[
20]
Nor again must we in all matters alike demand an explanation of the reason why things are
what they are; in some cases it is enough if the fact that they are so is satisfactorily
established.
1 This is the case with
first principles; and the fact is the primary thing—it
is a first
principle.
[
21]
And principles are studied—some by
induction, others by perception, others by some form of habituation, and also others
otherwise
2;
[
22]
so we must endeavor to arrive at the principles of each kind in their
natural manner, and must also be careful to define them correctly,
[
23]
since they are of great importance for the subsequent course of the
enquiry. The beginning is admittedly more than half of the whole,
3 and throws light at once on many of the
questions under investigation.
8.
Accordingly we must examine our first principle
4 not only as a logical
conclusion deduced from certain premises but also in the light of the current opinions on
the subject. For if a proposition be true, all the facts harmonize with it, but if it is
false, it is quickly seen to be discordant with them.
[
2]
Now things good have been divided into three classes, external goods on the one hand, and
goods of the soul and of the body on the other
5; and of these three kinds of goods, those of the soul we commonly
pronounce good in the fullest sense and the highest degree. But it is our actions and the
soul's active exercise of its functions
6 that we posit (as being Happiness); hence so
far as this opinion goes—and it is of long standing, and generally accepted by
students of philosophy—it supports the correctness of our definition of
Happiness.
[
3]
It also shows it to be right in declaring the End to consist in certain actions or
activities, for thus the End is included among goods of the soul, and not among external goods.
7
[
4]
Again, our definition accords with the description of the happy man as one who
‘lives well’ or ‘does well’; for it has virtually
identified happiness with a form of good life or doing well.
8
[
5]
And moreover all the various characteristics that are looked for in happiness are found
to belong to the Good as we define it.
[
6]
Some people think
happiness is goodness or virtue, others prudence, others a form of wisdom; others again
say it is all of these things, or one of them, in combination with pleasure, or
accompanied by pleasure as an indispensable adjunct; another school include external
prosperity as a concomitant factor.
[
7]
Some of these views
have been held by many people and from ancient times, others by a few distinguished men,
and neither class is likely to be altogether mistaken; the probability is that their
beliefs are at least partly, or indeed mainly, correct.
[
8]
Now with those who pronounce happiness to be virtue, or some particular virtue, our
definition is in agreement; for ‘activity in conformity with virtue’
involves virtue.
[
9]
But no doubt it makes a great difference
whether we conceive the Supreme Good to depend on possessing virtue or on displaying
it—on disposition, or on the manifestation of a disposition in action. For a man
may possess the disposition without its producing any good result,