since the function of Rhetoric is to find the available means of persuasion and its end is a judgement; and since an appeal to the speaker's own character and to the passions of those who are to give the judgement is bound to carry great weight, the speaker must be provided with rules for ethical and “pathetic” （emotional） proofs. In Book 1.5 Aristotle mentions appeals to the emotions with disapproval, but this does not apply to all such appeals, but only to those which are likely to bias the judges unfairly （e.g. stirring up envy, hatred, a desire for revenge）.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, translated by J. H. Freese. Aristotle. Cambridge and London. Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd. 1926.
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