[6]
so they choose what is pleasant as good and shun pain as
evil.5.
If then whereas we wish for our end, the means to our end are matters of deliberation and
choice, it follows that actions dealing with these means are done by choice, and
voluntary. But the activities in which the virtues are exercised deal with means.
[2]
Therefore virtue also depends on ourselves. And so also
does vice. For where we are free to act we are also free to refrain from acting, and where
we are able to say No we are also able to say Yes; if therefore we are responsible for
doing a thing when to do it is right, we are also responsible for not doing it when not to
do it is wrong, and if we are responsible for rightly not doing a thing, we are also
responsible for wrongly doing it.
[3]
But if it is in our
power to do and to refrain from doing right and wrong, and if, as we saw,1 being good or bad is doing right or wrong, it
consequently depends on us whether we are virtuous or vicious.
[4]
To say that “
None would be vile, and none would not be blest
”2
seems to be half false, though half true: it is true that no one is unwilling to be
blessed, but not true that wickedness is involuntary;
[5]
or
else we must contradict what we just now3
asserted, and say that man is not the originator and begetter of his actions as he is of
his children.
[6]
But if it is manifest that a man is the
author of his own actions, and if we are unable to
trace our conduct back to many other origins than those within ourselves, then actions of
which the origins are within us, themselves depend upon us, and are voluntary.
[7]
This conclusion seems to be attested both by men's behavior in private life and by the
practice of lawgivers; for they punish and exact redress from those who do evil
(except when it is done under compulsion, or through ignorance for which the
agent himself is not responsible), and honor those who do noble deeds, in order
to encourage the one sort and to repress the other; but nobody tries to encourage us to do
things that do not depend upon ourselves and are not voluntary, since it is no good our
being persuaded not to feel heat or pain or hunger or the like, because we shall feel them
all the same.
[8]
Indeed the fact that an offence was committed in ignorance is itself made a ground for
punishment, in cases where the offender is held to be responsible for his ignorance; for
instance, the penalty is doubled if the offender was drunk,4 because the origin of the offence was in the man himself, as he might
have avoided getting drunk, which was the cause of his not knowing what he was doing. Also
men are punished for offences committed through ignorance of some provision of the law
which they ought to have known,
This text is part of:
Search the Perseus Catalog for:
View text chunked by:
- bekker page : bekker line
- book : chapter : section